BHARGAVA, J. - (1.) RESPONDENT Ramprashad filed the present suit out of which this Civil Second Appeal arises for ejectment of the appellant from a shop situated in Naya Bazar, Ajmer City. The appellant's carrying on the business of Moonj and Ban etc. in the shop for the last 10 to 15 years is not in dispute. RESPONDENT's son-in-law Surajkaran is in occupation of an adjoining shop and is also carrying on the same business is also not in dispute. Sooraj Karan purchased the disputed shop as well as the shop in which he himself was carrying on business on 14th September, 1960. Thereafter, on 19th December, 1960, he sold the disputed shop to the respondent, who is a retired employee of the railways. After purchasing the shop the respondent served a notice of ejectment on the appellant on 2nd January, 1961, and having not received any reply from them, filed a suit for ejectment on 20th May, 1961. In the plaint, it is alleged that the shop is required by the plaintiff for his own use and occupation as he purchased it for starting his own business. The appellants contested the suit and their case was that the sale of the disputed shop in favour of the respondent was fictitious and sham. In fact it was Sooraj Karan who wanted to have the appellants ejected from the shop so that they may be uprooted from the rival business which they were carrying on. It was stated that the respondent had no bonafide and reasonable necessity for the shop. The learned Munsiff, Ajmer City, who tried the case, amongst others, framed the following issue on the question of the plaintiff's bonafide and reasonable necessity, "3. Does the plaintiff require the suit premises reasonably and bonafide for his own use and occupation?" In support of this issue the plaintiff examined himself and stated that he wanted the shop to be vacated for his own use. The exact words of his statement are
(2.) ESA nqdku vius [kqn ds csbus ds fy, djuk pkgrk gwwa** He admitted that he owned one shop which is situated below his house in Khazanchiwali Gali. He also admitted that he had rented out that shop to Bhaironlal before the institution of the suit. He also admitted that he had three sons, all of whom were in service of the railways. Chandmal (PW 2) stated that he did not know whether the plaintiff required the shop for his own use. Statements of both these witnesses were recorded by the trial court on 14th April, 1962. Sooraj Karan, the next witness, and who is the son-in-law of the plaintiff and who was examined on 25th July, 1962 was also present in the court on 14th April, 1962, as would appear from the order sheet of that date, but the learned counsel for the plaintiff sought adjournment. On 25th July, 1962, Sooraj Karan and one more witness Rampal were examined. Sooraj Karan stated that the plaintiff required the shop for starting business of Moonj and Ban, Rampal stated that the plaintiff wanted to sit on the shop and do business of any kind. The defendants examined themselves and produced as many as six witnesses to establish that the shop was not required by the plaintiff for his own use and it was really Sooraj Karan who for the purpose of eliminating the defendants from the business wanted to get the shop vacated. Learned Munsiff, after a consideration of the evidence on record came to the finding that the bonafides of the plaintiff were very doubtful looking to all the circumstances of the case and in his view there was great probability that it was Sooraj Karan who was behind the litigation. In his view the plaintiff had failed to discharge the burden of proving Issue No. 3. The learned Munsiff having regard to the statement of the plaintiff himself, which has been quoted above, was of the view that the plaintiff was very lukewarm in putting forth the grounds of his requirement. He also accepted the argument of the appellants that the shop near the plaintiff's house was quite suitable if he at all wanted to carry on business especially when the plaintiff has been so indifferent as to state the kind of business he wanted to carry on. The learned Munsiff also remarked that Sooraj Karan was purposely not examined on 14-4-62 because certain gaps had to be filled in. In his view the plaintiff was not a very trustworthy witness because he had denied the receipt of money orders which he had refused to accept and which were proved by the evidence of postmen namely D. W. 2/4 and D. W. 2/5. He, therefore, dismissed the plaintiff's suit. On appeal the learned Civil Judge, Ajmer reversed the finding of the lower court. In the opinion of the learned Civil Judge, it was not necessary for a landlord intending to start some business in a premises to disclose the nature of the business or work which he intended to undertake. All that was necessary was that he wanted to do some business in the premises, and if this fact is challenged, then it is for the defendant to subject him to cross-examination on that point. The learned Civil Judge, taking into consideration the fact that the plaintiff was Agarwal by caste and his brother had been carrying on business to whose shop he used to go off and on, that he was not engaged in any other business then and had purchased the property in 1960 from his