SHARMA, J. - (1.) THE defendant-appellant seeks to challenge the judgment and decree dated 23. 11. 98 of learned Additional District Judge No. 1, Sikar whereby the Civil Regular First Appeal preferred by defendant-appellant was dismissed and the judgment and decree dated 10. 10. 1994 of learned Additional Civil Judge (Lower Division) No. 1 Sikar passed in a suit for eviction was confirmed.
(2.) THE parties shall be referred herein after in the manner as they were arrayed in the suit. The brief resume of the case is that the plaintiff instituted a suit for ejectment in respect of the tenanted shop fully described in para No. 1 of the plaint on the ground of default in making payment of rent, sub-letting, reasonable and bo-nafide necessity and material alteration. The defendant in the written statement denied the allegations. On the basis of the pleadings of parties as many as nine issues were framed. The plaintiff examined 9 witnesses, whereas six witnesses were examined by the defendant. Learned trial court vide its judgment and decree dated 10. 10. 94 decided the issue No. 3 and 4 in favour of plaintiff and decreed the suit on the ground of reasonable and bonafide necessity holding that the plaintiff shall suffer comparative hardship if the decree in respect of tenanted shop is not passed. In so far as the other grounds for eviction are concerned the issues were decided against the plaintiff. The counter claim of defendant raised in written statement was also dismissed. The defendant preferred the civil regular first app-eal. But it was dismissed by the learned Appellate Court as indicated hereinabove. The defendant has now preferred the instant second appeal. Mr. B. L. Agrawal, learned counsel appearing for the defendant canvassed that the courts below have make out a new case while deciding the issue of reasonable and bonafide necessity. In para No. 14 of the plaint this fact was not pleaded that the tenanted shop was needed for installation of counter of hotel. It was also not averred that western shop adjacent to the disputed shop has got less accommodation on account of construction of stairs. In another suit the western shop was got vacated. But the pleadings of that suit was not properly considered by the courts below. It was also contended that the provisions of Section 14 (2) of Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, (for short `rent Act') in respect of partial eviction were not properly considered. In respect of alternative accommodation, I was taken through the various material. It was also argued that the application moved under Order 13 Rule 2 CPC was wrongly rejected by the trial court vide order dated 29. 7. 74. The objection was taken in civil regular first appeal, but it was not properly considered. The finding of issue No. 8 in respect of rent was also assailed. The reliance was placed on the judgment in case of Rahman Jeo Wangnoo vs. Ram Chand & others (1) and Riyaz Mohammad vs. Rameshwar On the other hand Mr. R. K. Agarwal, learned counsel appearing for plaintiff supported the judgments of the courts below and canvassed that concurrent find-ing of fact cannot be interfered with in second appeal. The reliance was placed on judgments in case of Dnyanoba Bhaurao Shemade vs. Maroti Bhaurao Marnor (3); Kondiba Dagadu Kadam vs. Savitribai Sopal Gujar & Ors. (4); Vidhyadhar vs. Mankikrao & Anr. (5), Navneethammal vs. Arjuna Chetty (6); Raj Kumar Khaitan and others vs. Bibi Zubaida Khatun and another (7); Mrs. Meenal Eknath Kshirsagar vs. M/s Traders & Agencies & Anr. (8); Raj Kumar & Anr. vs. Mehar Chand (9); and M/s Prem Tent House vs. Prakash Chand Jain I have pondered over the rival submissions and carefully scanned the material on record. In Dnyanoba Bhaurao Shemade (supra) their lordships of Supreme Court have propounded that concurrent finding of fact based on record cannot be interfered with by the High Court in second appeal. Therefore, the concurrent finding of the courts below in respect of reasonable and bonafide nece-ssity and comparative hardship which require reconsideration of facts needs no interference. Both the Courts below have properly appreciated the evidence and decided the issue in respect of reasonable and bonafide necessity and comparative hardship in favour of the plaintiff. I am unable to persuade myself to agree with the submissions advanced before me by learned counsel for the defendant.
(3.) SECTION 14 (2) of the Rent Act mandates the court to consider whether the eviction of tenant from part of premises is to be ordered so as to substantially satisfy reasonable requirement of landlord. Undoubtedly, even in the absence of specific pleading, the court has to act in compliance of the mandate and give a finding. This is what their lordships of Supreme Court have propounded in the case of Rahmand Jeo Wangnoo (supra ). In the instant case the plaintiff instituted the suit in respect of one shop and it was required for the purpose of running hotel along with other rooms. The requirement was properly considered on the basis of pleadings of parties by both the courts below. A careful perusal of the material on record reveals that entire shop is reasonably and bonafidely needed by the plaintiff for the purpose of ingress and installation of the counter. It is well settled law that the landlord is the best Judge of his requirement and if landlord desires to benifically enjoy his own property, his requirement cannot be termed as unreasonable. In view of the requirement of plaintiff as indicated hereinabove, I am of the view that non giving of any finding by the courts below, on the question of partial eviction, does not affect the root of the matter as in the facts and circumstances of the case the partial eviction is not possible. Both the courts below undoubtedly have not examined the mandate of Section 14 (2) of the Rent Act, but I have closely scrutinized the material on record in view of the mandate of Section 14 (2) of the Rent Act and in my consi-dered opinion the partial eviction of tenant is not possible in the facts of this case. In case of Raj Kumar & Another (supra) this court had occasion to examine the section 14 (2) of the Rent Act in the similar circumstances and it was held that where the things are so apparent that partial eviction is not possible, non giving of any finding by the courts below does not affect the decision. I am satisfied that no substantial question of law arises in the instant seco-nd appeal. I do not see any infirmity in the concurrent finding of the fact arrived at by both the courts below. The appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed. Cost easy. ;