Sarjoo Prosad, C. J. - (1.) THIS appeal has been referred to this Bench for decision as the questions involved are of sufficient importance and affect several other pending appeals. The material facts as set out in the judgment of reference are as follows : -
(2.) THE Collector of Barmer appointed the Sub-divisional Magistrate of Balotra as the Returning Officer for holding election of members of the Balotra Municipality, THE Returning Officer fixed 24th of December 1957 as the date for the election. He also notified that nominations could be filed between the 1st and 9th of December 1957. THE appellant, Shatrushal filed his nomination paper on 6th December, 1957 while the respondent Noor Mohammad filed his, on the 9th of December, which according to the date prescribed by the officer, was the last date for the receipt of nomination papers. It appears that 8th December, 1957, was a public holiday. As a result of the poll, Noor Mohammad, the respondent was declared elected. THE appellant Shatrushal then filed an election petition, out of which this appeal arises, before the District Judge, Balotra. THE main objections on which the election petition was founded were twofold : (1) That the nomination paper of Noor Mohammad having been filed on 9th December 1957 was not filed "at least fifteen days before the date election" as required by rule 15 of the Rules framed under the Rajasthan Town Municipalities Act; and that the improper acceptance of the nomination paper had materially effected the result of the election; (2) That the nomination paper of Noor Mohammad was not handed over to the Returning Officer personally, but was presented to one Bansidhar, a clerk in the court of the Sub-divisional Magistrate; as such, there was no proper presentation in the eye of law and the nomination paper should have been rejected. The court below after discussing the relevant issues framed in the case found in favour of Noor Mohammed and held that sec. 10 of the General Clauses Act (1897) of the Central Legislature applied to the case and cured the defect, if any, in the presentation of the nomination paper of the respondent. In other words, the court held that the filing of the nomination paper on 9th December 1957, though not strictly in accordance with rule 15, was valid because of the fact that 8th December, 1957, was a public holiday and, under the above provision of the General Clauses Act, the nomination paper could be received on the next working day. On the other question also, the court below held following the decision of this Court in Sajjan Singh vs. Bhogilal Pandya (1) that the presentation was valid and the clerk in question was competent to receive the nomination paper on behalf of the Returning Officer, he having been duly authorised to do so. On these grounds, the court below dismissed the election petition against which order the appeal has been preferred. The questions indicated above have been again canvassed before us by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties. The first question which we have to consider is whether the acceptance of the nomination paper of the respondent Noor Mohammad on 9th of December 1957 was improper and illegal so as to materially affect the result of the election. The validity of elections can be challenged on grounds embodied in sec. 19 of the Rajasthan Town Municipalities Act (Act No. XXIII of 1951 ). Sub-sec. (5) which is relevant to the present enquiry says : "if the validity of the election is brought in question only on the ground of an error by the officer or officers charged with carrying out the rules made under clause (b) of sub-sec. (2) sec. 205 or of an irregularity or informality not corruptly caused, the Judge shall not set aside the election. " Then follows an explanation which runs thus : "the expression 'error' in this sub-section does not include any breach or any omission to carry out or any non-compliance with the provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder whereby the result of election has been materially affected. " The sub-section, therefore, postulates that the validity of an election cannot be questioned merely on the ground of an error in not complying with the rules framed under the Act, provided the error is of such a nature that thereby "the result of the election is materially affected. " It is clear that but for the above Explanation an election could not be set aside on the mere ground of some irregularity in following the rules. In order to succeed, therefore, the appellant has to show not only that there is non-compliance with the rules but that the same has materially affected the result of the election. Thus it is necessary to consider whether there has been any breach of the rules; and if so, whether the breach in question has materially affected the result of the election. The complaint in this case is that there was no compliance with rule 15 of the relevant rules which being mandatory was in itself sufficient to vitiate the election. The rules have been framed under sec. 205 of the Municipal Act and have the effect of statutory rules. R. 15 provides that every person who intends to stand for election in any ward, 'shall not less than fifteen days before the date fixed