son-in-law, came to the conclusion that there was nothing unreasonable if the plaintiff wanted the shop to start business of Moonj and Ban because in that case he could count upon the help and assistance of his son-in-law. The argument that it was Sooraj Karan who really wanted the shop to be vacated was repelled by the learned Judge on the ground that if that was so, Sooraj Karan could have filed a suit on the basis of his bonafide necessity by asserting that his own shop was insufficient for his business. In this appeal learned counsel for the appellants has contended that the learned Civil Judge has completely mis-read the statement of the plaintiff inasmuch as he even did not say on oath that the wanted to start some business in the shop. All that he stated is that he would himself sit in the shop and which does not mean that he would start any business in that shop. It is contended that the lacuna in the statement of the plaintiff could not be filed by the evidence of the witnesses, especially in this case by the evidence of Sooraj Karan who is at the bottom of the entire litigation. It is contended that the learned Civil Judge has wrongly assumed certain facts such as that the appellant has got necessary finance to carry on the business and that in case he starts his business in the shop, he will have the assistance of his son-in-law which are not borne out by the record. Now the question whether the premises are required reasonably and bona-fide by the plaintiff for his own use and occupation is largely a question of fact and ordinarily cannot be interfered in second appeal, but here the learned Civil Judge has mis-directed himself on the question that it is enough for a landlord to say that he required the premises for his own business without disclosing its nature and it is upon this premise that he has found the statement of the plaintiff sufficient to discharge the burden that the shop was required reasonably and bona-fide for his personal use and occupation. In my view the learned Civil Judge was in error in coming to the finding to which he did on the aforesaid premise. No doubt there is no bar for persons to start or engage themselves in business after their retirement from service. They may enter into a new venture for the purpose of augmenting their income or to keep themselves occupied but the law, i. e. , the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 which has been enacted to control eviction from the premises of tenants and is apparently for their protection requires that the landlord's requirement should be reasonable and bonafide. If in a suit for ejectment, the plaintiff only makes a statement that he requires the premises for starting business or for his own use without disclosing the nature of the business or the purpose for which he requires it, then there would be no basis for the court to judge whether the requirement is bonafide and reasonable. Mere assertion on the part of the landlord that the premises are required for his own use or business is not sufficient. Nature of the requirement must be disclosed so that not only the tenant may have an opportunity to rebut it, but the court may also in the light of the circumstances of each case be able to put it to the test of reasonableness and bonafide. Under the garb of personal requirement, it is not open to the landlord to circumvent the law and it is the duty of the court to see that the landlord is not seeking eviction on the false pretence and for ulterior purpose. Mr. Guptaa, for the respondent, admits that the plaintiff's own statement in the present case is not sufficient to prove that the requirement was reasonable and bonafide because he has not told the court the nature of the business he required to start, but his contention is that his witness Sooraj Karan had supplied that lacuna and he has stated that the plaintiff required to start business of 'moonj' and 'ban* in the shop. However, I am of the view that when it is the personal requirement of the plaintiff, it is he alone who has to disclose the nature of the requirement and if he does not do so, the evidence of other witnesses on that point can be of no avail. The nature of the requirement must therefore be alleged and proved by the plaintiff. Learned Civil Judge was, therefore, clearly in error in holding that it was for the defendant-tenant to elicite from the plaintiff in cross-examination about the nature of the business for which the landlord required the premises. The other factors which the learned Civil Judge has taken into consideration i. e. , the financial position of the plaintiff and the help and assistance he was likely to get from his son-in-law are also not borne out by the evidence on record. In the present case when the plaintiff has neither disclosed the nature of the business in the plaint nor in his statement before the court, it cannot he held that his requirement is reasonable and bonafide. The trial court was, therefore, right in dismissing the suit. This appeal is, therefore, allowed with costs and the decree of the first appellate court is set Sadie and that of the trial court is restored. As a result, the plaintiff's suit shall stand dismissed. 1970 RLW 1 .;