Dave, J. - (1.) THIS is a second appeal by the defendant against the judgment and decree of the learned Civil Judge, Kotah, dated the 11th December, 1958, arising out of a suit for ejectment and arrears of rent.
(2.) THE dispute between the parties relates to an open plot of land situated in a locality which is called Chhotey Talab at Kotah. It is common ground between the parties that the said plot of land belonged at one time to Mohd. Siraj. Mohd. Siraj had rented it out to the defendant on a rent of Rs. 10/- p,m. THE plaintiff purchased the said plot from Mohd. Siraj some time in 1957 and thereafter the defendant attorned to the plaintiff. The plaintiff's case was that he intended to start a workshop of his own after his retirement and therefore he had purchased the said plot for installing his workshop at that place. After purchasing the plot, he sent a registered notice to the defendant on 17-5 57 for vacating the premises by the 30th of June, 1957, but the defendant failed to comply with this demand. It was therefore prayed by the plaintiff that the defendant may be evicted from the premises. He also claimed Rs. 45/- for arrears of rent till the date of the suit. The defendant admitted the receipt of the notice, but contested its validity. It was also urged that the defendants had tendered the rent to the plaintiff, but he refused to accept it, that the plaintiff's main purpose in asking for the defendant's eviction was to enhance the rent and therefore it was prayed that the suit should be dismissed. From the pleadings of the patties the trial court framed the following issues - (1) Does the plaintiff reasonably and bonafide require the suit premises for his use and occupation ? (2) Has a valid notice been served upon the defendant 'i (3) Did the defendant tender rent which was refused by the plaintiff ? (4) To what relief is the plaintiff entitled ? The trial court decided issue No. 2 against the defendant and issues Nos. 1 & 3 against the plaintiff. It decreed the suit for Rs. 45/-as arrears of rent. The claim for ejectment was, however, dismissed and the parties were left to bear their own costs. Aggrieved by this judgment and decree dated 30. 7. 58, the plaintiff filed an appeal which was heard by the learned Civil Judge, Kotah. It was held by him that the defendant was not protected by the provisions of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent, and Eviction) Act, 1950 which will hereinafter be referred as "the Act". It was further found by him that the plaintiff needed the suit premises for his own use reasonably and bona fide. He, therefore, allowed the appeal, amended the decree of the trial court and passed a decree for ejectment against the defendant. It is against this judgment and decree dated the 11th December, 1958, that the present appeal has been filed. Learned counsel for the appellant has urged that both the courts below have committed an error in holding that his client was not protected by the provisions of sec. 13 of the Act referred above. It is pointed out by him that pending the trial of the suit the definition of the term 'premises' occurring in sec. 3 (v) of the Act was amended so as to include "any land not being used for agricultural purposes,"that this amendment brought the disputed land within the meaning of the term 'premises', that the amendment came into force on 26. 12. 57, and thereafter the courts were debarred from passing any decree for eviction unless it could be established that the plaintiffs case was covered by one of the conditions mentioned in sec. 13 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent has urged on the other hand that although the amendment came into force on 26. 12. 57 before the suit was decided by the trial court it could not have a retrospective effect, because the legislature did not express in clear terms its intention to give retrospective effect to the said amendment. In support of his contention learned counsel has referred to C. Moothaliondam Chetty vs. G. Venkate-sam Chetti (1), Kishorilal Potdar vs. Debi Prasad Kejriwal (2), Apt Kumar Roy vs. Surendra Nath Ghose (3), and Atma Ram vs. Madanlal Rathi (4 ). In the first case the learned Judge was considering an amendment in sec. 7-A of the Madras , House Rent Control Order, 1941, as amended in July, 1941, and it was held that the amendment was not retrospective. It may be observed that under the old sec. 7-A of the Madras House Rent Control Order, 1941, it was at the option of a tenant in possession, if he wished to extend the period of his tenancy by not less than six months and not more than 12 months, to give the landlord, a notice of not less than seven days duration and by the delivery of such notice, the tenancy could be deemed to be so extended. Under the new section a tenant had complete security of possession so long as he wished to stay unless the landlord could get an order from the Controller to evict him for good and sufficient cause set out in sub-sec. (2 ). It was in those-circumstances that it was held by the learned Judge that the amendment ought not to be construed to operate retrospectively unless it was so intended to operate. The other three cases also referred to by learned counsel for the respondent have got no direct bearing on the present case. In the present case the amendment came into force on 26. 