KOKJE, J. - (1.) THE petitioner is a member of Municipal Board, Mandalgarh District Bhilwara having been elected to the Office in the month of August, 1995. On 12. 4. 99, the Department of Local Self Govt. , Rajasthan issued notices to the petitioner and four other members of the Board calling upon them to show cause as to why they should not be disqualified from the membership of the Board on the ground of remaining absent for three consecutive meetings of the Board. THE petitioner filed reply to this notice and gave reasons for his absence. THEreafter by the impugned order dated 29. 9. 99 the petitioner was suspended in exercise of powers under Section 63 (4) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 (hereinafter to be referred as the Act ).
(2.) THE petitioner challenged the impugned order of his suspension on the ground of constitutional invalidity of Section 63 (4) of the Act as well as on merits. Because the petitioner has sought relief of declaration of Section 63 (4) of the Act to be ultravires the Constitution, this case has come up before the Division Bench. We have heard the learned counsel for the question of Constitutional va-lidity of Section 63 (4) of the Act. When it was pointed out to the learned counsel that Constitutional validity of Section 63 (4) of the Act has already been upheld in Jaan Mohd. vs. State (1), the learned counsel contended that, that case was decided prior to the amendment of the Constitution inserting part IX. A containing Articles 243 (U), Article 243 (V) and Article 243 (Z) (F ). According to the learned counsel, by virtue of Article 243 (ZF), any law relating to Municipalities in force in a State immediately before commencement of the Constitution (Seventy-fourth Amendment) Act, 1992 which was inconsistent with the provision of Part IX-A of the Constitution, could not continue beyond one year of the commencement of the Seventy-fourth Amendment. According to the learned counsel Section 63 (4) of the Act is inconsistent with the provisions of Part IX-A of the Constitution in as much as it runs counter to Article 243 (U) and Article 243 (V) of the Constitution. We have heard the learned counsel at length. A bare perusal of Article 243 (U) and Article 243 (V) shows that the provisions have nothing to do with suspension of a member of a Municipal Board. Article 243 (U) provides that every Municipality unless sooner dissolved under any law for the time being in force, shall continue for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer. This Article confines itself to duration of Municipalities and ensures a certain term for the Municipalities. It provides safeguards against summary dissolution and perpetuation of elected bodies by stalling elections. There is nothing in Art. 243 (U) which has even remote connection with suspension of an individual member of the Board. The question of any inconsistency between Section 63 (4) of the Act and Article 243 (U) of the Constitution, therefore, does not arise. Similarly, Article 243 (V) of the Constitution relates to disqualification from membership. It provides that the person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of a Municipality, if he is so disqualified by or under any law for the time being in force for the purposes of elections to the Legislature of the State concerned or if he is so disqualified by or under any law made by the Legislature of the State. It also provides that if any question arises as to whether a member of a Municipality has become subject to any of the disqualifications men-tioned in Clause (1), the question shall be referred for the decision of such authority and in such manner as the Legislature of a State may, by law, provide. This Article also applies only to disqualification and not to suspension. It is true that the notice issued to the petitioner mentions that by remaining absent for three consecutive meetings of the Municipal Board, the petitioner has incurred disqualification under Section 63 (1) (A) of the Act. But ultimately no order as to disqualification has been passed as yet and instead the petitioner has been suspended. It cannot be said that Section 63 (4) which deals with suspension of a member of the Municipal Board runs counter to Article 243 (V) of the Constitution. In the aforesaid circumstances, it cannot be said that Section 63 (4) of the Act is ultravires the Constitution. We are not expressing any opinion on the merits of the case because after holding that the challenge to vires of Section 63 (4) of the Act does not subsist, it would be just and proper for us to send the matter to appropriate Single Bench for decision on merits. The petition shall now be listed before appropriate Single Bench. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the matter is urgent as the term of the Municipal Board itself is about to expire. We therefore direct that the case be listed before appropriate Single Bench on 25th of November, 1999. . ;