TYAGI, J. - (1.) THIS application under Art. 226 of the Constitution filed by Hans Raj challenging the election of two members to the Board of Directors of Sawai Madhopur Kendriya Sahkari Bank Ltd. (hereinafter referred as 'the Bank') raises an important question about the interpretation of the provisions of secs. 125 & 128 of the Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'.
(2.) THE facts giving rise to this dispute are as follows: On 18th January, 1968, the 1lth Annual Meeting of the Bank was called to fill the two vacancies in the Board of Directors of the Bank through election. THE petitioner along with Respondents Nos. 5 & 6 Shanker & Kanwerlal was a candidate at that election. His allegation is that the Returning Officer was bent upon to help the Respondents Nos. 5 and 6 and therefore be acted with a malafide intention to reject nomination papers of all other candidates except that of Respondents Nos. 5 & 6 and thus declared Respondents Nos. 5 and 6 duly elected as members of the Board. THE petitioner challenged the validity of the elections of the Respondents Nos. 5 and 6 by referring the dispute to the Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Ajmer under sec. 75 of the Act. An application was also moved by the petitioner for the issue of an ad interim order directing Respondents Nos. 5 and 6 not to participate in the election of the Chairman of the Bank and also not to function as members of the Board of Directors. THE Deputy Registrar issued ad interim order as prayed by the petitioner on 30th January, 1968 directing Respondents Nos. 5 and 6 not to function as the members of the Board of Directors and not to take part in the election of the Chairman of the Bank. Having felt aggrieved by the said interim order of the Deputy Registrar, the Bank and the other three Respondents Nos. 4, 5 and 6 filed a revision petition before the Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Rajasthan, Jaipur under sec. 126 of the Act. This petition was registered by the Registrar as Revision Petition No. 5 of 1968. THE Registrar passed ex parte ad interim under on 28th February 1968 at the request of the respondents (who were petitioners before him) to suspend the operation of the order of the Deputy Registrar dated 30th January 1968, and fixed 16th of March, l968 for the hearing of the opposite parties on the question of confirming the ex parte ad interim stay order. As a consequence of this ex parte interim order Respondents Nos. 5 and 6 were administered oath of office of the Directors of the Bank on 28th February, 1968, and they participated in the election of the Chairman of Bank. . THE petitioner went to the Tribunal under sec. 125 of the Act to challenge the validity of the interim order passed by the Registrar on the 28th of February, 1968. THE Tribunal dismissed the revision application of the petitioner on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to entertain any revision application under sec. 125 of the Act against the order passed by the Registrar in exercise of his jurisdiction under sec, 128 of the Act. THE petitioner, by this Writ petition, has now challenged both the orders of the Registrar dated the 28th of February, 1968, and the order of the Tribunal rejecting his revision application. A joint reply has been filed on behalf of Respondents Nos 3 and 4. Respondent No. 2 has also filed a reply to this Writ application. No reply has however been filed on behalf of Respondents Nos. 5 and 6. Replying respondents have contested the stand taken by the petitioner. From the pleadings of the parties the question that emerges out for the determination of this Court is whether under the circumstances of this case the Registrar had jurisdiction under sec. 128 of the Act to entertain a revision application against the ad interim order passed by the Deputy Registrar directing the two members not to function as Directors of the Bank and not participate as Director in the election of the Chairman of the Bank. Lengthy arguments have been addressed to the Court regarding the scope of sec. 125 and 128 of the Act. The main contention of Mr. Bajranglal on behalf of the respondents is that before any order could be passed by the Deputy Registrar under sec. 77 of the; Act either to decide the dispute himself; or to transfer it for disposal to any person who had been invested by the Government with powers in that behalf, or to refer it for disposal to one arbitrator, the Deputy Registrar should first determine whether the dispute under sec. 75 did or did not exist and till that decision was taken by the Deputy Registrar the Tribunal could not entertain any revision application under 125 of the Act and the only authority, who could entertain the revision against the ex parte ad interim order passed by the Deputy Registrar, was the Registrar alone because of the provisions of sec. 128 of the Act. To decide this controversy it will be convenient