for election', signify his intention by applying in writing to the Returning Officer in the prescribed form. The period mentioned in the rule is the sheet anchor of the appellant's case. Special stress is laid on the words that the application signifying a candidate's intention to stand for election "shall" be submitted to the Returning Officer "not less than fifteen days before the date fixed for election. " It is contended that the period mentioned in the rule is integrated with the time scheme governing the entire election proceedings and is therefore of the essence of the matter. Any violation of the time scheme is in the circumstances not permissible and the mandate of r. 15 has to be given full effect; in other words, if the nomination paper was presented within the forbidden limit of fifteen days prior to the election, the nomination paper had to be rejected as a matter of course. Reliance has been placed by the learned counsel on certain decisions of this Court as also of the Calcutta High Court bearing on analogous provisions of other statutes and rules and also upon two decisions of Judges of this Court sitting singly, directly bearing on the import and application of the r. 15 itself It is further submitted that as the acceptance of the nomination paper in the present case was that of the returned candidate himself, there could be hardly any doubt that the said illegal procedure adopted by the Returning Officer in violation of r. 15 has affected materially the result of the election. In this connection, our attention has been drawn to the decision of the Supreme Court in Vashist Narain Sharm vs. Dev Chandra (2), where Ghulam Hasan J. commenting on the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent analysed the three different ways in which the question of improper acceptance of a nomination might materially affect the result of the election: (1) where the candidate whose nomination was improperly accepted had secured less votes than the difference between the returned candidate and the candidate securing the next highest number of votes; (2) where the person referred to above secured more votes; and (3) where the person whose nomination has been improperly accepted is the returned candidate himself; and then proceeded to observe with reference to the last category that it might be readily conceded that such would be the conclusion. It cannot be gainsaid that the above remark of the Supreme Court is entitled to much weight, it is accordingly urged that on the facts of the present case that application for setting aside the election should have been entertained as well founded under sec. 19 (5) of the Act. The above contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant deserve serious notice. Before we come to discuss the points raised, it would be useful to refer at this stage to some of the cases which have been cited by the learned counsel. In the case of Gopesh Chandra Aditya vs. Benode Lal Das (3) the plaintiff had filed a suit for declaration that his nomination paper had been illegally rejected and that his rival candidates had not been duly elected as members of the Municipal Board of Sylhet. 18th of April, 1934 was the date fixed for the election and the plaintiff sent his nomination paper on the 3rd of April, which was otherwise in order, to the Election Magistrate. Under the relevant rules, nomination papers had to be sent to the Chairman of the Municipality and not to the Magistrate. The Magistrate, however, forwarded the nomination paper to the Chairman of the Municipality, whom it reached on 5th April 1934, the Municipal Office being closed from 30th March to 4th April. On an objection taken to the validity of the nomination paper, the Magistrate, who heard the objections, held that the nomination was invalid and rejected the nomination paper Accordingly, the plaintiff sued for the above declarations. The suit was filed on the strength of the proviso to sec. 13 of the Municipal Act, which stated that nothing contained in the section or in the rules framed under the authority of the Act would affect the jurisdiction of the civil courts to decide on the question as to whether a person was or was not qualified to be a voter or eligible for election as member of the Municipal Board. R. 13 of the rules framed under the Assam Municipal Act which applied to the case required that a candidate for election should send his name to the Chairman in writing in a prescribed form with necessary particulars filled up by a date "not less than fifteen days before the date fixed for electioin" and supported by the signatures of two electors in each ward in which he proposed to stand. It was held on the interpretation of this rule that compliance therewith was mandatory and the nomination was invalid. The grounds were that the candidate should have sent his nomination paper to the Chirman, and if he sent it to somebody else, who was not authorised to receive it, he did not comply with the rules. The other ground was that the nomination paper having been received by the Chairman on the 5th of April and the date of election being the 18th April, there was not an interval of clear fifteen days between the date of submission of the nomination paper and