- (1.) HON'ble YAMIN, J. - This revision petition has been preferred against the order of learned Special Judge, Anti Corruption Cases, Jodhpur against his order dated 3. 4. 1999.
(2.) ACCUSED petitioner is facing trial before learned Special Judge under Sections 7, 13 (1) (d) of Prevention of Corruption Act for an incident which happen- ed on 21. 7. 1989. Charge was framed and read over to the accused on 13. 8. 1993. No prosecution witness was examined till 3. 4. 1999. On that date four witnesses were examined. ACCUSED petitioner moved an application that in view of judgment of Raj Deo Sharma vs. State of Bihar (1), the prosecution evidence should be closed. The court examined four witnesses saying that since the Presiding Officer was on leave on 19. 12. 1998 and witnesses were present, therefore, the evidence should not be closed. Even on that date evidence was not closed though no witness was present. The grievance of the petitioner is that evidence of Srikishan and Ramgopal should have been closed as they were not present on 3. 4. 1999. But the Special Judge passed order that these witnesses were present on 19. 12. 1998 when Presiding Officer was on leave, and the prosecution could not be held responsible for withholding these witnesses and as such he allowed to issue warrants against both of them. He did close evidence of all other witnesses. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in view of Raj Deo Sharma's case (supra) learned Special Judge should have closed evidence of these two witnesses and should not have issued warrants for their presence on 20. 4. 1999. On the other hand learned Public Prosecutor supported the order of learned Special Judge submitting that Raj Deo Sharma's case (supra) is a case in which it has been said that it is subject to the guidelines laid down in A. R. Antulay and others vs. R. S. Nayak and another (2) and it has been observed in para No. 13 of Raj Dev Sharma's case (supra) that legal position adumbrated by Supreme Court in A. R. Antuley's case that right to speedy trials flows from Article 21 and it encompasses the stages right from the date of registration of the FIR and onwards remains unaltered. In A. R. Antuley's case (supra) the Supreme Court observed that while determining whether undue delay has occurred one must have regard to all the attendant circumstances including nature of offence, number of accused and witnesses, the work-load of the court concerned, prevailing local conditions and so on what is called, the systematic delays and each and every delay does not necessarily prejudice the accused.
(3.) THIS Court in Lissu Ram vs. Union of India (S. B. Cr. Revision Petition No. 282/1999, decided o n May 10, 1999) has held that Raj Deo Sharma's case (supra) would not be applicable to the cases in which an accused faces trial under the Prevention of Corruption Act. In "common Cause" A Registered Society through its Director vs. Union of India & Ors. (JT 1996 (4) SC page 701), decided on 1. 5. 1996. cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act are excluded from the directions given in the said judgment. Raj Deo Sharma's case (supra) should be read together as one is in addition to the other but not a substitute. So even after Raj Deo Sharma's case (su- pra) the provision of closing the evidence which is due to systematic delay will not be applicable to the present case. Consequently, there is no force in this revision and it is hereby dismissed. .;