- (1.) The accident in question occurred on 6.4.1987, at a point of time when the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was in force. The claim application was filed on 15.11.1989, a point of time when the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 had come into force. Even though, Sub -section (3) of Section 110 -A of 1939 Act provided a limitation period of six months from the date of occurrence of accident for filing a claim petition, it also simultaneously provided that the Claims Tribunal should have the jurisdiction to entertain the application even after the period of six months, if it was satisfied that the applicant was prevented by a sufficient cause from making the application in time. Sub -section (3) of Section 110 -A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 is reproduced hereunder. This reads thus : - - "110 -A. Application for compensation. - -(3) No application for compensation under this section shall be entertained unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the accident : Provided that the Claims Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of six months if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevent by sufficient cause from making the application in time."
(2.) What is noticeable therefore is that the proviso did not contain any restriction on the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in extending the period of limitation or in condoning the delay for any period. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, even though, of course also provided for and prescribed the limitation period of six months and also contained a provision for condonation of delay, but this condonation provision was materially different (in the new Act) as compared to the old 1939 Act in as much as under the new Act a restriction was imposed that if the claim petition was filed more than one year after the date of occurrence of the accident the delay could not be condoned. This was contained in Sub -section (3) of Section 166 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Sub -section (3) reads thus : - - "166. Application for compensation. - -(3) No application for such compensation shall be entertained unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the accident : Provided that the Claims Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of six months but not later than twelve months, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time." That was the law applicable as on the date of filing of the claim application, i.e. on 15.11.1989.
(3.) In the case of Vinod Gurudas Raikar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors., reported in , their Lordships of the Supreme Court while considering the vital differences with respect to the applicability of Sub -section (3) of Section 110 -A of the 1939 Act and Sub -section (3) of Section 166 of the 1988 Act observed as under : - - "11. In the case before us the period of limitation for lodging the claim under the old as well as the new Act was same six months which expired three weeks after coming in force of the new Act. It was open to the appellant to file his claim within this period or even later by 22.7.1989 with a prayer to condone the delay. His right to claim compensation was not affected at all by the substitution of one Act with another. Since the period of limitation remained the same there was no question of the appellant being taken by surprise. So far the question of condonation of six months delay was concerned, there was no change in the position under the new Act. In this background the appellant's further default has to be considered. If in a given case the accident had taken place more than a year before the new Act coming in force and the claimant had actually filed his petition while the old Act was in force but after a period of one year, the position could be different. Having actually initiated the proceeding when the old Act covered the field a claimant could say that his right which had accrued on filing of the petition could not be taken away. The present case is different. The right of privilege to claim benefit of a provision for condonation of delay can be governed only by the law in force at the time of delay. Even the hope or expectation of getting the benefit of an enactment presupposes applicability of the enactment when the need arises to take its benefit. In the present case the occasion to take the benefit of the provision for condonation of delay in filing the claim arose only after repeal of the old law. Obviously the ground for condonation set up as 'sufficient cause' also relates to the time after the repeal. The benefit of the repealed law could not, therefore, be available simply because the cause of action for the claim arose before repeal. 'Sufficient cause' as a ground of condonation of delay in filing the claim is distinct from 'cause of action' for the claim itself. The question of condonation of delay must, therefore, be governed by the new law. We accordingly hold that the High Court was right in its view that the case was covered by the new Act, and delay for a longer period than six months could not be condoned. The appeal is dismissed, but in the circumstances, without costs.";