the date of election. According to the learned Judges, the time mentioned in the rule was of the essence of the thing and if there was not clear fifteen days interval, the nomination was invalid. This assumption in law was not challenged before the learned Judges, but it was argued that by reason of the provisions of sec. 14 of the Eastern Bengal and Assam General Clauses Act, (which is analogous to Sec. 10 of the Central Act) it should have been taken that between the 5th and 18th April there was an interval of clear fifteen days, the municipal office being closed from the 30th March to 4th April. The contention was overruled. We will have to come back to this decision shortly after we have examined some of the cases of this Court on which the learned counsel has sought to rely. In Prabhudayal vs. Chief Panchayat Officer, Jaipur (4) it was held that rule 4 of the Rajasthan Panchayat Election Rules is mandatory and must be strictly obeyed before an election is held, the reason given being that before the notice mentioned in rule 4 is published the electors do not know whether the entire Panchayat circle will be divided into wards or not and whether the election would take place for all the members of the Panchayat treating the entire Panchayat circle as one ward. The voters consequently of the Panchayat circle would come to know for the first time by the notice in question that the Panchayat circle would-be divided into a number of wards and a certain number of Panchas would be elected from each ward. The above rule provides that the notice should be given to the electors "at least seven days before the date for election. " The announcement in that case was five days before the election. It was held that this was a clear violation of a mandatory provision of the rule and, therefore, it vitiated the election. It is important to notice that it was contended before the learned Judges that rule 20 of the Rules mentioned the grounds on which the election of an individual could be challenged, i. e. which the election was the outcome of some misconduct or corrupt practice substantially influencing the result thereof. R. 20 therefore obviously did not govern the case where there was non-compliance with the rules and on the language of rule 4 it was held to be mandatory, because otherwise the voters would be deprived of certain essential knowledge in regard to the conduct of the election. Consequently, the period mentioned therein was held necessary to give due notice to the persons interested. This case was followed in another decision of the Court in Anokhmal Bhurelal vs. Chief Panchayat Officer, Rajasthan, Jaipur (5) in which the judgment was delivered by my brother Ranawat J. The above cases including the Calcutta decision are, in our opinion, clearly distinguishable, as they depend upon the language and context of the particular role or statute to which they relate. In the Calcutta case it was held on the language of sec. 13 of the main statute itself that compliance with the relevant rule, which had also the same number was mandatory. Besides it was found that there was no valid presentation of the nomination paper at all, the presentation having been made to an officer, who under the rule was not authorised to receive the same. The decisions of this Court have a bearing on the interpretation of Rule 4 of the Panchayat Rules, it being found that Rule 20 of those rules under which an election petition could be filed had no application to the case and therefore strict compliance of the provision in Rule 4 was necessary in order to give due notice to persons interested. It is to be remembered that in none of these cases there is to be found any provision analogous to sec. 19 (5) of the Rajasthan Town Municipalities, Act, with which we are concerned in this case. It is this provision which governs and controls the rules framed under the Act in so far as violation of the rules is likely to affect materially the result of the election. The question whether a particular rule of law is mandatory or directory is not easy to answer and cannot be decided safely merely upon drawing analogies from certain provisions of other rules. The language of the rule in question or the provision of law has to be examined in each case specially in the context and scheme of the legislation and the matter has to be approached in the light of certain well known standards or tests. The mere use of the word "shall" does not make any difference if the context suggests that the legislature did not intend that any disobedience of minor rules of the procedure should defeat its main purpose. The primary consideration therefore is the language of the rule itself, examined in the light of the scheme and purpose of the legislation in the context of which the rule occurs. Secondly, it has to be seen whether on the face of the rule there is any penalty provided in which case the penalty may require to be enforced. Thirdly, one has to interpret the rule having regard to the balance of convenience which may result in case it is held to be directory or mandatory. Lastly, the well known doctrine of construction should be borne in mind that where the legislature requires a thing to be done by any public authority or