- (1.) THIS is a review petition against an order of the D. B. composed of Sh. Gajendra Singh and myself dated 13-9-65 whereby the revision presented by Motinath petitioner against the order of the commissioner, Jodhpur dated 30-3-60 was rejected. As Shri Gajendra Singh has ceased to be attached with the Board, this case came up for hearing before me. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that Sanwatram deceased now represented by the non-petitioners filed a suit for perpetual injunction against the petitioner Motinath on 14-7-68. An ad-interim injunction was granted to him on 18-7-58 and it was made absolute after hearing the objection of the petitioner Motinath on 4-2-59. No appeal was preferred against that order. However, the petitioner, Motinath, filed a cross suit u/s. 188 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act against Sanwatia on 30-5-59 and obtained a temporary injunction on 3. 6. 59. THIS order was vacated on 10-8-59 by the S. D. O. Merta on the ground that the possession of the holding in dispute was with the non-petitioners and the injunction which had been made absolute in the previous suit of the non-petitioners on 4-2-59 operated as res judicata.
(2.) AGAINST this order vacating the injunction previously granted to Motinath petitioner by the S. D. O. Motinath filed an appeal before the Commissioner who also upheld the order in favour of Sanwatram by his judgment dated 30-3-60 holding that the principle of res judicata applied to this case and that the balance of convenience demanded that the possession should remain with the respondents. He further held that it would be improper to examine the entries in the khasra Girdawri for the relevant period as it was likely to prejudice the parties. Having felt aggrieved by this order Motinath filed a second appeal before this Board. Since it was found that no second appeal lay against an order passed in appeal against the order of trial court, this appeal was considered and heard as a revision application by the aforesaid Bench of this Board. Having heard the contesting parties the D. B. held that as far as proceedings relating to temporary injunction had been made absolute in the first suit the principle of res judicata would apply and that the order would stand fill pendency of the suit. It was open for the applicant (Motinath) to have filed an appeal against that order and set it aside. As he failed to do so, the principle of res judicata would operate as a bar in the suit. While doing to the D. B. also duly considered the authority of Satyadhyan Ghosal vs. Smt. Deoraj in Debi (AIR 1960 Supreme Court page 941) in which the principle of res judicata has been expounded by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. It was observed by the D. B. that there is no doubt that the order passed by the subordinate courts is purely an interlocutory order and relates to the question of making the injunction absolute in one of the pending cases. This order can no doubt be challenged after the final order was passed by the appellate court. But it was held that this interlocutory order could not be reagitated over and over again in any subsequent suit relating to the same subject matter and between the same parties, once the order passed in the first suit had become final and had not been appealed against. It was observed that the proper course in the subsequent suit of Motinath-petitioner was to follow the rule of lis pendens and to stay the subsequent suit and to pass no orders at all in that suit. By not taking this action the trial court had contravened the provisions of sec. 10 of the Civil Procedure Code and had landed into complications. In view of this the D. B. proceeded to apply the principle of lis pendens coupled with the principles of res judicata and declined to interfere with the impugned order. The present review has been filed against this order. It is agitated before me that as the principles of sec. 10 of the C. P. C. were not acted upon by the trial court, it cannot be argued that the principle of res judicata would apply as it is contended that this interpreted on is contrary to the positive rule of law and constitutes an error apparent on the face of the record. It is argued that interlocutory orders are summary orders in which rights are not determined and, therefore, the principle of res judicata is not applicable thereto. In support of this contention reliance is placed on Hanuman Prasad vs. Board of Revenue (A. I. R. 1957 Raj. Page 281 ). There can be no dispute with this statement of law. But as the law of review stands, I am afraid, it does not permit me to grant a review petition against the impugned order on these grounds. It is well settled that a review cannot be granted on the ground that a decision is erroneous on merits. Such a ground while being appropriate for an appeal is not appropriate for an application for review. As the impugned judgment stands, it was arrived at by a conscious process of reasoning and was awarded after giving due and lengthy consideration to the material on record. It is also well established that an erroneous view of the law on a debatable point or a wrong exposition of the law or a failure to apply the law cannot be considered to be a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record and that a court has jurisdiction to decide wrongly and further that no review lies even if the decision of the court is erroneous, if the Court was aware of what it was doing. An error apparent on the face of the record must be an error of inadvertency. The error now imputed to the judgment in question cannot be categorised as such an error. As a result, I find myself unable to accept the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner and I am of the opinion that this review petition is not. maintainable. .;