CHAUHAN, J. - (1.) INSTANT writ petition has been filed for quashing the land acquisition proceedings contained in Annexures 2 to 7 and further declaring that the land acquisition proceedings has elapsed by virtue of Sec. 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act' ).
(2.) THE facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that the respondents had published a notification under Sec. 4 of the Act on 30. 6. 1988 in respect of a large track of land measuring several thousand bighas. THE declaration under Sec. 6 of the Act was also made in respect of the same land vide notification dated 15. 3. 1989. Being aggrieved and dis-satisfied, the petitioner who owns about 4 bighas of land challenged the land acquisition proceedings by filing a writ petition (Annx. 8 ). THE said writ petition was allowed by judgment and order of this Court dated 7. 4. 1992 (Annx. 11 ). Being aggrieved and dis-satisfied, the respondents preferred D. B. Civil Special Appeal No. 23/94, which was allowed by the judgment and order dated 19. 04. 1996 (Annx. 13) and the case was remanded to be decided by the Single Judge, after giving an opportunity to file reply to the said appellants. The case was heard and the writ petition was dismissed vide judgment and order dated 24. 2. 1998 (Annx. 15 ). Being aggrieved and dis-satisfied, the petitioner preferred D. B. Civil Special Appeal No. 649/99. The same has been dismissed by the judgment and order dated 23. 7. 1999. The petitioner has now preferred this fresh petition taking ground that as declaration under Sec. 6 of the Act was made on 15. 3. 1989, the proceedings under the Act have elapsed after two years of the said date, by virtue of Sec. 11-A of the Act. As per submissions made by the petitioner, the proceedings of the acquisition elapsed after two years from the date of declaration under Sec. 6 of the Act, excluding the period of interim stay, which according to Mr. Gehlot has been only for about four months. Thus, by all means, the limitation provided under Sec. 11-A of the Act expired prior to the date of first judgment given by this Court on 7. 4. 1992. Had the petitioner raised this ground by making an amendment, perhaps there was no occasion for the Court to decide this controversy on other grounds. The petitioner did not raise this issue even before the appellate forum nor before the Single Judge when the case was decided after remand, nor in his appeal against said judgment and order, which has been dismissed on 23. 7. 1999. Whatever may be merits of the case, public policy demands not to entertain this petition. As similar issue has been considered by this Court in Uda Ram vs. Central State Farm & ors. , (1) and after placing reliance on large number of judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court, particularly, in Sarguja Transport Services vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal (2), Ashok Kumar vs. Delhi Development Authority (3) and Khacher Singh vs. State of U. P. , (4), this Court came to conclusion that the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure are not attracted in the writ jurisdiction but the principles enshrined can be made applicable as the public policy requires.
(3.) IN Commissioner of INcome-tax vs. T. P. Kumaran (5), and Union of INdia vs. Punni Lal (6), it has been held that the principles enshrined in Order 2 rule 2, CPC are applicable and if any argument was available to the petitioner and has not been taken in the earlier petition, the petitioner can not be permitted to agitate it, as he is estopped by application of the principle of constructive res judicata. In the instant case, the petitioner had sufficient opportunity to agitate the issue raised now but he has never raised. By application of principle of constructive res judicata he is not permitted to agitate it and keep the Court busy in resolving his dispute, in a manner he wants, as it would amount to sheer abuse of the process of court. This petition is, therefore, dismissed, as not maintainable. . ;