- (1.) HEARD learned counsel for the parties.
(2.) THE Award dated 17.07.2001 delivered by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal (No.2), Dhanbad in Reference No. 04 of 1992 is under challenge whereby the reference in question has been answered in favour of the workman by holding that the dependent son of Sri N. K. Banerjee, Overman, who retired on 07.06.1986 is entitled to employment under the management of M/s Bharat Coking Coal Limited -the petitioner herein. At the outset learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that very terms of reference indicate that the claim of employee was for appointment of dependent son on his retirement on 07.06.1986 in terms of circular of BCCL dated 22.06.1977 and the provisions of Clause 9.4.4. of National Coal Wage Agreement -III but in view of the mandate of Article -16 of the Constitution of India read with Article 13(2) and judgment of Supreme Court of India reported in AIR1987SC 1015 para 16 and 17 thereof, the said dispute and reference is not tenable rather contrary to the Part -III of the Constitution. The reference quoted here -in -below.: - "Whether the action of the management of Bhowra(N) OCP of M/s Bharat Coking Coal in denying employment to the dependent son of Shri N.K. Banerjee, Overman, who retired on 07.06.1986, in terms of Circular No. BCCL/PA -II/5/2/128/77/31457 -618 dated 22.06.1977 and para 9.4.4. of NCWA -III is justified? If not, to what relief is the workman entitled? 
(3.) THE question whether a dependent of an employee of an instrumentality or agency of the State itself is entitled to be given preference in the matter of public employment on the ground that his parent has been the employee is contrary to the fundamental right guaranteed under Article -16 of the Constitution of India as it amounts to making discrimination in the matter of public appointment on the ground of descent which is prohibited under Article 16 of the Constitution is squarely covered by the decision in the case of Yogender Pal Singh and Others Vs. Union of India and Others reported in AIR 1987 SC 1015 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India while dealing with contention in connection with the Recruitments Rules held as follows para -16 and 17 is quoted here -in -below: - "16. We should, however, point out at this stage a fundamental defect in the claim of the appellants, namely, that rule 12.14(3) of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934 which authorised the granting of preference in favour of sons and near relatives of persons serving in the police service became unconstitutional on the coming into force of the Constitution. Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 16 of the Constitution which are material for this case read thus: - "16.(1)There shall be equality of opportunity for a citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. (2) No citizen sha , on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them, be ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect of, any employment or office under the State.  17. While it may be permissible to appoint a person who is the son of a police officer who dies in service or who is incapacitated while rendering service in the Police Department, a provision which confers a preferential right to appointment on the children or wards or other relatives of the police officers either in service or retired merely because they happen to be the children or wards or other relatives of such police officers would be contrary to Article 16 of the Constitution. Opportunity to get into public service should be extended to a the citizens equally and should not be confined to any extent to the descendants or relatives of a person already in the service of the State or who has retired from the service. In Gazuila Dasaratha Ram Rao V. State of Andhra Pradesh (1961) 2 SCR 931 : (AIR 1961 SC 564) the question relating to the constitutional validity of section 6(1) of the Madras Hereditary Vi age Offices Act, 1895 (3 of 1895) came up for consideration before this Court. That section provided that where two or more villages or portions thereof were grouped together or amalgamated so as to form a single new vi age or where any vi age was divided into two or more villages all the vi age officers of the class defined in section 3, clause (1) of that Act in the villages or portions of the villages or village amalgamated or divided as aforesaid would cease to exist and the new offices which were created for the new village or vi ages should be filled up by the Collector by selecting the persons whom he considered best qualified from among the families of the last holders of the offices which had been abolished. This Court held that the said provision which required the Collector to fill up the said new offices by selecting persons from among the families of the last holders of the offices was opposed to Article 16 of the constitution. The Court observed in that connection at pages 940 -941 and 946 -947 (of SCR) : (at Pp. 569 -70 and 572 of AIR) thus : "Article 14 enshrines the fundamental right of equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. It is available to all, irrespective of whether the person claiming it is a citizen or not. Article 15 prohibits discrimination on some special grounds -religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. It is available to citizens only, but is not restricted to any employment or office under the State. Article 16, cl. (1), guarantees equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State; and cl. (2) prohibits discrimination on certain grounds in respect of any such employment or appointment. It would thus appear that Art. 14 guarantees the general right of equality; Arts. 15 and 16 are instances of the same right in favour of citizens in some special circumstances. Article 15 is more general than Art. 16, the latter being confined to matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. It is also worthy of note that Art. 15 does not mention 'descent' as one of the prohibited grounds of discrimination, whereas Art. 16 does. We do not see any reason why the full ambit of the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 16 in the matter of employment or appointment to any office under the State should be cut down by a reference to the provisions in Part XIV of the Constitution which relate to services or to provisions in the earlier Constitution Acts relating to the same subject . .... . .(pages 940 -941) (of SCR) : (at p. 569 -70 of AIR). There can be no doubt that S. 6(1) of the Act does embody a principle of discrimination on the ground of descent only. It says that in choosing the person to fill the new offices, the Collector shall select the persons whom he may consider the best qualified from among the families of the last holders of the offices which have been abolished. This, in our opinion, is discrimination on the ground of descent only and is in contravention of Art. 16(2) of the Constitution.  (pages 946 -947) (of SCR) : (at p. 572 of AIR).  ;