to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the parties. Sec. 75 of the Act deals with the disputes under the Act referred to the Registar for disposal and it re-reads, as follows: "75. Disputes which may be referred to arbitration - 1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time in force, if any dispute touching the constitution, management or the business of a co-operative society arises - (a) among member, past members and persons claiming through members, past members and deceased members, or (b) between a member, past member or person claiming through a member, past member or deceased member and the society, its committee or any officer, agent or employee of the society, or (c) between the society or its committee and any past committee, any officer, agent or employee, or any past officer, past agent or past employee or the nominee, heirs Or legal representatives or the nominee, heirs or legal representatives of any deceased officer, deceased agent or deceased employee of the society. (d) between the society and any other co-operative society. (e) between the society and the surety of a member, past member or a deceased member, or a person other than a member who has been granted a loan by the society or with whom the society has or had transaction under s. 66, whether such a surety is or is not a member of a society, such dispute shall be referred to the Registrar for decision and no court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or other proceeding in respect of such dispute. Sub-sec. (2) of this section lays down that - (2) For the purposes of sub-sec. (1), the following shall be deemed to be disputes touching the constitution, management or the business of a co-operative society, namely: - (a) a claim by the society for any debt or demand due to it from a member or the nominee, heirs or legal representatives of a deceased member, whether such debt or demand be admitted or not; (b) a claim by a surety against the principal debtor whether the society has recovered from the surety any amount in respect of any debt or demand due to it from the principal debtor as a result of the default of the principal debtor, whether such debt or demand is admitted or not; (c) any dispute arising in connection with the election of any officer of the society. Sub-sec. (3) reads, as follows: - If any question arises whether a dispute referred to the Registrar under this section is a dispute touching the constitution, management or the business of a co-operative society, the decision thereon of the Registrar shall be final and shall not be called in question in any court. " S. 77 lays down the procedure for the disposal of the disputes referred to under S. 75 and it provides: - "the Registrar may, on receipt of the reference of a dispute under sec. 75 - (a) decide the dispute himself, or (b) transfer it for disposal to any person who has been invested by the Government with powers in that behalf, or (c) refer it for disposal to one arbitrator. Sub-sec. (3) of this section deals with the power of the Registrar or any other person to whom the dispute is referred for decision to pass interlocutory order, and it reads, as follows: "the Registrar or any other person to whom a dispute is referred for decision under this section may, pending the decision of the dispute, make such interlocutory orders as he may deem necessary in the interests of justice. " Chapter XIII deal with Appeals, Revision and Review. S. 123 confers power on the Government to constitute a Tribunal to exercise the functions conferred on the Tribunal by or under the Act. Sub-sec. (6) of s. 123 lays down that - "any person aggrieved by - (a) any decision of the Registrar made under clause (a) sub-sec. (1) of s. 77 or (b) any decision of the power invested by the Government with powers in that behalf under clause (b) of sub-sec. (1) of s. 77, or (c) any award of an arbitrator under cl. (c) of sub-sec. (1) of s. 77, or (d) xx xx xx xx (e) xx xx xx xx may within 60 days from the date of the decision, award or order, as the case may be, appeal to the Tribunal. S. 125 deals with the revisional powers of the Tribunal and it lays down that "the Tribunal may call for and examine the record of any proceedings in which an appeal lies to it for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any decision or order passed and if in any case it shall appear to the Tribunal that any such decision or order should be modified, the Tribunal may pass such order thereon as it may deem fit. " S. 128 deals with the revisional powers of the Government and Registrar to call for the proceedings of the subordinate officers and to pass orders thereon. It reads like this: - "the State Government and the Registrar any call for and examine the record of any inquiry or the proceedings of any other matter, or any officer subordinate to them except those referred to in sec. 125, for the purpose of satisfying themselves as to the legality or