JUDGEMENT
-
(1.) The present writ petition has been preferred by the petitioner for getting compassionate appointment, because of the death of the father of the present petitioner, in the year, 1984.
(2.) Having heard learned Counsel for the petitioner and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, I see no reason to entertain this writ petition, mainly for the following facts and reasons:
(i) It is contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the father of the petitioner expired in the year, 1984, who was serving with the respondents;
(ii) Thereafter, the elder brother of the petitioner applied for compassionate appointment in the year, 1986, but, the elder brother of the petitioner also expired in the same hear. Thereafter, no application was preferred by anyone from the family of the petitioner.
(iii) It is also contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that thereafter, the mother of the present petitioner (widow of the deceased employee) filed an application in the year, 1992 for compassionate appointment of her second son, who is the present petitioner.
(iv) It is also contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that thereafter, no reply has been given by the respondents, though they are always contacting the respondents and, therefore, the respondents must appoint the present petitioner, on compassionate ground, because of the death of the father of the present petitioner.
This contention is not accepted by this Court, mainly for the reason of delay. Father of the present petitioner has expired in the year, 1984. Thereafter, for the present petitioner, an application was preferred in the year, 1992 and the writ petition has been filed in the year, 2008. Thus, after the death of the deceased-employee (father of the present petitioner), more than 20 years' period is over by now and thus, the very purpose of compassionate appointment, which is to support those family members, who are dependant upon the income of the deceased-employee, immediately after his death, is frustrated, as from the year, 1984, the family of the deceased-employee, including the present petitioner i.e. son of the deceased-employee, are getting their livelihood from some other sources of income.
(v) It has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sanjay Kumar v. State of Bihar and Ors. as, 2000 7 SCC 192, in paragraph No. 3 as under:
We are unable to agree with the submissions of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner. This Court has held in a number of cases that compassionate appointment is intended to enable the family of the deceased employee to tide over sudden crisis resulting due to death of the breadearner who had left the family in penury and without any .means of livelihood. In fact such a view has been expressed in the very decision cited by the petitioner in Director of Education v. Pushpendra Kumar. It is also significant to notice that on the date when the first application was made by the petitioner on 2-6-1988, the petitioner was a minor and was not eligible for appointment. This is conceded by the petitioner. There cannot be reservation of a vacancy till such time as the petitioner becomes a major after a number of hears, unless there are some specific provisions. The very basis of compassionate appointment is to see that the family gets immediate relief.
Similarly, it has been decided by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Bhagwan Singh as, 1995 6 SCC 476 as well as in the case of State of V.P. and Anr. v. Paras Nath as, 1998 2 SCC 412, that purpose of compassionate appointment to provide immediate relief to the dependents of deceased employee, will be frustrated, if a long time has been lapsed after death of deceased.
(3.) Thus, because of lapse of several years or quarter of century after the death of the deceased-employee, who has expired in the year, 1984, I see no reason to issue a writ of mandamus upon the respondents to appoint the petitioner on compassionate ground due to aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements. There is, therefore, no substance in this writ petition and hence, the same is hereby dismissed.;