- (1.) IT is proposed to decide the above eight revision petitions through this common order as they relate to similar facts and hinge on common points of law.
(2.) THESE revision petitions are directed against the orders of the Addl. Collector, Ajmer dated 23-12-68 whereby he rejected the appeals of the applicants against the revision of tax made by the Commissioner, Municipal Council, Ajmer, vide his order dated 1-12-67. Two objections have been raised on behalf of the applicants. Firstly, that the Commissionrr is pot competent to revise the assessment u/s 117 (2) of the Rajas-than Municipalities Act and secondly that no valid reasons had been advanced for enhancing the earlier assessment. It is stated that in some cases assessment has been doubled while in other cases it has been raised by 7 or 8 itmes and thus suffers from arbitrariness. In reply, it is stated on behalf of the Municipal Council that Sec. 117 prescribes for a public notice to be given of time fixed for revising the assessment list, when the revising authority will proceed to revise the valuation of the assessment. Sub-sec. (2) prescribes that the revising authority to whom objections under sub-sec. (1) may be made shall be the board or any committee to which the board may delegate this function or an officer of the State Government to whom with the permission of the State Government the board may delegate this function. It is stated that u/s 307 of the Act the State Government appoints a Commissioner for every council, an executive officer for every board or a secretary for every council which resolves to appoint a secretary in addition to the Commissioner Under sub-sec. (3) a commissioner or an executive officer, as the case may be, are required to : - (a) Watch over the financial and executive municipal administration of the municipality. Sub-sec. (4) prescribes that subject to any rules obtaining in this behalf a council or board, as the case may be may punish any officer appointed under this section, otherwise than by dismissal or removal by a resolution passed by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the whole number of its members at a special general meeting and approved by the State Government. My attention has also been drawn to Local self Govt. Deptt. letter No. F. 4 (34) LSG/59 dated 26th December, 1961 conveying the sanction of the State Govt. under sub-sec. 2 of sec. 117 to the delegation of the functions under sub-sec. 1 of sec. 117 of the Act by Ex-Municipal Council, Ajmer upon the Commissioner of that Council as requested by the Administrator of that Council. It is argued that the cumulative effect of these provisions of law and the aforesaid notification is that the Commissioner, namely, S. S. Ranawat who passed the impugned orders was duly appointed by the State Govt. as the revising authority contemplated u/s 117 (2) of the Act. It is further argued that Shri Ranawat belongs to the R. A. S. cadre of Rajasthan and did not lose his character of being an officer of the Govt. by being appointed as the Commissioner. To buttress this argument reliance has been placed on sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 117 whereby the power to take disciplinary action against the Commissioner is reserved by the State Govt. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the applicants has referred to sub-sec. 19 of Sec. 3 which defines an officer of the board as a person holding for the time being an office created or continued by or under this Act but does not include a member of the board or of a committee as such. It is argued from third premise that a state officer appointed u/s 307 becomes an officer of the board and ceases to be an officer of the Govt. In support of this contention reliance is placed on Bhairondan vs. Chairman Board of Revenue (1966 RLW 510) and Vijai Raj vs. Suraj Roop (1966 RLW 310 ). It was held in the former authority that the Chairman, Municipal Council or Administrator, Municipality, when so appointed is not an officer appointed by the State Govt. and the Board can not revise orders passed by such authority. I fail to see how this authority is applicable to this case as it arises from a different ration. It seeks to answer the question whether the Chairman, Board of Revenue who was an officer authorised by the State Govt. u/s 300 had the power to revise the orders of the Administrator or that of the President Municipal Council under such section. While it was conceded by the learned counsel for the respondent in that case that the Chairman, Board of Revenue had no authority to revise the orders of the President, Municipal Council, because he was not an officer appointed by the State Govt. in that behalf, it was contended that the Chairman could revise the order? of the Administrator because he was an officer appointed by the State Govt. On the other, it was contended by the counsel for the applicant that this argument was not tenable because the Administrator was not an officer appointed to perform the duties of a Collector or to perform the duties of an officer which could be discharged by him under the particular provisions of the Act, apart from the duties of the Board. It was argued that the administrator was himself the duly constituted Board for the purposes of the Act u/s. 293 A and he functioned as a Board and not as a mere officer entrusted with limited responsibilities. Examining the import of sec. 300 in the context of sec. 293 A. the learned Judges observed that sec. 300 cannot be so interpreted that if an officer is appointed as an Administrator, his orders would stand on a different footing and sec 300 would be excluded. In their opinion, therefore sec. 300 did not empower the Chairman, Board of Revenue to revise the orders of the Administrator passed by him in that capacity. As stated above, this case had no application to the present question. Similarly in the case of Vijai Raj also it was held that an order passed by the Municipal Commissioner was not revisable by Collector or Revenue Appellate Authority as the Municipal Commissioner was not appointed by the State Government. In this case, the Municipal Commissioner had passed an order u/s. 203 (2) and on a reading of sec. 300 it was held that under this section the order passed under the Act by a Collector or other officer appointed by the State Government could be revised. To my mind, this authority also has no application to the present case. I am inclined to accept the line of argument advanced by the learned counsel for the Municipal Council that the Commissioner who was an officer of the cadre of R. A. S. did not lose his character as an officer of the State Government on being appointed as a Municipal Commissioner under sec 307 of the Act. The notification dated the 26th December, 1961 issued by the Government further puts a seal of authority on his status. I, therefore, reject the first objection raised by the learned counsel for the applicants as untenable. As regards the next objection, the learned counsel for the Municipal Council stated that the revised assessment is not without a pattern. Roughly, it is proposed to tax the shops at the rate of Rs. 25/- per 100 sq. fit. of the area occupied. Here and there marginal adjustments had been made keeping in regard the situation and the nature of the business carried on by the cabin-holders. The rates were examined in court in this light and it was found that the impugned orders more or less followed the above pattern and were not arbitrary as was sought to be made out by the applicants. Yet another objection was raised on behalf of the learned counsel for the Municipal Council on the authority of Arjunsingh vs. Tekchand (RLW 1966 p. 214) holding that there is no provision in Part XIII of the Constitution enabling the courts to adjudicate on whether the taxes imposed are heavy and are, therefore, unreasonable. It was held in that case that it was not open to the courts to sit in judgment over the Taxing Authorities and consider whether particular taxes imposed under a law passed under Art. 304 are heavy, and therefore, unreasonable resulting in undue restraint on trade and commerce. The learned counsel for the applicants was not able to meet this contention. In the result, I see no force in these revision petitions and hereby reject them. .;