N. C. SHARMA, J. - (1.) THIS is a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India by Kanta Sahgal challenging the termination of her service by respondent No. 5 by an order Annexure/3 dated January 9,1989 (mistakenly written as dated January 9,1988 ).
(2.) FACTS as alleged in the writ petition, in brief, are that the Gurdwara Sri Guru Nanak Sat Sang Sabha (for short, here in after, "sabha"), respondent No. 4 is a registered society. It has established Shri Guru Nanak Deo Vidyalaya Seva Sang situated at Gurudwara Building, Rajmal ka Talab, Jaipur. Administration and management of this vidyalaya is carried on by respondent No. 5. The petitioner was appointed as Assistant Teacher in the pay scale of Rs. 110-5-160-8-200-10-230 under a letter of appointment dated July 1,1972 issued under the signature of the then Secretary of the Vidyalaya. Thereafter she was made substantive on the post of school teacher with effect from July 1,1975 and her pay was fixed at Rs. 395/- in the scale of Rs. 355-570/ -. Her present emoluments are stated to be Rs. 1,800/ -. It is alleged that the petitioner had worked satisfactorily for over 16 years. She was also appointed as Head Mistress in the said Vidyalaya. However, suddenly and arbitrarily the petitioner was removed from service of the School by order Annexure/3 issued on January 9, 1989. In Annexure/3, it is mentioned that in accordance with the directions of the Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee and Five-person Special Committee, the petitioner's services are terminated by paying to her one month's salary in advance. The petitioner's grievance is that respondents No. 4 and 5 did not communicate to her any specific charges or grounds for removing her from service. The grounds mentioned in the communication dated November 22, 1988 were Vague, irrelevant and extraneous. It is further stated that removal order was. passed without giving to the petitioner any reasonable opportunity of being heard and without holding any enquiry. It is also pleaded that the action of removal is opposed to the rules of recognition of educational institution in this State. The formost question which falls for determination is whether a writ lies against respondents No. 4 and 5 on the facts alleged by the petitioner in her writ petition. Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, inter alia, provides that every High Court shall have power to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Goverment, directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the inforcement of any of the rights conferred by part III and for any other purpose. The expression "any person" used in Art. 226 of the Constitution can inlued within its ambit respondents No. 4 and 5. However, it is well-settled that the High Court will issue writ only for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by part III, or for the enforcement of any legal right vested in the petitioner and if those legal rights have been violated by the person upon whom a legal duty is imposed. The learned counsel for the petitioner referred to the decision in J. K. Ready Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (1) In that case, the petitioner had filed a writ petition for quashing the decision of the Board of Directors, Allahabad Agricultural Institute taken in a meeting, wherein it was held that the petitioner had ceased to be a member of the Board of Directors after the date of superannuation. He also sought for a writ for quashing the Government order recognising the Agricultural Institute as a minority institute and further a writ of mandamus directing the respondents therein to pay his salary for the month of October 1984, accumulated leave and to consider his pension matter. It was held by the Allahabad High Court that there is abundant authority for the proposition that a writ petition lies against a private body for enforcement of performance of any legal obligation or duty imposed by statute. It was simultaneously stated that no writ however lies against a private body where there is neither statutory nor public duty imposed on tha body by a statute, nor is there any legal right for enforcement of such statutory or public duty. For that purpose, reference was made to the decision in Praga Tools Corporation Vs. C. V. Imanual (2 ). The next decision relied upon is in the case of Manmohan Singh V. Commissioner, Union Territory, Chandigarh (3 ). It may be mentioned that in Manmohan Singh's case (supra) Guru Nanak Khalsa High School was an aided school and, hence, it was governed by the Punjab Aided Schools (Security of Service) Act, 1969. Admittedly, that school was receiving 95% of its expences as grant from the Government. His Lordship Desai J. , speaking for the court, referred to the Constitution Bench judgement of the Supreme Court in Ajay Hasiay V. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi (4), which was also a case relating to aided school receiving 95% of expenses by way of grant from the public exchequer. In Ajay Hasia's case (supra), Bhagwati J. observed that "the financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the Corporation, it would afford some indication of the Corporation being impregnated with governmental character. The Corporation was, therefore held to be a State agency or instrumentality. More or less similar was the position in Vidya Dhar Pande Vs. Vidyut Grih Shiksha Samiti (5 ). The matter in Vidya Dhar Pande's case (supra) was relating to the Regulations framed by the Board of Secondary Education under Sec. 28 (2) (d) of the Madhya Pradesh Madhyamik Shiksha Adhiniyam, 1955 and the regulations had statutory force. The school was receiving 100% aid from the Government. Reliance was also placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Frank Anthony P. S. E. Association vs. Union of India (6 ). In that case, the matter was governed by Delhi School Education Act, 1973. Sec. 8 (2) of the Act provided for obtaining prior approval of the Director for dismissal, removal, reduction in rank or termination of service of an employee of a recognised private school. This provision was held to be objectionable by the Supreme Court. I fail to understand how this decision helps the petitioner.