person, then if there is substantial compliance with the rule, it should be held to be sufficient. The legislature could not have intended to cause harassment to parties concerned where due to unavoidable reasons, the public authority or person was not able to perform the duty strictly according to schedule. If these principles are kept in view, the interpretation as to the effect and import of rule 15 becomes clear. Let us see how the rule occurs in the context of the rules both preceding and following it. The scheme of the Act shows that some date has to be fixed for the election and this apparently appears to be left to the Returning Officer, because voters' list has to be prepared and finalised within a certain time before the date of the election after disposing of objections raised in the matter. Then the Returning Officer publishes notice under rule 14 about the election. In rule 14 also, the language is "not less than one month before the date fixed for the election. " Then comes rule 15 where persons intending to stand for election in any ward are required to signify their intention by applying in writing to the Returning Officer in a prescribed form. Here again the language is "not less than fifteen days before the date fixed for el c ion. " Rule 16 prescribes the mode in which the application for nomination has to be made. Sub-rule (1) of that rule requires that the candidate should deposit or cause to be deposited in the office of the Municipal Board a sum of twenty five rupees in cash and forward the receipt along with his application for candidature and no application shall be valid unless accompanied by such receipt. Here it is apparent that a penalty is attached, if there is non-compliance with the rule in question in making the deport. Then comes another important rule which is rule 17. This provides that on the last day fixed for receiving applications for candidature, the Returning Officer shall at 5 P. M. read out the names of the candidates whose applications have been received and a list of such candidates shall forthwith be posted up under his signature in the Municipal office with a notice that objections, if any, to the candidature of the persons specified in the list would be heard and disposed of by him at 3. P. M. on the third working day after the date of the publication of the aforesaid notice. On that day, the Returning Officer is to hear objections, if any, and after such summary enquiry as he may deem necessary regarding those objections, he may reject for reasons to be recorded the names of those against whom the objections prevail and prepare a list of such others as are considered to be duly eligible under the foregoing rules to stand for election and announce their names. Sub-rule (2) of rule 17 provides that the Returning Officer may on his own motion reject an application if the application is not in the prescribed form, or does not contain all the information required to be furnished by the form prescribed or if the information furnished is found to be incorrect. It is significant that R. 17 does not anywhere speak of rejection of the candidate's nomination merely because of some delay in filing the same as required by rule 15 of the Rules. These factors go to indicate that rule 15 was not meant to be mandatory. On account of the delay the returning officer could reject, if he thought proper or accept inspite of it. Rule 15 has to be read along with rules 16 and 17 and the whole object of the rule is to enable both the voters and the objectors reasonable time to know about the candidates who have filed their nomination papers and have been announced as duly nominated. If there has been substantial compliance with the rules, it cannot be said that the result of the election has been materially affected. In this case, there is no denying the fact that objections were filed under rule 17 of the Rules and duly disposed of by the Returning Officer and no objection has been raised before us by any voter or the appellant that on account of the acceptance of the nomination paper of the returned candidate by the returning officer on the date in question, he was seriously prejudiced in exercising his right of voting. Above all this, as I said the rules are controlled by the language of sec. 19 of the Act itself which requires that the election could not be set aside merely on account of an error in compliance with the rules or breach or omission thereof, unless it is further shown that the result of the election has been materially affected. On these grounds, it seems to us that the rule in question cannot but be held to be merely directory and not mandatory, and in case there has been substantial compliance thereof, no complaint can be entertained merely on account of the technical violation of the rule, if any. The learned counsel for the appellant has cited some extreme instances to support his contention that compliance with the rule was mandatory. The exigencies of such instances, if any, can be clearly met by the provisions of sec. 19 as affecting materially the result of the election, even though the rule may be held to be directory. In view of sec. 19, it is plain enough that ex propria vigori the infringement of any of the rules