FINDLAY,J.C - (1.) THE facts of this case are clearly given in the judgments of the two lower Courts. The Subordinate Judge held that the compromise in question was not void for want of consideration or registration, but went off somewhat at a tangent and came to the conclusion that the parties to the compromise were labouring under a mistake of fact as to the plaintiff-appellant's rights. He accordingly held that the compromise was void and that the plaintiff's suit must succeed.
(2.) THE learned District Judge very properly pointed out that the finding of the first Court as to Madhorao having influenced the plaintiff into making a bargain disadvantageous to herself was, in the circumstances, an unjustified one. Confirming, as he did, the findings of the first Court on other points, the suit was necessarily dismissed. The plaintiff has now come up to this Court on second appeal. The main stand taken on the plaintiff's behalf has been that the compromise was void as being one of which registration was compulsory under Section 17(1)(b), Registration Act. The learned Dist. Judge, following the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Baldeo Singh v. Udal Singh A.I.R. 1921 All. 248, held that the compromise did not require registration. In this connexion I have been referred to the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Nirman Singh v. Rudra Partab Narain Singh A.I.R. 1926 P.C. 100. At p. 539 of the said volume, their Lordships remark as follows: The perusal by their Lordships of the judgment of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh leads their Lordships to think that its judgment is to a great degree based on the mischievous but persistent error that proceedings for the mutation of names are judicial proceedings in which the title to and the proprietary rights in immovable property are determined. They are nothing of the kind, as has been pointed out times innumerable by the Judicial Committee. They are much more in the nature of fiscal inquiries instituted in the interest of the State for the purpose of ascertaining which of the several claimants for the occupation of certain denominations of immovable property may be put into occupation of it with the greater confidence that the revenue for it will be paid.
(3.) THE said decision obviously to a large extent nullifies the reasoning of Piggot and Kanhaiya Lal, JJ., in Baldeo Singh v. Udal Singh A.I.R. 1921 All. 248 quoted above, but for my own part I do not regard the compromise in question in the present case as one which fell within the purview of Section 17(1)(b), Registration Act. It must be remembered that the compromise in question was merely with reference to the pending mutation proceeding. In that proceeding, Mt. Anjira Bai had applied for her name being entered in respect of the 4-annas village share. Mt. Annapurna Bai and Mt. Itha Bai applied on the contrary that their names should be entered. The compromise arrived at was that a annas 2 share should be mutuated in Mt. Anjira's name. Mt. Anjira Bai was to hold the share for her life and would maintain herself on it. She was to have no power to hypothecate or sell the share or any part of it and, further, her holding of the share was to be contingent on her continuing to be of a good character. In respect of the remaining annas 2 share, Mt. Annapurna Bai's and Mt. Itha Bai's names were to be entered and it was expressly stated and agreed upon by the parties that Mt. Laxmi Bai was to continue to be manageress of the annas 4 share. The arrangement thus was a purely mutual and family one for the enjoyment of the property. There was no limiting or extinguishing of anybody's fight and the document contains not a word which can be construed as meaning that Mt. Anjira Bai ever gave up her right in the property save in the case of unchastity. The contending parties' names were in effect mutated in respect of half the property, and Mt. Laxmi Bai was retained as manageress of the whole annas 4; of such a document, registration was, in my opinion, unnecessary.;