propriety of any decision or order passed, and as to the regularity of the proceedings of such officer. If in any case it appears to the State Government, or the Registrar, that any decision or order or proceeding so called for should be modified, annulled, or reversed, the State Government or the Registrar, as the case may be, may after giving persons affected thereby an opportunity of being heard, pass such order thereon as it or he thinks just. " It is not disputed by learned counsel for the parties that by virtue of the provisions in the Act, the Deputy Registrar who entertained the election petition of the petitioner, was competent to accept that petitioner under sec. 75 of the Act, and that it could deal with the dispute contained in the election petition in accordance with the provisions of sec. 77 of the Act. The main objection of Mr. Bajranglal is that before the Deputy Registrar could proceed to take any decision in accordance with any of the clauses (a) (b) or (c) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 77, it was incumbent on him to decide whether really a dispute under sec. 75 did exist and it was only thereafter that the Deputy Registrar could proceed to decide whether he should himself decide the dispute or refer it for disposal to an arbitrator, or transfer it for disposal to any other person invested with the power in that behalf by the Government. According to learned counsel as long as this question was not determined by the Deputy Registrar that a dispute as mentioned in sec. 75 did really exist in the present case, the provisions of sec. 77 (1), (a) (b), or (c) did not apply and as such, the Tribunal was not competent to entertain any revision application against the ad interim orders passed by the Deputy Registrar. The further contention of Mr. Bajranglal is that at this stage the only authority available to the parties to approach against the ad interim stay order passed by the Deputy Registrar was the Registrar under sec. 128 of the Act and as such a revision petition was competent before the Registrar and if the Registrar had entertained the revision application filed by the respondent it cannot be said that the Registrar had acted without jurisdiction. Mr. Garg has, on the other hand, contended that under the provisions of sec. 77 (1) when the dispute is referred to the Deputy Registrar, he has to decide which course out of three alternatives given in clauses (a), (b) & (c) of sec. 77 (1) of the Act would be adopted by him for the disposal of the dispute, and if the Deputy Registrar after entertaining the dispute passed any ad interim order directing the Respondents Nos. 5 and 6 not to function as members of the Board of Directors of the Bank, then it shall be taken that the Deputy Registrar had decided to act under clause (a) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 77 and in such circumstances the only authority that could entertain a revision application against the interim order passed by the Deputy Registrar was the Tribunal under sec. 125 of the Act and not the Registrar under sec. 128 of the Act. According to Mr. Garg, an appeal in such matter was ultimately to lie before the Tribunal under sec. 123 (6) of the Act and therefore application of sec. 128 of the Act was totally ruled out. He also submitted that the dispute relating to the election to any office of the society is undoubtedly a dispute which could be decided under anyone of the three clauses of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 77 and therefore in any event, the appeal lies before the Tribunal, and as such, the revision application can be entertained only by the Tribunal under sec. 125 of the Act and not by the Registrar or the Government under sec. 128. In order to dispose of this ticklish question. I shall have to examine the true scope of sec. 77 of the Act. Sec. 75 of the Act defines as to what matters may come within the ambit of disputes which may be referred to the Registrar' under the provisions of the Act. Clause (c) of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 75 specifically lays down that any dispute arising in connection with the election, of any officer of the society shall be deemed to be a dispute touching the constitution, management or the business of a co-operative society. According to this clause all matters which arise out of an election to any office in the society shall be governed by the expression 'dispute', as used by the Legislature while framing sec. 75 of the Act. Sec, 77 of the Act prescribes the procedure for deciding the disputes referred to the Registrar and it lays down that the Registrar may on receipt of the reference of the dispute under sec. 75 has either to (a) decide it himself; (b) transfer it for disposal to any person who has been invested by the Government with powers in that behalf, or (c) refer it for disposal to one arbitrator. It may be mentioned here that the Registrar includes the Deputy