or provision of the Act would not vitiate the election unless the result thereof was substantially affected in consequence of that breach or infringement. We may at this stage refer to a decision in Ajit Kumar Sen vs. State of West Bengal (6) where the principles for determining the mandatory or directory nature of a rule or statutory provision have been appropriately formulated and with which we respectfully agree. It was recognised there that the question whether a particular provision is mandatory or directory is, in many instances, extremely difficult. The language employed is not always a sure index For instance, the mere fact that the word "shall" has been used, does not necessarily justify the conclusion that the provision is imperative, nor is it possible to lay down any hard and fast rule in the matter. Broadly speaking, however, it was held, that there are three fundamental tests which are often applied with remarkable success in the determination of this question. They are based on considerations of the scope and object, sometimes called the scheme and purpose of the legislation in question; on consideration of justice and balance of convenience; and also on a consideration of the nature of the particular provision, namely whether it affects the performance of a public duty or relates to a right, privilege or power. In the former case, the Act is generally directory, in the latter, mandatory. There the question related to the interpretation of certain sections of the Calcutta Municipal Act (No. 3 of 1923 ). In particular, sub-sec. (3) of sec. 45 required that the notification fixing the date of election had to be published in the official Gazette "not less than two months before the date fixed for the election. " It was argued that although the mandate of the section had been disobeyed and the publication was within less than two months of the date of election, the election was not affected thereby. It was further held that the object of providing that the notification should be published not less than two months before the date fixed for the election was to give notice to the intending candidates as well as to the voters in good time; and they found that in the circumstances of the case, there was substantial compliance with the rule. This Court also recognised the same principle in Dalel Shigh vs. Tehsildar of Chhoti Sadri (7 ). In that case, their Lordships had to consider the effect and import of sec. 14 of the Rajasthan Panchayat Act (No. 21 of 1953 ). It was urged before them that a somewhat similar provision under the rules framed in the Marwar Panchayat Act was held to be directory, in Poonma vs. Gram Panchayat of Koselao (8 ). Their Lordships observed that whether a provision like sec. 14 was mandatory or directory depended upon the scheme of the particular Act in which it was to be found and a decision on one Act could be no authority for the interpretation of the nature of a section like section 14 in another Act, and then looking to the provisions of the Rajas-than Panchayat Act, they came to the conclusion that sec. 14 was mandatory and could not be held to be a merely directory. It is not necessary to refer to the other reasons for the decision which are not germain to the investigation before us. Our view that Rule 15 in the instant case is not mandatory finds ample support from the above decisions. We have now to consider the two other decisions cited by the appellant's learned counsel which have a direct bearing on the interpretation of rule 15. Reference has been made to the decision of Bhandari J. in Shri Madan vs. Shri Ram Kumar (S. B. Civil Miscellaneous First Appeal No. 30 of 1956, decided on 31st of July 1957.) This decision is clearly distinguishable, as it turned merely on the consideration of the question whether the presentation of the nomination paper under rule 15 was or was not less than fifteen days before the date fixed for the election. The ratio of the decision is that "not less than fifteen days" should be held to mean that there must be a clear margin of fifteen days between the date of presentation of the nomination paper and the date fixed for the election. In other words, fifteen clear days must intervene between the two terminals. Incidentally it should be observed that this decision follows the earlier decision of this Court in Anokhmal Bhurelal's case (5) (ibid) on the point. Bhandari J. did not purport to decide exactly whether rule 15 was directory or mandatory. The other decision is by Jagat Narayan J. dated the 6th of March 1959 in Ram Khilari vs. Hari Singh (S. B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 17 of 1959; since reported 1959 RLW, 415) There the learned Judge, of course, decided that rule 15 was mandatory, but without any discussion of the context in which it appeared. The other point which the learned Judge then considered was as to the meaning of the expression "not less than fifteen days before the date of election". Following the analogy of Anokhmal's case (ibid) he held that the nomination paper had not been duly presented and this fact alone was sufficient, ac:ording to the learned Judge, to affect materially the result of the election as the delay could not be condoned. In view of the