- (1.) HEARD both sides.
(2.) THIS appeal is by the Management. The appellant challenges the decision of the learned Single Judge setting aside a notice of termination of an Award in terms of Section 19(6) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and issuing a direction which, according to the appellant, went against the prior binding direction issued by a Division Bench of this Court. The facts are not much in dispute. There was an Award in Reference No. 51 of 1990 dated 19.5.1992 which directed the Management to give employment as general mazdoors to 111 workmen within four months of publication of the Award. The Management challenged that Award in CWJC No. 3430 of 1992 (R). By judgment dated 17.1.1994, the Award was confirmed. The Court directed that the workmen who are entitled to the benefit of the Award be identified. This appeared to be for the reason that the Award mentioned only the names of the workmen and gave no other particulars, like the name of the father, age, address and so on. Being not satisfied with the dismissal of the writ petition, the Management filed a petition for special leave to appeal in the Supreme Court. That petition was subsequently withdrawn with liberty to seek a review of the judgment of the High Court. Subsequently, the Civil Review No. 59 of 1994 (R) was filed in this Court. On 28.8.1996, the Review Petition was disposed of. In paragraph 13 of that order, the Division Bench gave a specific direction regarding the identification of the beneficiaries of the Award. The Division Bench directed the Union to produce, within fifteen days of that judgment, the photographs of the workmen along with affidavits of each individual workman. The Management was to publish the photographs and details in the notice board inviting objections, if any. If no objection was received, the Management was, prima facie, to accept the photographs and affidavits produced by the Union and to re -employ those workmen. But the Management was given the liberty to take disciplinary action against those workmen who were found to be impersonating others and who are not genuinely covered by the Award. Thus, the Union was, more or less, given the privilege of identification of the workmen on production of their photographs with affidavits within the time fixed. The Management challenged that order in the Supreme Court. On 13.12.1996, the petition for Special Leave to Appeal, was dismissed. The Management thereafter filed a petition for modification of the order in the Supreme Court. On 31.12.1996 by Annexure -12 order, the Supreme Court retained the order dismissing the petition for Special Leave to Appeal, but added that the final word in the matter of identification would rest with the Management.
(3.) ALL this time, the Union did not produce the photographs and the affidavits as directed by the Division Bench in the order passed in Civil Review No. 59 of 1994. But 20 persons applied for employment claiming to be the beneficiaries of the Award. No affidavits were filed asserting that they were the persons concerned. The Management took the stand that the photographs were not routed through the Union and that they were not accompanied by affidavits as contemplated by the order in Civil Review No. 59 of 1994. Thereafter by letter dated 6/12.3.1998, the Management gave a notice to the Union under Section 19{6) of the Industrial Disputes Act, of the intention to terminate the Award on the expiry of the period of two months from that date in terms of Section 19 (3) of the Industrial Disputes Act. There was some correspondence based on the said notice. Ultimately, the Union filed an application in the Supreme Court praying for a modification of the earlier order and seeking a direction to be issued to the Deputy Commissioner to decide on the question of identification of the beneficiaries of the Award. By An -nexure -12 order dated 24.2.1994, the Supreme Court dismissed that application as misconceived. The Union filed CWJC No. 47 of 2000 in this Court on 20.1.2000 praying for a writ of certiorari to quash the communication issued by the Management intimating the Union that the Management had already terminated Award dated 19.5.1992 and for an appropriate direction calling upon the Management to implement the Award in question . The Union took the stand that the Management had no right to terminate the Award in terms of Section 19(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act and that the unilateral action of the Management was unsustainable and unjustified on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. The Union also argued, presumably based on Section 19(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act, that the Award of this nature could not be terminated by recourse to subsection (3) and (6) of Section 19 of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Management resisted the writ petition by submitting that the Union never complied with the direction contained in the order in Civil Review No. 59 of 1994 and hence there was no occasion for the Management to accept any workman as beneficiary of the Award, and it was in that situation, and after a considerable lapse of time, that the Management issued the impugned notice, Annexure -13 and that there was no reason to interfere with the direction of the Management. It was also submitted that in the light of the binding direction earlier issued by the Division Bench and affirmed by the Supreme Court, no relief could be granted to the Union on the facts and in the circumstances of the case.;