Registrar or Assistant Registrar appointed under the Act to help or assist the Registrar in the discharge of his duties and it is admitted that by issuing a notification the Deputy Registrar has been empowered by the Government to take cognisance of a dispute relating to election to any office in the society. The question arises whether before making up his mind to decide the dispute himself or transferring it or referring it to some other authority or arbitrator is it necessary that the Registrar should first launch upon the proceedings to decide whether really a dispute does exist under the provisions of the Act. This depends upon the interpretation of the word 'dispute' as is used in sub-sec. (1) of sec. 77. Sub-sec. (3) of sec. 75 lays down that if any question arises whether a dispute referred to the Registrar under this section is a dispute touching the constitution, management or the business of a co-operative society, the decision thereon of the Registrar shall be final and shall not be called in question in any court. Mr. Bajrang Lal places reliance on this provision of the law and contends that the jurisdiction of the authorities referred to clauses (a), (b) & (c) of sub sec. (1) of sec. 77 depends on the decision of the Registrar regarding the existence of the dispute and unless the Registrar has determined that a dispute under the Act exists or not, the authorities mentioned in clauses (a), (b) or (c) of sec. 77 cannot assume jurisdiction to decide the dispute and till then the question of the application of clauses (a), (b) or (c) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 77 does not arise. Reference has been made in this connection to a Bombay case in I. R. Hingorani vs. Pravinchandra Kantilal Shah (1 ). In that case the question was raised whether it was incumbent for the Registrar or the Assistant Registrar to hear the parties before making orders referring the dispute to his nominee whether a dispute under the Maharashtra Act did exist or not. In Maharashtra Act provision analogous to sec. 77 of the Act was contained in sec. 93 and it was on the basis of that provision that an objection was raised before the Bombay High Court that prior to the referring of a dispute to his nominee the Registrar must hear the parties and decide whether to dispute did really exist or not. Sub-sec. (1) of sec. 93 of Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, reads, as follows - "if the Registrar is satisfied that any matter referred to him or brought to his notice is a dispute within the meaning of sec. 91, the Registrar shall subject to the rules decide the dispute himself or refer it for disposal to a nominee or Board of Nominee appointed by the Registrar. " Sec. 91 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 is equivalent to sec. 75 of the Act. In that case, it was urged that apart from the language of sec. 93 (1) there was a practice prevalent in Maharashtra that after the application for reference has been scrutinised in the office of the Registrar, the matter could be referred to the nominee and if a contention was raised before the Nominee that he had no jurisdiction, because no dispute existed within the meaning of sec. 91, the nominee referred back the matter to the Registrar or the Assistant Registrar who decided after giving notice to the parties whether a dispute within the meaning of sec. 91 did exist. In view of the provisions of sec. 93 (1) and sec. 92 (2) which gave finality to the decision of the Registrar which is analogous to sub-sec. (3) of sec. 75 of the Act and the practice prevalent in Maharashtra State, it was urged that sub-sec. (1) of sec. 93 contemplated a provisional satisfaction of the Registrar before the matter was referred to the nominee. The Lordships of the Bombay High Court while dealing with the provisions of that Act were of the opinion that the jurisdiction of the Registrar or his Nominee to decide a dispute depended on the Registrar being satisfied that such a dispute exists. They further observed that "the Registrar cannot, however, come to the conclusion that a dispute exists unless he first applies his mind to the matter. ' According to the learned Judges, the question whether a dispute exists or not will arise as soon as the Registrar applies his find to the matter in order to satisfy himself about the existence of a dispute within the meaning of s. 91. If he decides that a dispute exists, then he will take further action under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 93 to decide the dispute 'himself or refer it for disposal to his nominee. " Then in another Bombay case Krishnarao son of Bakaramji Hedge vs. The State of Maharashtra, through the Secretary, Agriculture and Co-operation Department and 3 others (2), their Lordships of the Bombay High Court held that - "under this Act, first the party makes a reference and the Registrar decides whether a dispute exists. Then commences the second proceeding