SHETHNA, J. - (1.) ALL these petitions are disposed of by this common order as common question of law is involved in these petitions.
(2.) ALL the petitioners were appointed on the post of Junior Engineer (Civil) by the Secretary Local Self Government Department, State of Rajasthan, purely on temporary basis for a period of six months. However, without any fresh order of extending their services or issuing fresh orders of appointment, they were continued in service even after expiry of the period of six months. However, on 24. 8. 1999, the State Government took a decision to terminate the services of the Junior Engineers appointed in the Municipal Board and accordingly, their services were terminated by the impugned common order dated 24. 8. 99 (Annexure-2 ). This has been challenged by all the petitioners by way of these petitions before this Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. At the out-set, it may be submitted that learned counsel Shri Bagri submitted that other juniors whose services have also been terminated by a common order dated 24. 8. 99, some of them challenged the same by way of separate writ petitions before this Court, wherein the learned Single Judge of this Court ordered to issue notices. He, therefore, submitted that this Court should also issue notices to the respondents. In my considered opinion, mere issuance of notice in identical matters cannot be said to be a precedent and this Court is not bound to entertain these petitions and issue notices when this Court is fully convinced that there is no case whatsoever in favour of the petitioners to get any relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Then, on merits, it was vehemently submitted by the learned counsel Shri Bagri that against clear vacancies of Junior Engineers in the Municipal Board the appointments were made initially for a period of six months, but after expiry of that period of six months their services were not terminated and they were allowed to continue till the passing of the impugned order dated 24. 8. 99 when the vacancies still exist. He, therefore, submitted that the impugned order be quashed and set-aside. The law on this point is very well settled. Any temporary adhoc appointment for a fixed period would not confer any right to the persons who are appointed purely on temporary and ad hoc basis for a fixed period. Merely because the services of the petitioners were not terminated after a period of six months and without any fresh order of appointment or any order extending their services, if they were allowed to continue in service for a period of few months more, then it cannot be said that they were entitled to be continued and their services could not have been terminated in this manner. Unless and until there is any order either confirming them on the post or specifically extending their services for a particular period then only their services could not have been terminated, otherwise, it was always open to the Government to terminate their services at any time after expiry of the period of six months. Hence, this submission of Mr. Bagri is rejected. Mr. Bagri then submitted that one of the conditions of the appointment order was that one month notice was required to be given before terminating the services of the petitioners and in this case no such notice was given, therefore, the impugned common order of termination is illegal and liable to be set aside. This submission of Mr. Bagri has no substance. If the services of the petitioners were terminated within six months from the date of their appointments, then it was incumbent upon the State Government to issue atleast one months' notice to them. However, once that period of six months expired, then the respondents were not required to serve one month notice before terminating the services of the petitioners. Except aforesaid contentions, no other contention was raised.
(3.) IN view of the above discussions, I do not find any substance or merit in these petitions. Accordingly, the petitions are dismissed. .;