SHAILENDRA KUMAR JHA Vs. THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, D.A.V. PUBLIC-SCHOOL, BARIATU, RANCHI
LAWS(JHAR)-2011-7-122
HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND
Decided on July 26,2011

SHAILENDRA KUMAR JHA Appellant
VERSUS
The Regional Director, D.A.V. Public -School, Bariatu, Ranchi Respondents

JUDGEMENT

- (1.) Heard the counsel for the parties.
(2.) The petitioner was in employment and joined on 17.11.1991 in Parmar Vidyawati Surjeet Singh D.A.V. Public School, Jhumri Tilaiya. According to the petitioner, he was promoted to the post of Clerk. However, in the year 1993, a criminal case under Sections 408, 468, 477A, 379 IPC was registered against the petitioner and the petitioner's contention is that because of registration of criminal case and the petitioner's facing trial, the respondent employee did not allow the petitioner to join the duties. The petitioner was acquitted in the said criminal case on 21.8.2006. Then, the petitioner approached the Management seeking his reinstatement, but, the Management did not oblige the petitioner-appellant. Ultimately, the petitioner-appellant served the notice upon the respondent-Management on 5.11.2007, which was not responded by the respondent-Management. Then, the petitioner-appellant approached the Jharkhand Education Tribunal, who rejected the petitioner's O.A. on the ground of being barred by time under the provisions of Section 10(2) of the Jharkhand Education Tribunal Act, 2005. The petitioner- appellant preferred the writ petition being A.C. (S.B.) NO. 5 of 2009 to challenge the order of the Tribunal on the ground that the Tribunal could not have decided the objection of limitation as preliminary issue and then It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner that the bar as contained under sub-section (2) of Section 10 of the Act of 2005 has no application because this bar applies in the cases where any order passed by the Education Institution is challenged, and the petitioner's case is that no order was passed against him, but, he was denied to join (sic) duties and the Tribunal is vested with jurisdiction not' only to hear and decide the challenge to order passed, by Educational Institution but also vested with power to pass order to redress the grievance of employee of any Educational Institution where it is a case of inaction only for which no order is passed. The learned single Judge has rejected the respondent-Management's contention and held that even When no order has been passed by the Management, then also the O.A. can be filed by the employee of the Educational Institution. Hence, the Tribunal held that the petitioner-appellant preferred the application before the Tribunal after the expiry of the period as provided under subsection (2) of Section 10 of the Act of 2005 and that too, without filing any application for condoning the delay, therefore, it is barred by 'time and rejected the petitioner's application.
(3.) Learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner submitted that sub-section (2) of Section 10 of the Act of 2005 applies only in the cases where any "order" is passed and challenged, then the action can be initiated in the Tribunal within the period of six months from the date of passing of the order by an Educational Institution. It is submitted that so far the jurisdiction to entertain the petition is not limited to the case where the Educational Institution has passed the "order" but it is wide and any application by any aggrieved person with respect to his "grievance" against the Educational Institution is maintainable. This jurisdiction is given under Section 9 of the Act of 2005, which is wide, covering the "grievances" and not restricted for the challenge to any order passed by the Educational Institution. Therefore, so far the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to grant the relief to redress grievance of the employee, there is no limitation prescribed and the limitation has been made applicable to the cases where any "order" is passed by the Institution and challenged. Therefore, the bar of limitation has no application to the petitioner's case and the petitioner was not required to file any application for cordoning the delay. It is also submitted that when Section 10(2) has no application, at the most the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 can only be applied, providing that where the limitation is not provided for any application/ suit, then the period of limitation for application shall be three years, and therefore, the petitioner's application before the Tribunal was within the period of three years, and therefore, was within the period of limitation. In the alternate, it has been submitted that the petitioner may be permitted to file an application for condoning the delay if this Court comes to the conclusion that the petitioner's application should have been within the period of limitation as prescribed under sub-section (2) of the Section 10 of the Act of 2005.;


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