- (1.) THIS revision arises in the following circumstances : Nahar Singh and his son Balwant Singh instituted a suit for ejectment of Kalu, who was tenant of a shop belonging to the plaintiffs, on the ground that the shop was required for the personal use of the plaintiffs, this being one of the grounds mentioned in sec. 13, which took away the protection against ejectment otherwise provided by that section under the Rajasthan Premises ( Control of Rent and Eviction ) Act, 1950. The suit was instituted on 24. 7. 1956. The defendant denied the allegation, but the suit was decreed on 31st May, 1957. The appeal was dismissed on 31st January, 1958, and the revision was rejected on 13. 2. 1958 by the High Court. The landlords put their decree in execution, and obtained possession on 20th February, 1958.
(2.) ON 13th May, 1958, Kalu made an application under sec. 15 of the Act alleg-ing that the landlord had failed to utilise the premises for his personal use within two months of obtaining the possession, and, therefore, Kalu, who was the evicted tenant, should he placed in possession of the premises. The commissioner, who was appointed in the case, reported to the court on the next day that the shop was lying vacant. The landlords filed a reply, in which it was said that the shop needed repairs which were' started on the 1st of March, 1958, and were completed by the middle of May, and the shop was occupied by the landlords on the 21st of May, 1958. The learned Munsif was of the opinion that the shop needed repairs, and, therefore, the landlords cannot be said to have committed default, if they occupied the shop after the period mentioned in sec. 15. He accordingly rejected the application. ON appeal, the learned Civil Judge was of opinion that the language of sec. 15 was imperative, and the period of two months allowed by the section was considered sufficient by the Legislature for petty repairs that may be required, and since the landlords had not occupied the shop within that period, no indulgence could be allowed under the law to the landlords and the tenant was entitled to an order for being placed in possession of the premises. This order was passed on the 9th of March, 1959. The landlords Nahar Singh and Balwant Singh sold this shop on 20th March, 1959, to Bhuri Lal and his son Thavar Chand, on 25th May, 1959. Nahar Singh and Balwant Singh, the previous owners, together with Bhuri Lal and Thavar Chand, the new owners, filed this revision and various grounds were urged in support of that petition. It was urged in the first instance that the words "fails to utilise" in sec. 15 should be taken to be qualified by some such words "as without proper reasons". It was urged that in the present case the shop needed repairs, and it was for that reason that the landlords were unable to occupy this shop during the prescribed period. It may be mentioned that while Nahar Singh and Balwant Singh said in reply to the petition of the tenant that repairs had been started on the 1st of March, Nahar Singh said in his statement on oath as a witness that the repairs were started in the third week of March, and it was further disclosed in the evidence that the said repairs consisted of re-plastering and re-flooring of the shop. He, however, admitted that he had engaged one or two masons, who worked for about 20 days regularly, and thereafter they used to come either in the morning or in the evening or on Sundays, and so the work went on till 1 5th of May. He also stated that his grandson had become ill in the middle of April, and he remained in the hospital as an indoor patient for some time. It was also stated that a corrugated iron sheet was affixed outside the shop, the sanction whereof was received only on 12th May, 1958. It may be mentioned that sec. 20 of the Act imposes a duty on the landlord to keep the premises in good repair during the period of tenancy, and sub-sec. (2) permits a tenant to make the repairs if the landlord does not arrange for the repairs within a reasonable time after notice, and to recover the expenses from the landlord upto a certain limit. When a suit is instituted for ejectment of a tenant on the ground that the landlord requires the same for his personal use, it is often impossible to controvert that statement, and in order to guard against fictitious allegations, sec. 15 provides a remedy to a tenant in case the landlord fails to utilise the premises to the use or purpose for which the eviction had been obtained, The sec. has, however, given two months* time to the landlord to arrange for the utilisation, and it must be taken that the Legislature considered this period of time to be sufficient for making arrangements by the landlord for occupation of the premises by him. The section authorises the court to place the evicted tenant in possession of the premises in case the utilisation is not made by the landlord within the prescribed period. While the language conferring power on the court is that the court "may" place the evicted tenant in possession, the context and the background in which this power is conferred indicates that the tenant has a right to be placed in possession of the premises in the circumstances mentioned in the section. But circumstances can be conceived where this power may be construed as being discretionary where for various reasons it may not be possible to comply with the letter of the law. Suppose, for instance, that the landlord sells the property to some person within a week of receiving possession. It is impossible in the circumstances that the landlord, who has succeeded in a suit, should occupy the premises himself. In such circumstances, if the vendee gets into possession and utilises the premises for his own purpose, the court will have discretion whether the evicted tenant should be given relief as mentioned in the section. Another instance can be whether the tenant may have been ejected on the ground of requirement of personal use, yet the premises may be made over for a public purpose or for philanthropic use soon after obtaining possession. Since the tenant is not afforded protection in either of the two other cases, it may well be that the court will have a discretion as to whether the relief should be granted to the tenant. In the present case, I have no hesitation in agreeing with the lower appellate court that the grounds alleged by the landlords Nahar Singh and Balwant Singh for the delay in the occupation are insufficient to deny the relief to the evicted tenant Kalu. Learned counsel for the applicants contended on behalf of Bhurilal and Thavar Chand that these persons obtained the sale of the shop on 20th March, 1952, without any knowledge of the litigation pending between Nahar Singh and Balwant Singh on the one hand and Kalu on the other, and that subsequently to the sale they utilised the shop at once for carrying on the business of grocery, and that they have no other premises where they can now shift their business. It was urged that the vendees would be entitled to institute a fresh suit for possession of the shop on the ground of personal necessity in case Kalu is reinstated in that shop in the present proceedings, and that they can do so in their own right. Now, so far as the present proceedings are concerned, they started between Nahar Singh and Balwant Singh on the one hand and Kalu on the other. If Bhuri Lal and Thawar Chand come in the picture, they could in these proceedings only insist on what rights they obtained by assignment from Nahar Singh and Balwant Singh, and as stated earlier, Nahar Singh and Balwant Singh having failed to occupy the shop within two months could not resist the prayer of the tenant for being placed in possession of the shop. Whatever is now urged on behalf of Bhurilal and Thavar Chand is that they in their own right ate entitled to remain in possession, as they have the right to sue for ejectment of Kalu on the ground that they required the shop for their own purpose. In fact, even if Nahar Singh and Balwant Singh had failed in their suit for ejectment, Bhuri Lal and Thavar Chand could institute a suit on their own personal necessity, and the previous judgment would be no bar to a fresh enquiry on the allegations of Bhuri Lal and Thavar Chand. Since these two vendees alleged a right of their own irrespective of what rights were possessed by the vendors, it is upto them to submit their objections under sec. 15 of the Act to the trial court, and it would be for that court to take into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case and the equities that arise from the conduct and action of the parties, and to decide those objections on the merits. So far as the present revision is concerned, this can only be taken to be a revision on behalf of Nahar Singh and Balwant Singh, and if Bhuri Lal and Thavar Chand joined in the petition they can only be treated as persons who had acquired certain rights from the vendors and will be considered to be in the same position as the vendors. The revision is accordingly dismissed. The petitioners will pay the costs to the respondent.
(3.) LEARNED counsel for the appellants wants leave to appeal. I do not see good grounds for grant of certificate that the case is a fit one for appeal on behalf of Nahar Singh and Balwant Singh. I, however, certify that the case is a fit one for appeal so far as Bhuri Lal and Thavar Chand are concerned. .;