YAMIN, J. - (1.) IN this revision an important question has arisen before me for determination. But it is necessary to narrate some salient features of the case.
(2.) PETITIONER Lissu Ram alias Laxman Singh is facing trial before Special Judge, CBI Cases, Jodhpur for offences under Sections 467, 468, 471, 419, 420 IPC and Section 5 (2)/13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Challan was filed on 29. 10. 1991. Charges were framed on 1. 8. 1994. After framing of charges, Public Prosecutor incharge of the case took number of adjournments for filing additional/supplementary charge sheet etc. but did not file it till 18. 3. 1996. Court fixed the date for prosecution evidence and 16. 4. 1996 PW-1 on Chandra Shekhar and PW-2 Ram Swaroop were examined. Cross examination of Ram Swaroop was reserved as he wanted to locate some record but his examination in chief was completed. Cross examination was reserved on cost of Rs. 700/ -. This order was challenged before the High Court. High Court summoned file which remained pending from 20. 9. 1996 to 4. 6. 1998. When file went back, the examination of pro- secution witnesses restarted. On 7. 8. 1998 statement of Ram Swaroop was completed. On that date no other witness was present. Many dates thereafter were fixed and on some dates witnesses were examined. These dates are available on page No. 3 of the petition. Then on 15. 4. 1999 learned PP moved an application for taking up the case day to day and court fixed dates beginning from 26. 4. 1999 to 31. 5. 1999. On 26. 4. 1999 statement of one witness was started but it remained incomplete for want of time. The petitioner contested in the lower court that in view of Supreme Court judgment rendered in Raj Deo Sharma vs. State of Bihar (1), the evidence of the prosecution should be closed but the learned Judge rejected this request. Hence this revision against the order. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as learned standing counsel for CBI. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that Raj Deo Sharma's case (supra) is a case which takes care of delays. He submitted that in the case in hand when charges were framed against the petitioner on 1. 8. 1994 the prosecution evidence should have been completed within three years. He also submitted that even if the period for which file remained pending before the High Court (though there was no stay) is excluded, the period of three years has already expired and the learned Judge should have closed the evidence. On the other hand, learned counsel for the CBI submitted that Raj Deo Sharma's case (supra) does not give blanket powers to court to close evidence in every case. He submitted that the judgment of the Supreme Court is to be read with other judgments of the Supreme Court. He submitted that the directions given in Raj Deo Sharma's case (supra) are subject to Abdul Rehman Antulay and others vs. R. S. Nayak and another He also submitted that the directions given in para No. 16 of Raj Deo Sharma's case (supra) are also subject to and in addition to and without prejudice to the directions issued by the Apex Court in "common Cause" A Registered Society through its Director vs. Union of India & Ors. (3) as modified by the same Bench through the order reported in "common Cause" A Registered Society vs. Union of India & Ors. (4), (JT 1996 (4) SC page 701) (supra) lays down that the directions (1) and (2) given in the judgment shall not apply to cases of offences involving corruption, misappropriation of public funds, cheating, whether under the Indian Penal Code, Prevention of Corruption Act or any other statute, besides other serious offences under different Acts.
(3.) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner, when his attention was drawn to these exceptions, submitted that very purpose of Raj Deo Sharma's case (supra) will be defeated if the judgment is read that it excludes offences under Prevention of Corruption Act. I do not agree with this contention for the simple reason that Raj Deo sharma's case (supra) itself says that the directions given in it will be in addi- tion to and without prejudice to the directions issued in "common Cause" A Registered Society vs. Union of India (supra) and modified by same Bench through the order reported in "common Cause" a Registered Society vs. Union of India (supra ). Such a question recently came before a Division Bench of Bombay High Court in Shri I. P. Shankaran vs. Dy. Superintendent of Police, Central Bureau of Investigation, Bombay & Ors. (5), in which it was observed that the approach of the Apex Court in Antuley's case dealing with offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act shows that it would be manifestly contrary to public interest to allow persons facing trial under the said Act to be discharged or acquitted merely on the ground of delay which is unfortunately inherent in our legal system. In the case in hand before me the petitioner is not complaining of any dilatory tactics adopted by the prosecution. He is complaining of systematic delay. Bombay High Court taking into account the ratio of the decisions mentioned in the said judgment held that the short of closing prosecution evidence and/or quashing the prosecution case, what is contemplated by the Apex Court in Antuley's case as was done in that case is to give a direction for speedy disposal of the trial on day to day basis. The case in hand relates to the Prevention of Corruption Act to which ration of the decision in Raj Deo Sharma's case (supra) will not be applicable as the Raj Deo Sharma's case (supra) has to be read together as one in addition to "common Cause" vs. Union of India (supra) modified in "common Cause" vs. Union of India (supra) but not a substitute for the other. So cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act, misappropriation of public funds, cheating whether under the Indian Penal Code or Prevention of Corruption Act or any other statute or cases mentioned in "common Cause" vs. Union of India (supra) remained un- affected by cumulative effect of the judgments in "common Cause" vs. Union of India's case (supra) and Raj Deo Sharma's case (supra ). The contention of the learned counsel that in Raj Deo Sharma's case (supra) itself the case related to Prevention of Corruption Act. But it is evident from para No. 17 of this judgment that the Apex Court only set aside the order passed by the High Court and directed the Special Judge, CBI, Bihar to pass appropriate order in the case. There is no direction for closing prosecution evidence on expiry of the period of two /three years because it is made clear in para No. 16 itself that the directions given were to supplement the propositions of law laid down earlier in Antuley's case. ;