reasons, which we have already given, we find ourselves unable to agree with this decision. In our opinion, our view as to the directory nature of the rule would be sufficient to dispose of the matter, as there was substantial compliance with the rules and nothing has been established to show that the result of the election was in any way affected, much less materially, on account of the acceptance of the nomination paper by the Returning Officer on the date in question. Even if it is held otherwise, the next question which arises is, whether sec. 10 on the General Clauses Act (No. 10 of 1897) could be invoked to validate the presentation of the application on the 9th, assuming that it was within the forbidden period as mentioned in rule 15. In view of sec. 3 of the Act, it is conceded that the provisions of the General Clauses Act, 1897 of the Central Legislature, do apply to the Rajasthan Town Municipalities Act in the same manner as they applied to a Central Act. But it is argued that rule 15 has not fixed any period as to attract the operation of section 10 of the General Clauses Act. Sec. 10 of the General Clauses Act (omitting portions thereof which are at present irrelevant) runs thus: "10. Where, by any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, any act or proceeding is directed or allowed to be done or taken in any Court or office on a certain day or within a prescribed period, then, if the Court or office is closed on that day or the last day of the prescribed period, the act or proceeding shall be considered as done or taken in due time if it is done or taken on the next day afterwards on which the Court or office is open. " The substance of the section is to enable a person to do what he could have done on a holiday on the next working day and the significant words in the section are that the sect on would apply where the act or proceeding is directed or allowed to be done "within a prescribed period"; in that case if the Court or office is closed on the last day of the prescribed period, the act could be done on the next working day. Here, on the plain language of sec. 15, there is a prescribed period. The prescribed period is that the nomination should be presented "not less than fifteen days before the date fixed for election". The period has not been fixed with reference to any particular event, but with reference to a future event; but in either case there is no difficulty in reckoning the period because the date of the future event is known. The reckoning is not forward, but backward; but that should make no difference on principle in the application of a beneficent provision like sec. 10 of the General Clauses Act. Of course, in reckoning the period of fifteen days, one has to count from the date fixed for the election which may be excluded from consideration and then counting the 15th day, which, according to the decisions of this Court already mentioned, have to intervene, we may regard the day preceding the 15th day as "the last day of the prescribed period". That day, according to calculation fell on the 8th of December, 1957 which was a holiday. Therefore, there appears to be no reason why the benefit of see. 10 of the General Clauses Act should not be given to the party. It is not a case of extension of the period in Rule 15 by the Returning Officer, but the period is extended by operation of a complementary statutory provision. We are unable to appreciate the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that there is no period prescribed by rule 15. The period of limitation is undoubtedly there, and it is because of the period that all this argument has been addressed to us. We find ourselves much in agreement on this point with the views expressed in the decision of Punjab High Court in Suraj Bhan vs. Randhir Singh (9 ). This we do irrespective of our difference as to the meaning of the term "ten clear days' notice". That case had a bearing on sec. 55 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 under which a candidate could retire from contest only if he gave notice "not later than ten days prior to the date fixed for the poll". The polling was fixed for the 10th of March, 1957, and notice of retirement by one of the candidates was given on the 28th of February, 1957. The election was challenged on the ground that the intention of retirement having been given after the expiry of the prescribed time, the entire election was vitiated. It was found that 27th of February 1957 was a holiday and that under the General Clauses Act, the nomination could be filed on the 28th of February, 1957. They refuted the contention that sec. 55 of the Representation of the People Act did not really prescribe any period within which a particular act was to be done, but merely mentioned a condition precedent as to the doing of an act. The view which we have taken of the matter is also fortified by the authority of the Supreme Court in H. H. Raja Harinder Singh vs. Karnail Singh (10 ). There the argument was that the election petition had been presented beyond the time prescribed by rule 119 (a) and, therefore, should not have been entertained and that sec. 10 of the General Clauses Act had no application to the case. Under rule 119 the