MATHUR, J. - (1.) THIS Special Appeal is directed against the order of the learned Single Judge dated 28. 10. 99 dismissing the writ petition in limine.
(2.) THE appellant-writ petitioner Dr. (Smt.) Pushpa Mehta, hereinafter referred-to as "the appellant" and second respondent Dr. (Mrs.) Shanta Dubey are Professors in the Department of Micro-biology. By order dated 24. 04. 1999, the appellant was transferred from Kota to Udaipur and second respondent Dr. (Mrs.) Shanta Dubey in her place from Udaipur to Kota. THE second respondent challenged the said order of transfer before the Rajasthan Civil Services Appellate Tribunal on the grounds viz; (i) that she is on the verge of retirement; (ii) that she is suffering from Cancer; (iii) that her husband expired on 13. 2. 98; and that her you-nger son is studying at Udaipur. THE Tribunal found that the policy of the Government has been that the employees, who are at the verge of retirement should not ordinarily be disturbed. THE Tribunal also found that there was no administrative reason to transfer Dr. Dubey from Udaipur to Kota except to accommodate Dr. Mehta. In view of the finding, the Tribunal set aside the order of transfer dated 24. 04. 1999, as far as it related to transfer of the appellant and second respondent. THE State did not choose to challenge the said order of the Tribunal dated 22. 10. 99. However, the order was challenged by Dr. (Mrs.) Pushpa Mehta by way of petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. THE learned Single Judge rejected the petition. It is contended by Mr. M. Mridul, learned Senior Advocate, that the learned Single Judge as well as the Tribunal have committed gross error in interfering with the order of transfer in absence of limited and available ground i. e. the order of tra-nsfer being in violation of the statutory transfer policy or is in violation of the fundamental rights or the order is malafide. Learned counsel in support of his contention has referred-to three decisions of the Apex Court viz; (i) State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. vs. Sri S. S. Kourav & Ors. (1), (ii) Mrs. Shilpi Bose vs. State of Bihar (2) and (iii) Union of India vs. S. L. Abbas The propositions of law laid down in all the three cases cannot be disputed. It is well settled that ordinarily, the Tribunals and the Courts are not to interfere with the order of transfer unless it is challenged on the ground of malafide or the transfer is effected for extraneous considerations than the administrative reasons. In the instant case, the second respondent is due to retire in January 2001 and the appellant has long to go in service. The Tribunal was of the view that policy of the Government has been that ordinarily, an employee at the verge of retirement, should not be disturbed. It appears that the State Government was also satisfied with the reasoning given by the Tribunal and, therefore, it did not prefer to challenge the said order. It is only the appellant, who is interested in posting at Udaipur, has preferred to challenge the order of the Tribunal. It may be noticed that in the opinion of the Tribunal, the order of transfer was malafide for the reason that it has been passed in order to only accommodate the appellant. This finding gets confirmation from the fact that the State Government has chosen not to challenge the order of the Tribunal. Thus, there appears to be no administrative reasons to trans-fer Dr. (Mrs.) Pushpa Mehta to Udaipur and to disturb Dr. (Mrs.) Shanta Dubey, who is at the verge of retirement. We are of the view that unless there are compelling reasons, ordinarily, an employee should not be disturbed from the place of his/her posting, when he/she is at the verge of retirement. An employee should be given sufficient time, which may be of two years or so to plan peacefully his/her post re-tirement life. This can be the legitimate expectation of an employee who has served the Department for major part of his/her life. In exceptional case, if the transfer in such case is felt necessary in the public interest, it must be kept in mind while giving the fresh posting that minimum inconvenience is caused to the concerned employee. Any transfer contrary to aforesaid principle will lead to interference that the order is malafide. We find no good reason to interfere with the order of the learned Single Judge. Consequently, the appeal is rejected in limine. .;