12. 5 7 and from that date any land not being used for agricultural purposes was also included in the definition of 'premises'. The main question for determination in this case is, whether this amendment could be applicable to the property involved in the pending suits. It is true that there was no express provision in the! amended Act to apply this amendment to pending proceedings, but this amendment read with the provisions of sec. 13 in the parent Act, to my mind, leaves no doubt that the respondent was entitled to get the protection under sec. 13 of the Act from the very date from which the said amendment came into force. Sec. 13 of the Act laid down that "notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract, no court shall pass any decree, or make any order, in favour of a landlord, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise evicting the tenant. " This provision read with the amended definition of the term 'premises' would mean that from 26. 12. 57 no decree for eviction could be passed against the defendant also unless the plaintiff's case was covered by the remaining provisions of sec. 13 of the Act. I, therefore, agree with the contention of the appellant's learned counsel that his client was entitled to protection of sec. 13. The next argument raised by learned counsel for the appellant is that the respondent was unable to prove if the premises were required by him reasonable and bona fide and that his case was covered by sec. 13 (h ). It may be observed that the question whether the premises were required by the respondent reasonably and bona fide is a mixed question of law and facts but more of facts than of law. I would not have gone into the tactual part of the question in second appeal, but since the first appellate court was under the impression that the protection under sec. 13 was not available to the appellant and since it did not discuss the matter, I have allowed learned counsel for both the parties to argue this point at length. It has been urged by appellant's learned counsel that there is no evidence on the record except that of the plaintiff himself that he wanted the premises for his work shop. I have carefully gone into the evidence and I think that this contention is not tenable. The plaintiff has stated that he was formerly employed in the Workshop of the Public Works Department and that even before his retirement he contemplated setting up a workshop of his own and it was with with this purpose in view that he had purchased the plot in dispute. It appears from the statement of P. W. Mohd. S. Iraj also that the plaintiff had purchased this plot really for the purpose of setting up a workshop. He has supported the plaintiff by saying that the plaintiff had expressed this intention even before he purchased the said plot. It was pointed out by learned counsel for the appellant that Mohd. Siraj is not a witness of truth. He has drawn the attention of this Court to the statement of the appellant in which it was alleged by him that Mohd Siraj was also dealing in timber and that he was interested in running down the appellant on account of competition. I have given due consideration to this argument and it is true that although the appellant had made such an allegation in his statement, it is noteworthy that he did not cross-examine Mohd. Siraj on this point when he appeared in the witness-box. This shows that the allegation made by the appellant in his statement in rebuttal was only an after thought and it was wrongly stated by him just to discredit the witness. It is also significant that Mohd. Siraj was not cross-examined on the question whether he had any kind of animosity against the appellant. I therefore, see no reason to disbelieve him. It may be mentioned that P. W. Sardar Raj has also supported the respondent on this point. In my opinion it was quite natural for the respondent to think of setting up his own workshop after his retirement since he was a smith working in the P. W. D. Workshop and he must naturally think of taking up some work to make up the deficiency in earning caused by retirement. It is urged by appellant's learned counsel that the respondent was employed in Chambal Project and therefore he could not possibly start his own workshop. In the first instance this argument is not substantial. The respondent had taken this employment temporarily before he was able to establish a workshop of his own. He could not be expected to sit idle during the interval. Moreover, learned counsel for the respondent has drawn the attention of this Court to an order dated 15. 7. 58 which purports to have been passed by the Assistant Engineer, Chambal Project, and which shows that the respondent's temporary services have been terminated. There is, therefore, all the more reason for the respondent to start his own business. In my opinion, the first appellate court was not wrong in coming to the conclusion that the respondent wanted the premises for his own use and also that his requirement was reasonable and bona fide. I, therefore, see no good ground to allow this appeal and it is dismissed with costs. . ;