R. S. VERMA, J. - (1.) BY this writ petition the petitioner seeks to quash the order of the Rajasthan Civil Services Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur dated 11. 8. 78 Ex. 2 whereby the petitioner's services were terminated. The petitioner was given appointment temporarily as L. D. C. by the Superintendent of Police, Jaisalmer after his selection by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission vide order dated 4. 2. 75 Ex. 1 in pursuance of which he joined his duty on 12. 12. 75. The petitioner's services were terminated w. e. f. 13. 8. 78 as it was found that his work was not satisfactory during the period of probation. The petitioner was served with one month's notice before termination of his services. Notice Ex, 3 dated 11. 7. 78 was received by the petitioner on 13. 7. 78. An appeal was preferred by the petitioner before the Tribunal but the same was dismissed by the Tribunal and all his contentions were negatived.
(2.) MR. M. L. Kala, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the order of termination is bad in as much as it casts a stigma and when the order casts a stigma, it was essential to hold an enquiry. The order of termination therefore, is bad and to such an order provision of Art. 311 would be attracted. We are unable to agree with this submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner. In this connection a Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court reported in State of Orissa vs. Ram Narayan Das (1) is relevant wherein their lordships of the Supreme Court considered the order of discharge of a police officer on probation and held that in the case of a probationer observation like 'unsatisfactory work and conduct' would not amount to stigma. The order of termination of the petitioner does not cast any stigma on the petitioner. When the work of the petitioner was not found satisfactory so his services were terminated. Per se such an observation in the order of termination, cannot be said to be an aspersion or stigma on the efficiency or otherwise of the petitioner and to such an order in our opinion Article 311 would not be attracted. It is next contended by Shri Kala counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner's appointing authority was Superintendent of Police and the petitioner's services were terminated by the Deputy Inspector General of Police Jodhpur Range, Jodhpur who was not his appointing authority and it is only the appointing authority which can terminate the petitioner's service. Reference may be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in Sampuran Singh vs. The State of Punjab (2 ). It has been held in this case that in view of Article 311 (1) of the Constitution the removing authority cannot be subordinate in rank to the appointing authority. So this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is without substance as Deputy Inspector General of Police is an authority higher to the Superintendent of Police and higher authority, is competent to pass an order of termination. An authority lower in rank to the appointing authority is incompetent to pass such an order but authority higher to the appointing authority does possess all the powers of the appointing authority. Thus the second contention of the petitioner also fails. It is next urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner shall be deemed to have been confirmed by virtue of the provision contained in Rule 28 A of the Rajasthan Subordinate Offices Ministerial Staff Rules, 1957 as order of confirmation was not passed within six months after expiry of two years period of probation of one year under the old rule. In this connection suffice it to say that conditions of confirmation are required to be fulfilled then only the demming provision of confirmation would come into play. One of the conditions for confirmation to be fulfilled is that the incumbent should have passed departmental test of proficiency in Hindi and permanent vacancy should be there. No such material is placed on record to hold that the necessary conditions of confirmation were fulfilled by the petitioner and as such Rule 28 A old as well as new, would not be applicable to the petitioner. That apart the petitioner was appointed only on temporary basis and when his performance was not found satisfactory, his services were terminated. It is noteworthy that from the date of his appointment till the date of his termination, during five spells the petitioner remained away from duty for above 173 days. This period was taken to be a period on leave without pay. Over all performance of the petitioner was judged as would be evident from the consideration made by the Tribunal. Therefore, the authority was justified in terminating the petitioner's temporary service. No other point is pressed before us. This writ petition therefore, has no force so it is hereby dismissed. .;