G.M.Lodha, J. - (1.) Radhey Shyam plaintiff has filed this revision application against the order of the learned Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate, Rajgarh rejecting his application for admission of three documents under Order 13 Rule 2 C.P.C.
(2.) A preliminary objection has been raised by Mr. Anil Rajvanshi, learned counsel for the respondent that no revision can be entertained on the question whether an application under Order 13 Rule 2 should have been accepted or rejected. He relies upon the judgment of this court reported in Harakchand v. State of Rajas-than, 1970 Raj LW 320, where a Full Bench consisting of Bhandari, C. J. and Bhargava and Modi JJ, observed as under: "14. In this case it has been argued before us that by wrongly construing a document, the trial court held that it was admissible in evidence, while on a proper construction of document, it was inadmissible in evidence because of the provisions of the Registration Act and that the trial court thus proceeded to incorporate on record inadmissible evidence which would eventually be taken in consideration while finally deciding the case. Whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question of law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. 15. The Supreme Court in Pandurang Dhondi Chougule, (AIR 1966 SC 153), has taken the view that even if the subordinate court has wrongly construed the decree, the High Court was not justified in reversing the finding of the subordinate court under Section 115 of the Code. Gajendragadkar C. J. who delivered the Judgment on behalf of the Court observed as follows: The construction of a decree like the construction of a document of title is no doubt a point of law. Even so it cannot be held to justify the exercise of the High Court's revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code because it has no relation to the jurisdiction of the Court. Like other matters which are relevant and material in determining the question of the adjustment of debts, the question about the existence of the debt has been left to the determination of the Courts which are authorised to administer the provisions of the Act, and even if in dealing with such question, the trial Court or the District Court commits an error of law, it cannot be said that such an error would necessarily involve the question of the said court's jurisdiction within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code". 16. The same is true when the court is construing a document for the purpose of deciding whether it is admissible for want of registration. Construction of a document is no doubt a question of law. But simply because it is a question of law, it does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the subordinate court acted with illegality or material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction. Wanchoo, C. J. (as he then was) in Moonlal v. Sampatlal (ILR (1952) 2 Raj 1010), has taken the view that the finding of a trial court that a document is not a promissory note and was admissible in evidence on payment of duty and penalty could be revised by the High Court under Section 115 C.P.C. With utmost respect we are of the opinion that this view is not correct. Similarly the observation of this Court in Poonamchand v. Bastirm Deokishan 1969 Raj LW 248, that the question as to whether a document is admissible or hot admissible is a matter of procedure is not correct. A construction of a document is a part of proceedings of a court and if these proceedings are conducted properly and a mistake is made in construing the document, the order passed by the court is not revisable. 17. We respectfully agree with the decision of the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Shah Prabhudas Ishwardas v. Shah Bhogilal Nathalal, (AIR 1968 Guj 236), in which it has been held that error of law by the subordinate court in deciding whether a document was a promissory note within the meaning of Section 2 (22) of the Stamp Act or hot was not concerned with the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and, therefore, none of the three clauses of Section 115, C. P. C. were attracted to the case".
(3.) Mr. Goyal appearing for the petitioner submitted that this judgment was given on the Civil P. C. as it stood before the amendment of 1976. He contends that there has been a change and alteration in Section 115. He points out that a proviso has been added and Sub-clause (b) of the proviso mentions that in case an order if allowed to stand occasions failure of justice then interference can be made in revision.;