(3.) A going-through of all the decisions, would go to show that in each of them the matter was governed by statute and a legal right was created in favour of the petitioner and also an obligation on the institution involved therein. In two Suppreme Court cases, since the institution received 95% to 100% government aid, they were regarded as State for the purpose of part-Ill of the Constitution. In the present case, respondent No. 5 is not at all receiving any aid from the Government. It has not been placed by the petitioner in the writ petition that it is receiving any financial aid from the Government. The learned counsel for the petitioner referred to certain rules issued by the Government for recognition of educational institutions. Firstly, it may be mentioned that they are not statutory rules and their status is nothing more than that of executive instructions. Secondly, even these rules do not create any right in favour of the petitioner and do not impose a statutory obligation oh respondents No. 4 and 5 to frame charges against a delinquent teacher, to hold a departmental enquiry, or to give a reasonable opportunity to the petitioner of being heard. Rather, Clause (xi) of these Rules provided that every teacher is employed under an agreement of service approved by the Department. Amongst other things, this agreement shall provide that any dispute arising between the parties shall be decided by an Arbitration Board consisting of one member nominated by each of the party to the dispute and a nominee of the Director of Education will act as Chairman of the Board. The decision of the Board shall be binding on both the parties. It is, thus, clear that the relationship of the petitioner with respondent No. 5 is regulated by an agreement of service. The petitioner does not have any statutory sta-tus and no statutory right of having a reasonable opportunity to defend against any charge levelled by the Vidyalaya Seva Sang. In contrast to this reference may be made to rules which govern disciplinary matters in relation to those institution which received financial aid from the Government. In respect of them, it has been provided in the relevant rules framed by the Government of Rajasthan that no employee will be removed from service or reduced in rank unless the charge against him is proved and he had been afforded an opportunity of being heard, The provisions in this regard are contained at page 31 of the Education Code in Hindi, published by the Unique Traders. It is well-settled that there are four categories of relationships of masters and servants. The first category is of civil servants, whose conditions of service and tenure are governed by the provisions contained in Arts. 309,310 and 311 of the Constitution of India. The other category of servants are those whose relationship with their employers are regulated by labour and industrial legislation which create by it self the rights and obligations. The third category is where the relationship of master and servant is regulated by statutory rules or regulations framed under a statute. In relation to them, the statute applies. Last category is that of an ordinary master and servant. Their position is governed by the contract entered into between them, If there is breach of contract, the remedy is always by way of suit for damages, and in relation to them it is not within the competence of ordinary civil courts as well as of this Court under Art, 226 of the Constitution to make a declaration that the termination of service was wrongful, or that they continue to be in service. The petitioner's case falls in last of the categories. No writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution can be granted in favour of the petitioner. This writ petition has no force in it and it is hereby dismissed in limeline. . ;