VINOD KUMAR GUPTA,A.C.J. - (1.) THE suit of the plaintiff was based on the ground of default (sic) as contemplated under Section 11 (1) (d) of the Bihar Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 para 3 of the plaint contains a concise statement about the defendant allegedly committing default in payment of rent. It reads as under : - - '3. That, the defendant has duly paid the house rent upto July, 1994 and thereafter the defendant deliberately failed and neglected to pay the house rent in respect of the shop premises to the plaintiff since the month of August, 1994 and onwards inspite of repeated requests and demands.' If there was any doubt about the concise nature of averments regarding the defendant being a defaulter because of his having not paid any rent since August, 1994 para 4 of the plaint went on to aver as under : - - '4. That, the defendant has thus become a defaulter pure and simple in the matter of payment of house rent for more than two months and has thereby rendered himself liable to be evicted from the tenanted premises described in the Schedule below.' Admittedly and undoubtedly, the suit was based only on the ground of default and on no other ground.'
(2.) WHEN the suit was pending, the plaintiff came up with an amendment application and wanted insertion of thefollowing averment in para 10 of the plaint as originally filed : - - 'And cause of action also arose for eviction of defendant during the pendency of the suit for non -payment of monthly rent for more than 2 months, i.e., since the date of filing of the suit and receiving summons on 27.5.1996 by the defendant issued from the court lastly on 20.6.1996 when the defendant gave his appearance in the suit and thereafter day to day till the date he was ordered to deposit rent under Section 15 of the Act.' This amendment was allowed by the trial Judge vide order dated 21.8.1999. The application for review of the aforesaid order has been rejected by the trial Court, vide impugned order under challenge in this petition. The trial court was patently in error in allowing the amendment application of the plaintiff. By allowing the amendment application of the plaintiff, the trial court did not properly appreciate the contour of the default provision as contained in Clause (b) of Section 11 of 1982 Act. If a tenant committed default in payment of rent for two months and the suit is based on such default, that by itself is a good enough and sufficient ground, if the default is proved, for eviction of the tenant from the suit premises. Only one default is good enough for the plaintiff to get a decree of eviction against the defendant. More than one default of two months is neither required to be proved, nor does Section 11 (1) (b) contemplate plurality of defaults. Whether the tenant commits one default of two months or more than one defaults of two months each is, therefore wholly immaterial. Does it mean, therefore, that if a plaintiff files a suit based on a default and posterior to the filing of the suit, every subsequent default during the pendency of the suit, should give rise to a fresh cause of action, thus entitling the plaintiff to seek amendment of the suit as originally filed? The answer has to be an emphatically 'No' because defaults subsequent to the filing of the suit, if the suit is based on theground of default alone, are wholly irrelevant as far as progress of the suit is concerned. Not only that, if the plaintiff ever feels that after filing of the suit, the defendant is continuing in his defaults and is not paying rent, Section 15 of the Act is good enough for protection of the plaintiff for securing the rent, both arrears as well as current. When, therefore, recourse to Section 15 is permissible, either asking for amendment of the plaint on defaults posterior to the filing of the suit or permitting such an amendment may amount to absurdity in law, irrespective of the fact that whether it may or may not cause prejudice to the defendant. The trial Court, therefore, was wholly unjustified in allowing the amendment. Similarly, the order allowing the amendment being patently erroneous and totally in violation of the principle contained in Section 11 (1) (d) of the Act, the trial court should have considered the matter afresh in the Review Application and in the circumstances, by exercising its Review Power should have corrected the error that had crept in the original order dated 21st, August, 1999. To that extent, I have no hesitation in holding and saying that the order passed on the Review Application is also, therefore, patently erroneous.
(3.) FOR the reasons aforesaid, the revision application is allowed and the order impugned is set aside with all consequences.;