Jagat Narayan, J. - (1.) THESE three petitions can best be disposed of by one judgment. The petitioners held one permanent permit each along the Bikaner-Nokha route. On 30th March 1959 the regional Transport Authority Bikaner passed a resolution suspending their permits forthwith and asking them to show cause why they should not be cancelled under section 60 (l) (a) for overloading. Against that order the present writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution were filed.
(2.) IT appears that on 27. 3. 59 the Assistant Regional Transport Officer Bikaner who is also the Secretary of the R. T. A. submitted a report that he detected the buses of the petitioners carrying passengers in excess of the number of passengers which they were allowed to carry under the conditions of the permits. Notices were issued to Krishna Gopal, and Kani Ram petitioners to appear on 30. 3. 52 before the R. T. A. and show cause why their permits should not be suspended under section 60. No such notice was issued to Binj Raj petitioner. IT is alleged by Krishna Gopal and Kani Ram that they appeared on 30. 3. 59 before the R. T. A. but were not given a hearing. Krishna Gopal has alleged in para 2 of the affidavit which he filed in support of his application that he approached the Chairman of the R. T. A. and requested him to inform him whether his. case would be taken up and that the Chairman told him that his permit stood suspended. When Krishna Gopal protested that the report submitted by the Assistant Transport Officer was not correct, the Chairman is alleged to have told him that he was not entitled to any consideration as he had appealed to the State Transport Authority against his order in some other case. This allegation has not been rebutted specifically by the R. T. A. Kani Ram petitioner and his counsel Shri Sri Narain Advocate also alleged in their affidavit that they were present at the office of the R. T. A. on 30th March 1959 in response to the notice which had been issued, but they were not called and were not given a hearing. The Assistant Transport Officer has filed a counter affidavit in which he had alleged that they did not appear, but we are not impressed by that counter affidavit as the resolution of the R. T. A. dated 30th March 1959 does not show that Krishna Gopal and Kani Ram to whom notices had been issued did not appear. So far as Binj Raj is concerned it is not suggested on behalf of the R. T. A. that any notice was issued to him to appear on 30th March 1959. We accordingly find that the order dated 30th March 1959 suspending the permits of the three petitioners forthwith was passed without giving them an opportunity of being heard. The relevant portion of sec. 60 runs as follow : - Cancellation and suspension of permits. (1) The Transport Authority which granted a permit may cancel the permit or may suspend it for such period as it thinks fit. (a) on the breach of any condition specified in sub-section (3) of sec. 59, or of any condition contained in the permit; or . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Provided that no permit shall be cancelled unless an opportunity has been given to the holder of the permit to furnish his explanation The contention of the petitioners is that no order suspending a permit can be passed under sec. 60 without giving a hearing to a person whose permit it is intended to suspend. On behalf of the R. T. A. however it is argued that the wordings of the section show that the intention of the Legislature is that only in case of cancellation of a permit an opportunity to be heard has to be given but not in the case of suspension of the permit. Reliance has been placed on Kishore Singh vs. State of Rajasthan (l ). That was a case of cancellation of an arms licence. An order cancelling an arms licence is purely an executive order. No appeal is provided against such an order. On the other hand an order cancelling or suspending a permit passed under sec. 60 of the Motor Vehicles Act is a quasi judicial order which is appealable under sec. 64 (b ). The ruling relied upon on behalf of the R. T. A. is therefore not applicable to the present case. An order suspending a permit under sec. 60 is an order of punishment and before such an order can be passed rules of natural justice require that a hearing should be given to the party intended to be punished. It was held in K. Balgangadharan vs. C. R. Traffic Board (2) that the proviso to sec. 60 (1) cannot apply where the permits have not been cancelled but only suspended, yet rules of natural justice require that a person should be given a fair opportunity to state his case before he is punished. It was contended on behalf of the R. T. A. that the order suspending the permits of the petitioners was not an order of punishment but it was an order passed pending inquiry. In our opinion no such order of suspension pending enquiry is warranted by sec. 60 of the Motor Vehicle Act. Every order of suspension of a permit is appealable under sec. 64 (b ). It follows that every order of suspension is a quasi judicial order, which should only be passed after giving a hearing to the party affected. It does not therefore matter whether the order of suspension was passed pending enquiry or it was passed by way of punishment. As the orders in the present cases were passed without giving a hearing to the petitioners they are illegal and are set aside. The permits of the petitioners have remained suspended for mote than 3 months and in our opinion they have been sufficiently punished for the alleged over-loading if any. It is unnecessary to deal with other points raised in the writ petitions. In the circumstances of the case we allow the writ petitions and orders dated 30th March 1959 suspending the permits of the petitioners are set aside. We make no order as to costs. . ;