on merits which is a judicial proceeding. " In my view these decision cannot land any a strength to the argument of Mr. Baj-rang Lal because of the difference of language that has been used in the two different Acts namely the Maharashtra Act and the Rajasthan Act. Sec. 93 of the Maharashtra Act Speaks of the satisfaction of the Registrar regarding the existence of the dispute within the meaning of s. 91 of that Act before he could decide either to refer the matter to his nominee or a Board of Nominees, or to decide the dispute himself and that satisfaction according to their Lordships of the Bombay High Court is the decision which is covered by sub-sec. (2) of s. 91 of the Act, and therefore, in the scheme of that Act, the dispute could be decided by the Registrar or may be referred for decision to a nominee or a Board of Nominees only after he was satisfied about the existence of the dispute, and if any body is aggrieved about the satisfaction of the Registrar under sub-sec. (1) of s. 93, then that matter would be referred only to the Government under the provisions of s. 154 of that Act (which is analogous to s. 128 of the Act.) In Rajasthan Act, the Legislature did not provide that before the Registrar makes up his mind to decide the dispute himself or transfers it to any person having powers in that behalf or refers it to an arbitrator, he should first satisfy himself regarding the existence of the 'dispute' within the meaning of s. 75 of the Act. In the Act, the language used by the Legislature lis: - "the Registrar may, on receipt of the reference of a dispute under s. 75 (a) decide the dispute himself, or (b) transfer it for disposal to any person who has been invested by the Government with powers in that behalf, or (c) refer it for disposal to one arbitrator. " The word 'dispute' has not been defined by the Act. When the scheme of the Act is carefully scrutinised then it is found that the Legislature has used the word 'dispute' in the Act it two different contents. When under the provisions of the Act aggrieved party refers the controversy on matters referred to in s. 75 (1) & (2) of the Act to the Registrar then that controversy which has been termed as a dispute in that section can conveniently be called the "alleged dispute" because by that time the authority concerned has not applied its mind about its existence. Sec. 75 (3), on the other hand provides that the decision of the Registrar on a question whether a dispute exists or not shall be final and shall not be challenged in civil court. Here the expression 'dispute' has been used in a different sense and means nothing less than the real controversy in respect of the matters mentioned in Sec. 75. The opening words of s. 75 are - "notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force if any dispute touching the constitution, management, or the business of a co-operative society arises. . . . . . . . . such dispute shall be referred to the Registrar for decision and no court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or other proceeding in respect of such dispute. " The use of the word 'dispute' in this section means nothing more than what the parties think is a dispute, i,e. , the 'alleged dispute' not yet determined by a competent authority. In Hingorani's case (1) it has been held that a dispute which could go to the Nominee of the Registrar for a decision should be a dispute determined by the Registrar to be a dispute in the sense of s. 92 (2) of the Maharashtra Act as is borne out from the language need by the Legislature while enacting s. 93 of that Act but that meaning is difficult to be given to the expression 'dispute' used in the used in the opening part of sec. 77 of the Act. In my opinion, sec. 77 of the Act uses the word 'dispute' in a sense in which the word 'dispute' has been used in sec. 75 because at the difference in the language uses in this section viz. , the alleged dispute which has not been determined as a dispute under s. 75 (3) of the Act. In this view of the matter, if the Registrar or the Deputy Registrar as the case may be, entertains a dispute under s. 77 and passes some interlocutory order in connection with that dispute, then it shall be presumed that he passed that order without first determining the question of the existence of the dispute under s. 75 (3) of the Act but treating it as an alleged dispute referred to him and then exercising the jurisdiction to decide that alleged dispute by any one of the three modes prescribed by cls. (a), (b) and (c) of sub sec. (I) of sec. 77 of the Act. Since the Deputy Registrar had himself issued the ad interim order restraining the respondent from functioning as Directors it shall be presumed that he took upon himself under (he provisions of cl. [a] of sec. 77 (1) of the Act to decide the alleged dispute himself, The application of cl. (a) of sec. 77[1] in such circumstances cannot be ruled out.