petition has to be filed not later than fourteen days from the date of publication of the notice in the official Gazette under rule 118 that the return of election expenses of such candidate and the declaration made in respect thereof had lodged with the Returning Officer. According to this rule, the last date was May 16, 1954 which happened to be a Sunday and the day following had been declared a public holiday. The petition was accordingly presented on May 18, 1954. The presentation was held to be valid. Their Lordships observed that sec. 10 of the General Clauses Act would apply. All that was requisite is "that there should be a period prescribed, and that period should expire on a holiday. " Then they observed that it could not be denied that the period of fourteen days provided in rule 119 (a) for presentation of an election petition was a period prescribed and that was its true character, whether the words used are "within fourteen days" or "not later than fourteen days" and that there was in substance no distinction between the two expressions. To quote the language of their Lordships : - "it is obvious that the rule making authority could not have intended to go further than what the section itself had enacted, and if the language of the rule is construed in conjunction with and under the coverage of the section under which it is framed, the words "not later than fourteen days" must be held to mean the same thing as "within a period of fourteen days". Reference in this connection should be made to the heading of R. 119 which is, "time within which an election petition shall be presented". We entertain no doubt that the Legislature has used both the expressions as meaning the same thing, and there are accordingly no grounds for holding that sec. 10 is not applicable to petitions falling within R. 119. We are also able to read in the proviso to sec. 37 of the Act an intention generally to exclude the operation of sec. 10 of the General Clauses Act in the construction of Rules, as that will be against the plain language of R. 2 (6 ). It should be noted that proviso applies only to Sec. 30 (c) of the Act, and it is possible that the Legislature might have considered it doubtful whether sec. 30 (c) would, having regard to its terms, fall within sec. 10 of the General Clauses Act and enacted the proviso ex abundanti cautela. The operation of such a beneficent enactment as Sec. 10 of the General Clauses Act is not, in our opinion, to be cut down on such unsubstantial grounds as have been urged before us. We are accordingly of opinion that the petition which the respondent filed on Mayl8, 1954 is entitled to the protection afforded by that section and is in time. " For the reasons given above we regret we cannot accept the correctness of the observations made on the point in the Calcutta decision of Gopesh Chandra Aditya (ibid. ). We hold, therefore, that sec. 10 of the General Clauses Act does apply to the present case and the presentation should be held to be valid even under that provision of the law. The next ground taken by the learned counsel that the application could not be presented to the clerk of the Returning Officer who had no authority to accept the same has really no substance in it and has not, therefore, been seriously pressed before us. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate had been appointed the Returning Officer in his official capacity and it is not disputed that his Bench clerk who received the nomination paper was in charge of election work. He had been further authorised by the Returning Officer in writing to accept nomination papers filed before him. The contention that the Returning Officer could not delegate the power of accepting presentation of the document to the clerk in charge is equally futile. R. 15 merely required the presentation of the document, on the day or days prescribed, to the Returning Officer and on that day the Returning Officer had nothing else to do in the matter, except to take physical delivery of those papers. It was therefore, purely an administrative act which had to be performed by him, and the clerk whom he had specially authorised to receive these nomination papers could also take physical delivery of the papers. There is no complaint that the clerk made some wrong note about the date of presentation. In the circumstances, there could be no question of any delegation of any such power under the rules which the Returning Officer had to exercise by himself alone. Besides, the point is covered by a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Sajjan Singh vs. Bhogilal Pandya (l) (ibid) where it was held that even though the member of a Tribunal was not personally present the presentation of the recriminatory petition at the office of the Tribunal to the Munsarim of the court who was throughout available was valid and sufficient. The result is that the order under appeal is on the whole correct and appeal must be dismissed with costs. This order will also govern the other analogous appeals Nos. 40, 41 and 43 of 1958 which were listed for hearing along with this appeal and which involve identical points for determination. Those appeals are also without substance and are dismissed with costs. . ;