JUDGEMENT
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(1.) THIS is a petition by Sitaram, resident of Sujangarh, District Churu disputing the validity of appointment of an Administrator of the Municipality of Sujangarh made by the Government by Order dated 17th May, 1959.
(2.) THE term of the Municipal Board of Sujangarh was to expire on 31st March, 1959 and the Director of Local Bodies, Jaipur addressed a letter on 9th March, 1959 to the Government to extend the term of the Board upto 30th May, 1959. THE Government, however, did not pass any order and in the meanwhile fresh election of the Municipal Board, Sujangarh were held on 13th April, 1959. Before the result of the election could be announced one Prithvi Raj Daga of Sujangarh filed a writ application to the High Court complaining of certain irregularities committed at the election and a stay order was granted directing the Returning Officer to stop further proceedings at the election, namely, the counting of the votes and declaration of the result. This was writ petition No. 146 of 1959. THE Government then appointed an Administrator of the Municipality by order of 17th May, 1959. THE petitioner who was a member of the Municipal Board, and whose term expired on 31st March, 1959, has challenged the appointment of the Administrator on the ground that the order of the Government was not authorised under the law. His prayer was that the Administrator be restrained from taking charge of the Municipal Board and bis appointment should be quashed. It may be mentioned that the Tehsildar of Sujangarh was the person who was appointed as the Administrator and a copy of the order of such appointment which has been placed on file today is as follows : - "notification No. D. 4539/f. 1 (s) (1) LSC/a/55 dated 17th May, 1959. Whereas the term of members of the existing Municipal Board, Sujangarh has expired on 1. 4. 50. And whereas the fresh Election of the said Board will take some time. And whereas the present Board has no jurisdiction to continue; And whereas it is necessary to look after the Municipal affairs of the town; Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by Sec. 203 of the Rajasthan Town Municipalities Act, 1951, the Government of Rajasthan is pleased to appoint Tehsildar Sujangarh as Ex-officio Administrator, of the Municipal Board Sujangarh. THE Tehsildar, Sujangarh shall exercise and perform all the powers and duties of the said Municipal Board of Sujangarh till its reconstitution. By order of the Governor, Keshavpuri. Dy. Secretary to the Government. "
On behalf of the State and other respondents the Collector, Churu and the Tehsildar, Sujangarh, a reply has been fried in which it was conceded that the term of the previous Board had expired on 31st March, 1959. Its term was not extended and the Administrator was appointed to conduct the Municipal affairs and that the power was properly exercised by the Government.
Sec. 203 of the Rajasthan Town Municipalities Act, 1951 permits the appointment of an Administrator where a Municipal Board is directed to be dissolved or superseded by the Government on account or incompetency or for exceeding or abusing its powers. In the present case the Board came to be dissolved because of the expiry of the term of the Board and, therefore, Sec. 203 in terms was inapplicable. The Town Municipalities Act, 1951 was amended by insertion of Sec. 19a by which the power was conferred on the Government to appoint an Administrator where the election of the total number of members of the Municipal Board is set aside on a petition challenging the validity of elections. This amendment was made by Act XXIII of 1954. None of the two sections are really applicable to the facts of the present case. As stated above, the Municipality of Sujangarh was not dissolved or superseded by any order of the Government and the elections have not yet been set aside although the proceedings for conducting the elections have been kept in abeyance by order of this Court in writ petition filed by Prithviraj Daga.
Learned counsel for the State urges that a vacuum had been created and while there is no specific power conferred on the Government in circumstances like the present for appointment of an Administrator, the affairs of the Municipal Board had to be carried out and it was for this purpose that the Administrator was appointed. It was urged that this was a contingency which was not foreseen at the time of enacting the Town Municipalities Act and the provisions of Sec. 203 or of 19a may be given a liberal construction of these section so as to validate the appointment of the Administrator.
On behalf of the petitioner attention is drawn to sec. 2 of the Rajasthan Municipal Boards (Extension of Term) Act, 1952 (Act No, XXV of 1952) and it is urged that the Government could very well avoid vaccum by extending the term of the Municipal Board and this was what was recommended by the Director of Local Bodies. It was urged that the Government should be directed to extend the term of the Board so that the Municipal affairs may have a continuity and the appointment of the Administrator being in excess of the jurisdiction or authority possessed by the Government, may be set aside.
A perusal of the analogous Acts in other States shows that either there is provi-sion for election of the new Municipal Board before the expiry of the term of the old Board or the old Board is permitted to continue till the new Board comes to function. In the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916 the term of Board is declared to be four years subject to certain extensions under sec. 10 (a ).
Under Sec. 13 (a), there is provision for the election of new Board before the expiry of the term or the extended term of the old Board.
Under the Punjab Act of 1811 there is provision for old members to continue till the successors take the oath of allegiance (sec. 13 ).
(3.) IN Rajasthan provision has been made for continuity of the Board in case of delay in elections by extending the term of the Board under sec. 2 of Act No. XXV of 1952. The appointment of an Administrator is only contemplated when the Municipal Board is found to be incompetent under sec. 203 or the Municipal elections are set aside under sec. 19-A. As the writ petition filed by Prithviraj is still pending it is not possible to foresee its result. IN other words it is not possible to say whether the election will be set aside as a result of certain fundamental illegalities committed in holding the election or whether the petition of Prithviraj will be dismissed. Sec. 19-A may perhaps be available to the Government if the entire elections may be held to be invalid by an order of this Court in the writ petition. The appropriate safeguard against any vacuum is however provided by Act No. XXV of 1952. Where, therefore, the provision exists in law for meeting the particular contingency it would not be proper for a court to add or to alter to the terms of any section in order to lend support to an action of the Government which is otherwise in excess of the power conferred by the law.
Obviously the appointment of the Administrator in the circumstances like the present is not contemplated either by sec. 19-A or sec. 203. It may be that a lacuna is left in the framing of the law but it is equally dangerous to supply any omission in a statute and to encroach upon the field of the legislature.
Craies in his 'treatise on Statute Law' (Fifth Edition) observes at page 68. "the language of Acts of Parliament, and more especially of modern Acts, must neither be extended beyond its natural and proper limits, in order to supply omissions or defects, nor strained to meet the justice of an individual case. " Learned author quoted from a judgment in Gwynne vs. Buruell (1840), 7 Cl. & F. 572,696) - "if we depart from the plain and obvious meaning on account of such views (as those pressed in argument) we do not in truth construe Act, but alter it. We add words to it, or vary the words in which its provisions are couched. We supply a defect which the Legislature could easily have supplied, and are making the law, not interpreting it. This becomes peculiarly improper in dealing with a modern statute, because the extreme conciseness of the. ancient statutes was the only ground for the sort of legislative interpretation frequently put upon their words by the judges. The prolixity of modern statutes, so' very remarkable of late, affords no grounds to justify such a sort of interpretation. " The prayer on behalf of the petitioner that the old Municipal Board should be permitted to function cannot be accepted. The term of the old Board expired on 31st March, 1959 and if the Government in its wisdom did not think it proper to extend the term, the Board came to an end and cannot be regenerated by an order of this Court.
While, therefore, the appointment of the Administrator is not competent it is also riot possible to give any direction permitting the old Board to continue to function.
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