SHARMA, J. - (1.) SINCE question of facts and law involve in both these writ petitions are identical in nature, they were heard analogously and are being disposed of by this common order.
(2.) THE services of both these petitioners were terminated by the respondent No. 2 Nehru Shiksha Bharti Samiti, Bharatpur and the legality of termination order has been called in question by them in the instant writ petitions. Preliminary objections were raised by the learned counsel for the respondents in respect of maintainability of writ petitions. It was contended that Nehru Shiksha Bharti is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act and was established with an object to impart education and has been running various insti-tutions and receiving aid from the Government to the tune of 50%. The Society is neither State nor its instrumentality in terms of Art. 12 of the Constitution of India hence not amenable to the writ jurisdiction. It was further contended that the Rajas-than Non-Government Educational Institutions Act, 1989 (in short the Act of 1989) was enacted to provide for better organisation and development of education in the non-Government Education Institutions in the State of Rajasthan and in exercise of the powers conferred under the Act of 1989 the Rajasthan Non-Government Edu-cational Institutions Tribunal (in short `the Tribunal') was established. The Tribunal has been empowered to entertain application in respect of dispute between the Management of a recognised institution and any of its employee with respect to the conditions of service. Sec. 21 of the Act of 1989 provides that any matters pending immediately before the commencement of the Act of 1989 be transferred to the Tribunal for its decision. It was also contended that the petitioners could avail the alternative remedy as provided in the Rules for payment of grant in aid to Non-government, Cultural and Physical Education Institution of Rajasthan, 1989. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner urged that the respondent No. 2 is an authority u/art. 12 of the Constitution amenable to writ jurisdiction. In respect of the Act of 1989 it was contended by the learned counsel that no purpose shall be served in sending the matters to the Tribunal, as already observed in another matter. It has no jurisdiction in respect of the matters pending immediately before the commencement of the Act of 1989 before the High Court. I now proceed to deal with the arguments advanced before me in respect of the Act of 1989. The Act of 1989 has been enacted to provide for better organisation and development of education in the Non-Government Educational Institution in the State of Rajasthan. The Tribunal has been constituted u/s. 22 of the Act of 1989 consisting of Judicial Officer of the rank of a District Judge and the Tribunal has to entertain, hear and decide appeals preferred u/s. 19 of the Act of 1989 and the disputes referred to in Sec. 21 of the Act of 1989. Sec. 21 of the Act of 1989 provides that where there is any dispute between the management of a recognised institution and any of its employee with respect to the conditions of service, the management or the employee may make an application in the prescribed manner to the Tribunal and the decision of the Tribunal thereon shall be final any dispute of such nature pending before the State Government or any officer of the State Government immediately before the commencement of the Act of 1989 shall be transferred to the Tribunal for its decision. Act of terminating the services of the petitioners by the non-petitioner No. 2 comes in the purview of the `dispute' referred in Sec. 21 of the Act of 1989. A preliminary objection was also raised before me by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 2 as already stated, that as the respondent No. 2 is not an authority u/art. 12 of the Constitution of India the writ petition is not maintainable and the writ petitions deserve to be rejected. Though various authori-ties have been cited before me but in my considered opinion the writ petition is not maintainable against the respondent No. 2 which is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act. But after a laps of so many years I cannot render the petitioners remedyless. The paramount object in statutory interpretation is to discover what the legislature intended. This intention is primarily to be ascertained from the text of the enactment in question. That does not mean that the text is to be construed merely as a piece of prose, without reference to its nature or purpose. A statute is neither a literary text nor a divine revelation. "words are certainly not cystals, transparent and unchanged" as Mr. Justice Holmes has wisely and properly warned Towne vs. Elsher, (1 ). Learned Hand, J. , was equally emphatic when he said; "statutes should be construed not as theorems of Euclid, but with some imagination of the purpose which lie behind them. Lenigh Valley Coal Co. vs. Yensavage (2), U. O. I. Filip Tiagbo De Gama of Vedam Vasco De Gama It is well settled principle of interpretation of statute contains stringent provisions they must be literally and strictly construed so as to promote the object of Act Madan Mohan vs. K. Chandrasekhara,
(3.) AS already stated while referring Sec. 21 of the Act of 1989 that any dispute of the nature preferred in sub-sec. (1) pending before the State Government or any officer of the State Government immediately before the commencement of the Act of 1989 shall be transferred to the Tribunal for its decision. The disputes raised by the petitioners in the instant writ petitions are covered under Sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 21 of the Act of 1989. Therefore, I am of the considered view that the instant writ petitions may be transferred for adjudication before the Tribunal and such directions can be issued by this Court u/art. 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. In the light of what I have discussed hereinabove I transfer the instant petitions to the Non-Government Educational Institutions Tribunal Rajasthan Jaipur to decide the instant writ petitions on merits within a period of six months from the date of receipt of this order. The Registry is directed to forthwith send the case files to the learned Tribunal and the parties are directed to appear before the learned Tribunal on 21. 7. 1999 for seeking further directions in the matter. .;