L S. MEHTA. J. - (1.) ONE Ladulal made a complaint in the court of Munsiff-Magistrate, Sawai Madhopur, on September 12, 1963 with the allegation that on September 10, 1963. at about 10 or 10 30 a. m. , when he was available in his shop in village Khandar, the accused Ram Gopal and Jagdish came to him and hurled abuses towards him. They told him that he was responsible for preventing them from selling sugar in black-market. Gapoolal intervened in the quarrel. But the accused also abused him. The accused Ram Gopal pulled the complainant's 'dhoti' and dragged him and told him that he would be killed. Had some persons not intervened Ram Gopal would have administered lathi blows to him. The complainant, therofore, prayed that the accused should be punished under Ss. 352 and 405, I. P. C. On receipt of the complaint and after necessary inquiry, learned Munsiff-Magistrate ordered on 7-12 63 the registration of the case under S. 323, I. P. C. , and the accused were also directed to be summoned. The accused put in their appearance and denied to have committed any offence. The complainant examined his witnesses. The accused produced Jamnalal, D. W. 1. By its judgment, dated January 2, 1966. Jagdish was acquitted of the aforesaid offence. Ram Gopal was convicted under S. 323, I. P. C. He was, however, released after due admonition in accordance with the provisions of S. 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. Dissatisfied with that judgment an appeal was filed in the court of Additional Sessions Judge No. 1, Gangapur, but the same stood dismissed on September 26, 1967. Hence this revision.
(2.) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner submits that the court below went wrong in not applying S. 95, I. P. C. , to this case. S. 95 read as follows: - "nothing is ah offence by reason that it causes, or that it is intended to cause, or that it is known to be likely to cause, any harm, if that harm is so slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of such harm. The maxim 'de minimis non curat lex' (the law does not take account of trifles is the foundation of this section. Intercourse in a civilised society will come to an end, if for petty things a person finds himself exposed to all the trouble and worry of a criminal trial. The expression 'harm' as used in S. 95, I. P. C. has not been defined in the Indian Penal Code. In its dictionary meaning it means "hurt, injury, damage, impairment". Thus, the word 'harm' will also include physical injury. S. 95, I. P. C. , is a general exception, inclusive of physical injury or hurt. There is, therefore, not the least doubt that S. 95 can be applied to an offence under S. 323, Implication of S. 95, I. P. C. , received the consideration of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Mrs. Veeda Menezes Vs. Yusuf Khan Haji Ibrahim Khan and another (1 ). In para 5 of the judgment, it has been observed - "there can be no absolute standard or degree of harm which may be regarded as so slight that a person of ordinary sense and temper would not complain of harm. It cannot be judged solely by the measure of physical or other injury the act causes. A soldier assaulting his colonel, a policeman assaulting his Superintendent, or a pupil beating his teacher, commit offences, the heniousness of which cannot be determined merely by the actual injury suffered by the officer or the teacher, for the assault would be wholly subversive of discipline. An assault by one child on another, or even by a grown up person on another, which causes injury may still be regarded as so slight having regard to the way and station of life of the parties, relation between them, situation in which the parties are placed, and other circumstances in which harm is caused, that the victim ordinarily may not complain of the harm. " With this background, it is to be considered how far the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner merits consideration. The definition of hurt, as given in S. 319, I. P. C. , appears to contemplate the causing of pain etc. , by one person to another. There is nothing in the definition of hurt to suggest that an injury must be received by the complainant by direct physical contact. If bodily pain is caused by some voluntary act, a hurt is caused. If the harm is so slight that no person of ordinary sense or temper would complain of it, it is excluded by S. 95, I. P. C. Here complainant, a respectable business man, was sitting quietly and peacefully at his shop. The accused Ram Gopal came forward, used filthy words at the complainant, exhibiting disrespect or indignity towards him and pulled up his 'dhoti' to drag him out of the shop. In that context, the evidence produced by the complainant does not justify the conclusion that the hurt was so slight that a person of ordinary sense and temper, placed in the circumstances in which the complainant was put, might not reasonably have complained for that harm. Here is the case, where heinousness of injury cannot be determined merely by the actual injury suffered by the complainant. Even granting that a different view may be taken of the evidence, I do not think that I would be justified in a revision in disagreeing with the order of the appellate court. I, therefore, maintain the order of the appellate court and dismiss this revision petition. . ;