(3.) IT was then contended by Mr. Bajrang Lal that since the matter was not taken up before the Tribunal under sec. 125 of the Act the Registrar had the jurisdiction to exercise his power of superintendence under sec. 128 of the Act. He argued that the words "except those referred to in sec. 125", occurring in sec. 128, clearly mean that the State Government or the Registrar can exercise the power of revision under sec. 128 and call for the record of the subordinate officer in every case unless such an order has been called under sec. 125 of the Act by the Tribunal for revising the same, In support of this interpretation of sec. 128 of the Act reliance has been placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Everest Apartments Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. Bombay vs. State of Maharashtra (3) wherein their Lordships while considering the provisions of sec. 154 of the Maharashtra Act (which is an analogous provision of sec. 128 of the Act) observed - "there is no doubt that sec. 154 is potential but not compulsive. Power is reposed in Government to intervene to do justice when occasion demands it and of the occasion for its exercise, Government is made the sole judge. This power can be exercised in all cases except in a case in which a similar power has already been exercised by the Tribunal under sec. 149 (9) of the Act. The exception was considered necessary because the legality or the propriety of an order housing considered, it would be an act of supererogation to consider the matter twice. " (Underlining in mine ). IT is contended that the only exception which sec. 128 knows to fetter the revisional jurisdiction of the Registrar is that the Registrar shall not revise such orders of the subordinate officer which have already been revised by the Tribunal under sec. 125 of the Act. According to Mr. Bajranglal if the revision has not been taken to the Tribunal then order in all cases whether falling within the ambit of sec. 76 (a), or (b) or (c) is revisable under sec. 128 of the Act. Mr. Garg, on the other hand, contended that the real question before the supreme Court was not to determine the scope of sec. 149 (9) of the Maharashtra Act which is analogous to sec. 125 of the Act but the question was whether the Government was the sole Judge to revise the orders in that case or not, and in that connection, their Lordships considered the scope of sec. 154 of the Maharashtra Act, but while doing so, their Lordships in passing observed, - "this power can be exercised in all cases except in a case in which a similar power has already been exercised by the Tribunal under sec. 149 (9) of the Act. " In all humility. Mr. Garg urged that these observations of the Supreme Court are obiter dicta and do not lay down a law that orders in all matters are revisable by the Government or the Registrar which have not been taken to the Tribunal under sec. 149 (9) of that Act. I have carefully perused the entire judgment of the Supreme Court and I find that the teal question for determination for their Lordships in that case was to lay down the law regarding the true scope of sec. 154 of Maharashtra Act in respect of the powers of the Government and not to decide about the extent of the revisional jurisdiction of the Tribunal under sec. 149 (9) of that Act. Mr. Niren De. who appeared before the Supreme Court, to defend the orders of the State Government, conceded before the Court "that the State Government has been given power to call for and examine the record of any inquiry or the proceeding of any other matter of any officer subordinate to it, except those referred to in sub-sec. 9 of sec. 149, and if that was not a matter revised under sec. 149 (9) the power could be exercised by Government for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of the order. " The learned Judges examined the power of the Government in the light of these submission of Mr. Niren De and it was in this context that they were pleased to observed, - "yet the power of superintendence is given to the State Government in general terms in respect of any inquiry or proceeding with only one exception, namely, the proceedings of the Maharashtra State Tribunal, when the Tribunal calls for and examines the record of any proceeding in which an appeal lies to it, for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or the propriety of any decision or order passed. " It so appears that while, making reference to this exception in Para 5 of the judgment as reported in AIR their Lordships observed further that the power of superintendents of the Government could be exercised in all cases except in a case in which a similar power has already been exercised by the Tribunal under sec. 149 (9) of the Act. I have very carefully perused sec. 149 (9) of the Maharashtra Act and also sec. 154 of that Act which deal with the power of superintendence by the State Government or the Registrar and the Tribunal, but I do not find in sec. 154 of