SHETHNA, J. - (1.) KULVEER Singh, grand son of late Sadhu Singh-present respondent no. 1 filed a suit against the present petitioner Jagraj Singh before the Court of Sub-Divisional Officer, Anoopgarh for declaration of his right and ejectment of the present petition from the land in question under Sections 53, 88 and 183 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (for short "the Act" ). He also filed an appli-cation for appointment of receiver under Section 212 of the Act. The Trial Court refused to appoint receiver but ordered the present petitioners for cash security of Rs. 800/-per bigha for crop every year till the final disposal of the suit. It was also ordered that on failure to deposit the said amount, the Tehsildar shall take over the possession as receiver from the present petitioner.
(2.) THE present petitioner aggrieved by that order of cash security of Rs. 800/-per bigha for crop every year filed an appeal before the Revenue Appellate Authority (for short "the RAA" ). THE RAA considered the fact that the petitioner came into possession of the land in question as per the will executed by Sadhu Singh grand father of the present respondent no. 1 and mutation was also effected in his name in the record of rights and the possession was also with him. Accordingly, the RAA modified the order passed by the Trial Court of cash security of Rs. 800/-per bigha for crop every year and ordered the petitioner to give security bonds instead of cash security. Thus, the appeal was partly allowed in favour of the petitioner to the aforesaid extent. THE impugned order dated 24. 12. 97 is at Annex. 1. Aggrieved by this order, the present respondent no. 1 filed a revision petition before the Board of Revenue. On 2. 1. 98, the Board of Revenue ex-parte stayed the operation of the judgment and order of RAA but later on, on an application filed by the petitioner, the Board of Revenue restored the order passed by the Trial Court by its order dated 1. 7. 98 (Annex. 2 ). This order has been challenged by the present petitioner by way of this petition which is filed only on 30. 9. 99 i. e. after a period of fourteen months. Learned counsel Mr. Shrimalee relying upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of The Managing Director (MIG) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. Balanagar, Hyderabad and another vs. Ajit Prasad Tarway, Manager (Purchase and Stones) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. Balanagar, Hyderabad (1) vehemently submitted that when the appellate authority had partly allowed the appeal of the present petitioner and modified the cash security into security bonds then it was not open for the Board of Revenue to exercise its revisional jurisdiction. He submitted that the appellate order passed by the RAA was within its jurisdiction and even if the RAA rightly or wrongly interfered with the order passed by the Trial Court then also it was not open to the Board of Revenue to interfere with the same in its revisional jurisdiction. He submitted that the revisional jurisdiction of the Board of Revenue under Section 230 of the Act is pari materia to Section 115 C. P. C. He, therefore, submitted that the impugned order passed by the Board of Revenue allowing the revision petition and setting aside the order passed by the RAA and restoring the order passed by the Trial Court be quashed and set aside. In Ajit Prasad's case (supra), the petitioner was serving in the defendant company. Certain charges were framed against him and pending the enquiry of those charges, he was placed under suspension. He challenged both the suspension order as well as departmental proceedings before the Trial Court by way of suit on the ground that the departmental enquiry was initiated against him on mali-cious grounds. In the suit, he applied for interim order staying his suspension as well as the departmental proceedings. The learned Trial Judge initially issued an ex-parte interim order in favour of the petitioner as prayed for. Later on the same was revoked after by-party hearing. It was challenged in appeal by the plaintiff and the Appellate Court modified the order of the Trial Court to the extent that the defen-dant was restrained from proceeding with the enquiry till the final decision in the suit but it sustained the order of Trial Court regarding suspension. This order passed by the Appellate Authority was challenged by both the plaintiff as well as the company before the High Court in revision under Sec. 115 C. P. C. The High Court accepted the revision petition of the plaintiff Ajeet Prasad and stayed the operation of the suspension order as well as proceeding in the inquiry and dismissed the revision petition filed by the defendant company. This order of the High Court was challenged by the defendant Company before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and on facts of that case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed in para 5 of its judgment that, "in our opinion the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the first appellate court. It is not the conclusion of the High Court that the first appellate court may be right or wrong; may be in accordance with law or may not be in accordance with law; but one thing is clear that it had jurisdiction to make that order. It is not the case that the first appellate court exercised its jurisdiction either illegally or with material irregularity. That being so, the High Court could not have invoked its jurisdiction under S. