SHETHNA, J. - (1.) THE petitioner -State of Rajasthan has challenged in this petition the impugned judgment and order dated 5. 10. 96 (Annex. 2) passed by the Board of Revenue dismissing its revision only on the ground of delay in filing the same late without going into the merits of the case.
(2.) LEARNED counsel Mr. Maheshwari appearing for the private respondents submitted that this Court dismissed identical writ petition no. 318/98 on 3. 2. 99 and relying upon the same judgment, identical group of petitions no. 730/98 and allied matters were also dismissed by this Court on 15. 2. 99. He submitted that this is also an identical matter, therefore, this petition be straightway dismissed in terms of the aforesaid judgment. However, Mr. R. K. Soni, Addl. Govt. Advocate appearing for the petitioner -State of Rajasthan submits that in the aforesaid two judgments, two judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court and one judgment of Single Bench of this Court were not considered. He submitted that if they were considered then this Court would not have taken that view. In support of his submission, he has relied upon two Supreme Court judgments in the case of State of Haryana vs. Chandra Mani & Ors. (1) and in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. vs. Harish Chandra & Ors. In the first case of Chandra Mani (supra), what were the facts of the case were not stated in the judgment. It appears from the judgment that there was delay of 109 days in filing the Letters Patent Appeal. What were the reasons for condoning the delay have also not been stated in the judgment. It is only stated by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment that, "we have perused the reasons given for the delay in filing the Letters Patent Appeal. " Considering the judgments of Privy Council as well as its several judgments, in Chandra Mani'a case (supra), the Apex Court held in that case, "considered from the perspective, it must be held that the delay of 109 days in this case has been explained and that it is a fit case for condonation of the delay. " The Hon'ble Supreme Court has also observed in para 10 of its judgment in Chandra Mani's case that, "it is notorious and common knowledge that delay in more than 60 per cent of the cases filed in this Court -be it private party or the State -are barred by limitation and this Court generally adopts, liberal approach in condonation of delay finding somewhat sufficient cause to decide the appeal on merits. " The Hon'ble Supreme Court further observed that, "when the State is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucra-tic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officer/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay -intentional or otherwise -is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. " In Harish Chandra's case, there was a delay of 480 days in preferring S. L. P. before the Supreme Court. In that case, the respondents (in S. L. P.) themselves ap-proached the High Court in the year 1990 making a grievance that they have not been appointed even though they were included in the select list of 1987 and 1987 list itself expired under the Rule on 4. 4. 98. Thus, there was a delay on the part of the respondent-original petitioners before the High Court in approaching the High Court after two or three years. Therefore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court overruled the objections regarding the delay. However, in para 7 of the judgment in Harish Chandra's case (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court clearly stated that, "it is undoubtedly true that the applicant seeking for condonation of delay is duty bound to explain the reasons for the delay but as has been held by this Court in several cases, the very manner in which the bureaucratic process moves,if the case deserves merit the Court should consider the question of condonation from that perspective. " In the case of Urban Improvement Trust vs. Poonam Chand (3), the learned Single Judge of this Court condoned the delay while observed that, "after getting information about the judgment and decree dated 12. 9. 94, the defendant-appellants applied for certified copies of judgment and decree of the learned trial Court with promptitude and filed the appeal along with application under Sec. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act supported with an affidavit on 5. 5. 95. "
(3.) ON merits, learned counsel Mr. Soni submitted that the value of each pro-perty was nearly Rs. 5 lakhs instead of that in the documents, the value is put only Rs. 1 lakh which is very less. This way, the State is put to a great loss. He submitted that the learned Collector was wholly wrong in rejecting the reference submitted before him. He submitted that under the circumstances, the Board of Revenue ought to have condoned the delay which is hardly six months in this case and then it should have decided the revision on merits. As against this, learned counsel Mr. Maheshwari appearing for the private respondents submitted that when this Court dismissed the identical writ petitions by the aforesaid judgments dated 3. 2. 99 and 15. 2. 99 respectively, then this petition should also be dismissed only on the ground of limitation without going into the merits of the case. In addition to the Supreme Court judgments relied upon by this Court in the aforesaid two judgments, Mr. Maheshwari has also relied upon the latest judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of P. K. Ramchandran vs. State of Kerala In that case, there was a delay of about 565 days and the reason given for condonation of delay was, "at that time the Advocate General's office was fed up with so many arbitration matters equally important to this case were pending consideration". The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that it can hardly be said to be a reasonable, satisfactory or even a proper explanation, therefore, the petition was dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court by observing that," Law of Limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribe and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. " It may be stated that in that case, there was an inordinate delay of 565 days which was condoned by the High Court by accepting the explanation offered by the State of Kerala before it that at that time the Advocate General's office was fed up by arbitrary matters pending consideration. It was challenged before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and it was held that the Court have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds and the High Court's judgment was set aside. ;