MILAP CHANDRA, J. - (1.) THIS revision petition has been filed against the order of the Munsif, Merta City dated April 12, 1989 by which he rejected the objection-petition filed under Section 47, C. P. C. of the judgment-debtor-petitioner. The facts of the case giving rise to this revision petition may be summarised thus.
(2.) CIVIL Suit No. 362/74 was filed by the non-petitioners against the petitioner for his ejectment on the grounds of default in payment of rent and reasonable bonafide necessity. It was seriously contested by the petitioner. During the pendency of the suit, the premises were damaged by fire. The plaintiff-non-petitioners got their plaint amended too in corporate the plea that the suit premises are required by them in order to carry out building work as it has become unsafe and unfit for human habitation. This was also emphatically denied by the defendant-petitioner. After recording the evidence of the parties, the trial court dismissed the suit by its judgment dated January 20, 1981. The plaintiffs preferred an appeal against this judgment and it was dismissed by the civil Judge, Merta on 19. 2. 85. Thereafter, second Appeal No. 111/85 was preferred in this Court by the plaintiffs and it was allowed by judgment dated February 24, 1988 and the suit was decreed for the eviction of the defendant-petitioner on the ground mentioned in Section 13 (1) (k) of the Rajasthan premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' ). The plaintiff-non-petitioners filed execution application before the Munsif, Merta. The judgment-debtor-petitioner filed an objection-petition under Sec. 47, C. P. C. to the effect that under Sec. 22 (2) of the Act, no second appeal lay against the judgment of the CIVIL Judge, Merta and, therefore, the decree for eviction passed by this Court on 24. 2. 88 is a nulity and is not executable. The ' decree-holdere-non-petitioners filed their reply seriously opposing the objection-petition. After hearing the parties, the learned Munsif, Merta dismissed the objection-petition by his order dated April 12, 1989 which has been challenged in this revision petition. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the judgment-debtor petitioner that it is clearly provided in Section 22 (2) of the Act that no second appeal shall lie from any decree or order passed by a court under the Act, the judgment passed by this Court on February 24, 1988 decreeing the suit for ejectment of the defendant-petitioner on the ground mentioned in clause (k) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Act was passed under the Act, after the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in A. I. R. 1979 S. C. 1745 no notice of termination of tenancy is required the suit for ejectment has now ceased to be a suit under general law, it is now in substance a suit under sec. 12 (1) of the Act and is a judgment under Sec. 22 (2) of the Act, no appeal lies against it and as such second appeal filed in this Court was not maintainable and the judgment & decree passed by this Court were null & void. There is no substance in this revision petition. There is no provision in the Act for the institution of suits for ejectment. Section 13 (1) of the Act imposes restrictions against passing decrees for ejectment of tenants only on one or more grounds specified in Section 13 (1) of the Act, the decree for ejectment can be pass d against ateuant. A suit for eviction of a tenant is filed under the general law. Section 28 of the Act runs as under:- "the provisions of this Act shall in addition to and not derogatory, and any other law on the subject for the time being in force in the whole or any part of Rajasthan. " Section 100. C. P. C. itself provides that save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Court or pay any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court form every decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. Section 22 (2) of the Act simply prohibits second appeal against orders and decrees passed under the Act. It does not prohibit second appeals against decrees and orders passed in appeals against orders passed in suit filed under general law. It has been observed in Gyan Chand v. Kunjbeharilal, (1) at page 864 para 26 as under. " 26. It is manifest from a perusal of the scheme of the Act that appeals or applications for revision under Section 13a (C) relates only to decrees in suits for eviction based on the ground of non-payment of rent. Such appeals or applications for revision under Section 13a (C) are not contemplated under Section 22 of the Act. As shown above, decrees or orders passed by the court under the Act against which appeals and revisions are provided in Section 22 do not take in decrees or orders passed in a suit for eviction. Usual rights of appeal and revision will be available in the latter class of suits, to hold otherwise will be to deny a right of second appeal to a litigant, be he a landlord or tenant, against a decree in an eviction suit which is clearly not the intention of the legislature. Second appeal is only barred in case of decrees or orders passed under the Act to which a copious referance has been made hereinabove with reference to the various provisions of the Act. " It has been observed in Narainchand Mehta v. Krishna Kumar, (2); at page 604 para 15 as under: - "15. A comparison of Ss. 11 & 13 of the Act would show that decree for eviction is not passed u/s. 13 of the Act, but this section only contains certain limitations. It is true, as a part of his cause of action the plaintiff has to assert (1) that there is a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, (2) that the tenancy has been determined in accordance with the provisions of the T. P. Act, and (3) that the grounds mentioned in S. 13 of the Act justifying eviction of the tenant exists nevertheless neither the suit is instituted under the Act nor for that matter the decree is passed under the Act within the meaning of sec. 22 of the Act. If in stating the cause of action the plaintiff has to refer to the contract of tenancy, its determination according to general law, and at the same time has to make an assertion that the grounds for eviction contemplated by sec. 13 exist in the case thereby it cannot be said that the suit is instituted under the Act. or the decree is passed under the Act To my mind sec. 22 will cover only such of the decrees as are exclusively referable to the provisions of the Act. If the provisions of the general law or for that matter the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code have to be referred to or relied upon, then in such a case it cannot be said that the decree has been passed by a court under this Act within the meaning of sec, 22 of the Act. The question came to be considered in a number of cases, Such as Gordhanial Vs. Natnulal (1955 RLW 920), Anand Singh V. Chand-mal (1960 RLW 676), Shivkumar v. Vallabhdass (1957 RLW 497), Balchand v. Smt. Dhan Kanwar (1960 RLW 670) and Dr. Narumal v. Smt. Sahjadi Bibi (1970 RLW 193 ). I may mention that the contention was raised before Lodha, J, by learned counsel who appeared for the respondent in the case, but it was given up when his attention was invited to the cases just now cited by me. " In view of these facts, circumstances and authoritative observations, the revision petition deserves to be dismissed summarily.
(3.) CONSEQUENTLY, the revision petition is dismissed summarily. .;