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. " Coming to the facts of this case, it may be stated that the respondent No. 1 Kulveer Singh is a grand son of late Sadhu Singh. The petitioner claimed to have come into possession of the disputed land on the basis of a will executed by late Sadhu Singh in his favour and as per that will, he also got mutation effected in the record of rights in his favour. The said will itself is challenged by the respondent No. 1 plaintiff on the ground that the present petitioner Jagraj Singh has no relation with his late grand father Late Sadhu Singh and by creating such forged will, he came into possession of that land. He, therefore, applied before the Trial Court in a suit for appointment of receiver under Section 212 of the Act. The Trial Court was of the opinion that the defendant-present petitioner was already in possession of the land then there is no question of appointing any receiver but it was of the opinion that having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, a cash security of Rs. 800/-per bigha for crop every year would be just and reasonable order, therefore, it passed such order and also made it clear that on failure to depo-sit the said amount, the Tehsildar shall take over the possession of the land from the defendant-present petitioner as the receiver. In my opinion, it was absolutely legal and just order. However, in appeal, the Appellate Authority considered the wholly irrelevant facts and modify the order passed by the Trial Court of cash security into security bonds. It is no doubt true that the Appellate Authority has power to interfere with interim order passed by the Trial Court but merely because it was inclined to take some different view that fact itself would not be sufficient for disturbing or modifying the order of the Trial Court when the Trial Court gave cogent reasons for passing the order of cash security. In my considered opinion, it was not at all open to the Appellate Authority to interfere with such order and converting the same to the order of security bond. Thus, on the facts of this case, it is clear that the Appellate Court exceeded in its jurisdiction in passing the impugned order at Annex. 1 and thereby committed jurisdictional error. Once the Revisional Court satisfied that the Appellate Court exceeded in its jurisdiction and committed jurisdictional error then certainly the Revisional Court was entitled to interfere with the same and in my opinion, the Board of Revenue rightly exercised its revisional jurisdiction.
(3.) THIS petition is labelled as a petition under Article 226 as well as 227 of the Constitution of India but strictly speaking it is a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. The scope of which is very narrow and limited. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohd Yunus vs. Mohd. Mustaqim (2) even if the Revisional Court committed error on law then also it is not open to the High Court to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction under Art. 227. In this case while allowing the revision, the Board of Revenue has neither committed jurisdictional error nor committed any error on law which calls for interference of this Court under Art. 227. Before parting, I must state that learned counsel Mr. Shrimali stated on the basis of his long standing experience of forty years at the Bar that the Trial Courts take atleast about twenty years in disposing of the suits, He therefore, submitted that the order passed by the Trial Court which is restored by the Revisional Court of giving cash security of Rs. 800/-per bigha means it will come to Rs. 16,000/-per bigha as it is 20 bighas of land in question and after 20 years, it would be Rs. 3,20,000/ -. This argument of Mr. Shrimali cuts both the ways. Mere security bond is not sufficient for the plaintiff. We have to also consider what will happen if the plaintiff succeeds in the suit after 20 years as stated by the learned counsel Mr. Shrimali at the bar. If the Trial Court thought it fit in his wisdom to pass this order of cash security then I am of the opinion that it took proper care and interest of both the parties while passing that order. If the present petitioner against whom the suit is filed for ejectment, if he earns from the land every year by taking crops then he has to deposit that amount as ordered by the Trial Court which is restored by the Board of Revenue in revision. In view of the above discussion, I am of the considered opinion that the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ajeet Prasad (supra) cited by learned counsel Mr. Shrimali has no relevance in this case. ;