that the Government of the Registrar shall not exercise that power if the matter is once revised by the Tribunal under sec. 149 (9) of that Act. The argument advanced by Mr. Bajranglal bri|ngs us to examine the respective scopes of the two provisions of that Act viz. sec. 154 and 149 (9 ). Sec. 154 lays down: "the State Government and the Registrar may call for and examine the record of any inquiry or the proceedings of any other matter of any officer subordinate to them, except those referred to in sub-sec. (9) of sec. 149 for the purpose of satisfying themselves as to the legality or propriety of any decision or order passed, and as the regularity of the proceedings of such officer. " Sub-sec. 9 of sec. 149 simply says that - "the Tribunal may call for and examine the record of any proceeding in which an appeal lies to it, for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any decision or order passed. " From a perusal of these two sections together I find that sec. 154 has put one fetter on the revisional jurisdiction of the Government or the Registrar and it is that these authorities can revise all matters "except those referred to in sub-sec. (9) of sec. 149". In order to correctly determine the ambit of sec, 154 I will have to see as to what are those matter referred to in sec. 149 (a) which are made exceptions to the general power of superintendent under sec. 154 of that Act. Sec, 149 (9) refers to these proceedings only in which an appeal lies to the Tribunal. Sec. 154 does not lay down that the Government or Registrar shall not exercise power of superintendence in those matters in which such power has been exercised by the Tribunal under S. 149 (9 ). The only exception to the general power of superintendence of the Government and the Registrar is restricted to these matters which are referred in sec. 149 (9) of that Act, The expression "except those referred to in sub-sec. (9) of sec. 149" occurring in sec. 154 cannot mean anything else but this that only those which are revisable by the Tribunal cannot be revised by the Government and the Registrar under sec. 154 of that Act. I may Here state that the considerations of judicial uniformity and Judicial decisions of all the courts in India require that opinions expressed by the Supreme Court not only as a ratio decidendi in its decisions but also as obiter dicta should be given the utmost respect by all the courts in India but at the same time i feel that the courts cannot give wide connotation to the expression obiter dicta so as to include any or every expression of opinion even though it may be casual or unconnected to the point arisen before the Supreme Court in that case and such obiter cannot be placed at par with the ratio decidendi of the case. In determining the binding nature of the expression of opinion, the court shall have to take into consideration whether the expression of opinion was casual or considered or whether it was connected with any point arising in the case or whether it lays down any rule of law. I and not un-aware of the provisions of Art. 141 of the Constitution of India which expressly lays down that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India, but it does not say that every casual expression of the Supreme Court shall be a law for the land while taking a particular observation of the Supreme Court to be binding whether such observations are casual or they have been made to resolve a controversy squarely placed before it. In the above referred case the question raised before the Supreme Court was not to judge the true scope of sec. 149 (9) but the learned Judges were faced with a question relating to the scope of sec. 154 which knew only one exception to the revisional power of the Government or the Registrar viz. the matter referred to in sec. 1499; (Sub-sec. 9 of sec. 149 which deals with only with the matters which are revisable by the Tribunal. Sub-sec. (9) of sec. 149 does not say that only those matters will be treated as exceptions to sec. 154 which have been revised by the Tribunal. It was not the controversy before the Supreme Court, whether matters revisable under sec. 149 (9) will be exceptions to sec. 154 or those which have been revised thereunder will form an exception under sec. 154. In such circumstances, the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court can safely be treated by me as casual. The observations of the Supreme Court relied upon by Mr. Bajrang Lal cannot therefore be treated as laying down the law. In this view of the matter I find it difficult to accept the contention of the respondent that the Registrar had the jurisdiction to entertain a revision application in a matter in which appeal lies to the Tribunal. For the reasons mentioned above. I accept the Writ application. The order passed by the Registrar on 28-2-1968 (Ex. 5) is hereby quashed. Looking to the circumstances of this case, I leave the parties to bear their own costs. . ;