Modi, J. - (1.) THESE are three connected transfer applications by the accused petitioner Sumermal in three connected cases which are pending in the court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Churu. The petitioner is an editor of a fortnightly paper called "sumati" which is published from Churu. He is a common accused in all the three cases which have been instituted under sec. 500 I. P. C. against him and against certain other persons by three different complainants arising out of a single news item appearing in the issue of "sumati" dated the 15th May, 1958. Suffice it to state for the purposes of the present applications that the petitioner filed applications for transfer of these cases from the court of the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate before the District Magistrate Churu, and the Sessions Judge, Bikaner on a number of grounds but he was unsuccessful. Hence the present applications.
(2.) A number of grounds have also been taken in this Court in support of the applications for transfer but I consider it unnecessary to mention any of them except one. That ground is that while these cases were being taken up before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate on the 19th January, 1959, the petitioner moved three different applications in the three cases to the effect that he proposed to make an application to the High Court for the transfer of these cases from the file of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate and the petitioner consequently prayed for a suitable adjournment to enable him to do so. The learned Magistrate passed certain orders on these applications to which I propose to refer presently in greater detail, and the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the manner in which the learned Magistrate disposed of these applications for stay of proceedings was enough to raise a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that he would not have a fair deal at the hands of this Magistrate. Taking up the case of Ridhkaran against the petitioner which forms the subject matter of transfer application No. 86 in this court, when the application for stay of proceedings in the court of the Magistrate (along with an affidavit) was filed on the 19th January, 1959, what the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate said was this : *** It is difficult to understand the order stated above. In the first place, the learned Magistrate said that he did not consider it proper to stay the proceedings as prayed. In the next sentence, however, he went on to state that the proceedings be stayed. In the third sentence again he went on to say that if any orders would be received from the High Court they would be complied with. In the fourth sentence, the learned Magistrate would appear to have come to the conclusion that the proceedings would, therefore, be continued, and yet in the last sentence he again observed that time was being granted to the accused. This is an amazing order, to say the least of it, and it is so self-contradictory that I am altogether unable to comprehend it. Turning next to the case against the petitioner instituted by Chiranjilal which forms the subject matter of revision No. 88 of 1959, a similar application (supported by an affidavit) was moved by the petitioner to the learned Magistrate in which he intimated to the court that he was intending to make an application for the transfer of this case form the file of the Magistrate to another court, and, therefore, proceedings be stayed and an adjournment be granted for the purpose. The learned Magistrate passed the following order on this application : *** This order displays the same contradictory state of affairs as the one already cited above with this difference that it appears from this that even after having made the application the accused did proceed to cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner in this connection is that when the Magistrate was not prepared to grant a stay he had no option left to him but to proceed with the case, and it is prayed that it should not be deduced from this that the petitioner had abandoned his intention to file a transfer application to this Court. Having regard to all the circumstances of the case, this submission appears to me to be not without force. I now turn to the case of Vasudeo against the petitioner, which is covered by criminal revision No. 37. A similar application was filed on the 19th January, 1959, by the petitioner in this case as in the other two cases with more or less a like result. . This application was also supported by an affidavit. In this case also the learned Magistrate observed that it was not right in his opinion that proceedings should be allowed to be stayed on an application like this and, therefore, he continued the proceedings, and further, observed that if the petitioner should succeed in obtaining a stay order from the High Court it would be complied with. To say the least, this is an astounding state of affairs, and I am not at all surprised that any person in the position of the accused would have a perfectly reasonable apprehension in his mind that he would not have justice at the hands of a Magistrate who was prepared to continue proceedings in these cases in the teath of sub-sec. (8) of sec. 526 Cr. P. C. This sub-section clearly enjoins that where any party at a trial intimates to the court at any stage before the defence closes its case that he intends to make an application under sec. 526 to the High Court, the court shall adjourn the case for such a period as will afford sufficient time for the application to be made and an order to be obtained thereon. There is also a proviso to this section but that has obviously no application to the present case, and, therefore, I do not propose to refer to it. What I wish to say is that in the first place, the learned Magistrate was utterly wrong when he refused to adjourn the case for a suitable period to enable the petitioner to make an application to this court, and stay proceedings meanwhile. In the second place, the orders passed by the learned Magistrate in the three cases, to which I have made detailed reference above, are utterly self-contradictory. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the orders originally passed by the Magistrate were different and they were subsequently interfered with and that is the reason why the orders read as unintelligible as they do. If this is a correct explanation of the self-contradictory character of the orders referred to above, the matter is indeed reprehensible. In any case, the least that can be said about these orders is that they do not make any intelligent reading, and that the learned Magistrate in passing the kind of orders which he did certainly lends himself to the suspicion that the accused petitioner would not receive justice at the hands of this Magistrate. In this state of affairs, I am clearly of opinion that the interests of justice requires that these cases should be withdrawn from the court of this Magistrate and transferred to some other court. I order accordingly, and further direct that the District Magistrate shall transfer these cases to the court of such other Magistrate in his jurisdiction as he deems fit. .;