G. M. LODHA, J. - (1.) THIS is a tenant's revision application, in an ejectment suit, against the judgment stariking off his defence. The appeal filed before the Additional District Judge No. 2, Alwar was dismissed on May 18, 1979.
(2.) IN this ejectment suit, the plea of the plaintiff was for granting of a decree on the basis of the default and also bonafide necessity. On November 29, 1975, the Court ordered under section 13 (1) (a) that the defendant should deposit Rs. 488. 75p being arrears of rent within one month. The deposit was made on January 2, 1976. It is admitted case of the parties that the Courts were closed between December 24, 1975 to January 1, 1976 on account of the Winter Vacations. On an application for striking off defence under Section 13 (6) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' ). The Court relying upon the judgments passed in Yogesh Chand vs. State of Rajasthan (1) and in the case of Chimna vs. Chunni Lal (2) held that tenant has committed default in compliance of the orders of the Court and he cannot take benefit of Winter Vacations, because the amount could have been deposited, as it was not an ordinary work of the court, but was an extra ordinary work. A perusal of the above two judgments shows that the case of Chimna vs. Chunni Lal (2) is based on notification for summer vacations. The ground was that the amount could have been deposited as it was not an ordinary work and court can do urgent work. In the second case, the matter related to the filing of the appeal in relation to the injunction, and the question was whether the Court had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal during the vacations. In the insstant case, I am not deciding the controversy whather during the winter vacation the amount could be deposited or not? The case has assumed new dimensions, because of the references made to section 11 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955 which reads as under: "11. Computation of time-Where, by any Rajasthan Law, any Act or proceeding is directed or allowed to be done or taken in any court or office on a certain day or within a prescribed period, then, if the court or office is closed on that day or the last day &f the prescribed period, the act or proceeding shall be considered as done or taken in due time if it is done or taken on the next day afterwards on which the court or office is open : Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to any act or proceeding to which the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, (Central) Act IX of 1908) applies. " The section quoted above expressly permits that if any proceeding is directed or allowed to be done or taken in any court or office on a certain day or within a prescribed period, then, if the court or office is closed on that day or the last day of the prescribed period, the act or proceeding shall be considered as done or taken in due time, if it is done or taken, on the next day on which the court or office is opened. This section is analogous to section 10 of Central General Clauses Act which has been interpreted by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Harinder Singh vs. S. Kernail Singh (3 ). Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held that where a period is prescribed for the performance of an act in a Court or office, and that period expires on a holiday then according to the section, the act should be considered to have been done within that period, if it is done on the next day on which the Court or office is to open.
(3.) IN Madan Gopal Daga vs. Rallis INdia Ltd. (4) Calcutta High Court has observed as under : - "one of the fundamental principles in administration of justice is 'actus Curine Neminem Gravabit' which means that an act of Court shall prejudice no man. IN construing and applying an ambigous order of Court this principle should be observed. It means that no litigant or person should be hurt or damaged or prejudiced by any ambiguity of the order of the Court. If the time fixed for payment of adjournment cost by an order of Court is ambigous then the correct computation of time by a true construction of the order must be such as causes the least prejudice and harm to a litigant or a person affected by the order. When the Court orders that payment (of adjournment cost by the plaintiff) is to be made by the end of a month and the end of such month happens to be a holiday it is no breach of that order for the party to do the act on very first subsequent day on which the Court reopens after the holiday. The principle of construction is that the Court grant time knowing that the time will expire on a holiday so that the litigant who is required to do an act within that time can get the benefit and grace of the additional time involved in holidays and pay on the very next subsequent day on which the Court reopens. It is only by that construction that the Court can avoid prejudice to a litigant before it. If the Court wants that a particular act is to be done without the benefit of this extended time, a holiday intervening on the date of the expiry of the order, then it is for the Court to expressly say so that the particular act should be done by a particular date which is not a holiday. Doubts, if any, in the construction or effect of the order of a Court in which there is a penal clause should always be resolved in favour of the litigant by extending the time to include, the holiday and not to make him a victim of such doubts. Section 10 of the General Clauses Act does not apply to an order of the Court. Section 10 is only applied where a statute allows an order or act to be done within a particular time. It cannot be extended to cover an order of Court, fixing a particular time within an act is to be done. " My attention has been drawn to sub-sec. 3 and 4 of sec. 13 of the Act which reads as under: - " (3) In a suit for eviction on the ground set forth in clause (a) of sub-sec. (1) with or without any of the other grounds referred to in that sub-section, the court shall, on the first date of hearing or on any other date as the court may fix in this behalf which shall not be more than three months after filing of the written statement and shall be before the framing of the issues, after hearing the parties and on the basis of material on record provisionally determine the amount of rent to be deposited in court or paid to the landlord by the tenant. Such amount shall be calculated at the rate of rent at which it was last paid or was payable for the period for which the tenant may have made, default including the period subsequent thereto upto the end of the month previous to that in which such determination is made together with interest on such amount calculated at the rate of six percent per annum from the date when any such amount was payable upto the date of determination: Provided that while determining the amount under this sub-section, the court shall not take into account the amount of rent which was barred by limitation on the date of the filing of the suit. " " (4) The tenant shall deposit in court or pay to the landlord the amount determined by the court under sub-section (3) within fifteen days from the date of such determination, or within such further time, not exceeding three months, as may be extended by the Court. The tenant shall also continue to deposit in court or pay to the landlord, month by month the monthly rent subsequent to the period upto which determination has been made, by the fifteenth of each succeeding month or within such further time, not exceeding fifteen days, as may be extended by the court, at the monthly rate at which the rent was determined by the court under sub-section (3 ). " A careful study of the above clause would show that the time has been given by Act itself that is 15 day's subject to the extension granted by the Court upto the maximum period of three months. In this view of the matter, I am of the opinion that time for payment of arrears of rent, could be covered by the above clause i. e. prescribed by the Act, minimum being 15 days and the maximum being three months, which would depend upon the order of the Court. In view of the above, I am of the opinion that section 11 of the Act would apply and time, which has been granted to, the defendant in this case, would be deemed to be time prescribed or given by the Rajasthan Law, even though the exact extension has been by the Court's order within maximum limit of 3 months. ;