VIKRAMADITYA PRASAD, J. - (1.) AS in all these writ applications, the same question is sought to be determined, they have been heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment.
(2.) ALL the writ applications have been filed for quashing orders of the respondent No. 2, Annexure -10 series, and the order dated 8.12.1997 passed by the respondent No. 4 whereby and whereunder the petitioners have been discharged from service. In short compass, the case of the petitioner is that admittedly they were the workmen in the Diesel Engine Plaint of respondent No. 1 at Ranchi and there were certain Tripartite Settlement which was not being implemented by the respondents and for that, there were some labour disputes going on between, the workmen and the management -respondents. According to the petitioners, on 13.12.1995, there was some commotion in which the workmen had participated, but according to the respondents, this was not a simple commotion, rather it was a case of confinement of Senior Officials, pressuring them to tender resignation by the workmen etc. Then the petitioners were served with the charge sheet -cum - suspension order individually. Two Enquiring Officers were appointed, one of which was Ex -General Manager, Coal Authority of India and at that relevant time, he was a practicing advocate at High Court. Another enquiry officer, who was also a practicing advocate, was appointed for one of the writ petitioners, namely, Shri Ram Krishna Jha. According to the petitioners, appointments were against the rules of enquiry under the Certified Standing Orders (for short order) but according to the respondents, it was done so that there may not be any prejudice on the part of the enquiry officer and in the interest of the petitioners was it was not in violation of the provisions of the Clause 15(2) of the orders. The enquiry was challenged on the ground that the petitioners were not allowed to appoint practicing Advocates to defend that and the documents asked for by them were not. supplied, even after the preliminary enquiry has been conducted prior to the enquiry aforesaid. This contention was denied by the respondents. Then the enquiry was held and the copy of the enquiry report was provided to them and they filed representations against that to the discipli - nary authority. The disciplinary authority passed the order of discharge from service. The contention of the petitioners was that the authorities which had issued the charge -sheet -cum -suspension order was not competent to issue as they were not the employer of the petitioners and therefore, it was illegal and as such, the punishment ordered by the disciplinary authority was in violation of Clause 15(2) of the orders. Thereafter, it appears that the petitioner filed a writ application. The said writ application was disposed of with a direction that they should file appeals and the appellate authority should dispose of their appeals with four months. There was delay in passing the appellate order but the appellate authority confirmed the orders of the Disciplinary Authority. The order of discharge of the appellate authority has been challenged on the ground that the appellate authority has not applied its mind on the facts and circumstances of the case and it was improper exercise of jurisdiction. Then it appears that the petitioners approached the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Defence found that the punishment appeared to be harsh and therefore, it required review. But that order of the Ministry of Defence was not complied with by the Board of Directors on the ground that there was no provision for review of any order and in absence of any special order/direction by the Ministry of Defence, to that effect the advice of the Ministry of Defence was not binding upon them. The petitioners, thereafter filed these writ applications.
(3.) IT appears that when the matter was pending for hearing at the admission stage, it was brought to the notice of the Court that the petitioners had filed review and because of pendency of the writ applications, no decision was being taken on these. Therefore, by the order passed 1.9.1999 the Court save the following directions : - - "In the facts and circumstances, I adjourn the case for six weeks to enable the respondents -authorities to pass appropriate order on the review applications preferred by the petitioners. While passing such orders, they will take into consideration the quantum of punishment which, prima faice. appears to be disproportionate It is expected that they will taken some lenient view in the matter. The counsel for the petitioners, on instruction from them, stated that if the petitioners are reinstated to their original posts with continuity in service, they will not claim 75% of the back wages for the intervening period." It is apparent that the second portion of the aforesaid order with regard to the continuity of service, no claim being preferred for 75% of the back wages is not an order of the Court, rather it is submission made by the petitioners. The order of the Court was only that a lenient view be taken because the punishment appeared to be disproportionate.;