- (1.) The present interlocutory application has been preferred under Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for suspension of sentence, awarded to the appellant, who is original accused no. 2, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, F.T.CIII, Bokaro vide order dated 27th March, 2004 in Sessions Trial No. 394 of 1986 whereby, the appellant has been punished mainly for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.
(2.) Having heard counsel for both the sides and looking to the evidences on record, it appears that there is a prima facie case against the appellantaccused. As the criminal appeal is pending. we are not much analyzing the evidences on record, but, suffice it to say that: (i) Immediately is the F.I.R. and the appellant is named in F.I.R.. The incident has taken place on 18th April, 1986 at about 6.00 a.m. and on the same day, the F.I.R. has been lodged. (ii) The case of prosecution is based upon more than one eye witnesses, who are P.W.1, P.W.2 and P.W.3 and in their depositions they have narrated clearly the role played by the appellantaccused. (iii) Moreover, P.W.3, who is injured eye witness and whose injury certificate has already been proved by the medical evidence given by the doctor, we have no reason to disbelieve this injured eye witness, at this stage. (iv) The depositions given by the eyewitness are getting enough corroboration by the deposition given by Dr. Vinod Kumar (P.W.7), who has carried postmortem of the deceased.
(3.) As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid evidences on record, there is a prima facie case against the appellantaccused. Moreover, previously, twice the prayer for suspension of sentence awarded to the appellant was not allowed by this Court. This is the third attempt and there is change in circumstance whatsoever except passage of time after rejection of earlier prayer for suspension of sentence. Looking to these evidences on record, the gravity of the offence, quantum of punishment and the manner in which the appellantaccused has been involved in the offence as alleged by the prosecution, we are not inclined to suspend the sentence awarded to the appellant by the trial court. Hence, this I.A. is hereby dismissed.;