BHARGAVA, J. - (1.) THE short question for determination in this appeal against the judgment of the senior Civil Judge, Sikar (Election Tribunal) dated 28-2-1967, is whether the nomination paper of the respondent for election to the Municipal Board, Sikar was rightly rejected by the Returning Officer on the ground that he was employed as a legal practitioner against the Board at that time. THE decision of the above question depends upon the interpretation of the second part of clause 13 sec. 26 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act 1959 (hereinafter called the Act ).
(2.) THE respondent had filed his nomination paper for election to Ward No. 10 of the Municipal Board, Sikar. At the time of scrutiny of the nomination paper on 7-5-1966, objection was raised that the respondent was disqualified from being chosen as a member of the Board because he was employed as legal practitioner against the Board the Returning Officer accepted the objection and rejected the nomi-nation paper of the respondent. THEreupon the respondent filed an election petition challenging the election of the appellant on several grounds including that of illegal rejection of his nomination paper by the Returning Officer. THE Election Tribunal tried the election petition on several issues, but for the purpose of this appeal the decision of the Tribunal on issue No. 1 is only relevant. Issue No. 1 is as follows : "whether the nomination of the applicant was illegally rejected by the Return ing Officer and if so, what is its effect?" Sec. 24 of the Act lays down that - "subject to the provisions contained in sec 9 and 26, a person shall not be qualified to be chosen to fill a seat on a Board unless - (a ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (b) in the case of any other seat, he is an elector for any ward in the Municipality. " Sec. 26 deals with the general disqualifications for members and says that - "a person, notwithstanding that he is otherwise qualified shall be disqualified for being chosen as a member of a Board. (xiii) who is employed as a paid legal practitioner on behalf of such Board or accepts employment as legal practitioner against such Board during the term for which he has been elected. " The Tribunal on the interpretation of clause (xiii) to sec. 26 has come to the conclusion that the respondent was not disqualified for being chosen as a member of the Board. Being of that view the Tribunal accepted the election petition and set aside the election of the appellant to the Sikar Municipal Board from Ward No. 10. Being aggrieved by that decision the appellant has come in appeal before the Court and it has been contended on his behalf that clause (xiii) is ranged under sec. 26 which speaks of disqualifications for being chosen as a member of the Board and that being so the second part of clause (xiii) should also be regarded as a dis-qualification for being chosen as a member of the Board. He means to say that even a person who employed as a legal practitioner against the Board on the date of the filing of nomination paper, would be disqualified for being chosen as a member. Learned counsel wants the Court to read the second part of clause (xiii) as "or accepts employment as a legal practitioner against such Board for the period to which he is to be elected," so as to avoid inconsistency or repugnancy with in the section. No doubt it is the duty of the court to try and harmonise the various provisions in an enactment, but it is not permissible to read words in a statute which are not there as it would be obviously trespassing into the legislative field. As stated by the Privy Council in Robert Wigram Crawford vs. Richard Spooner (1); we cannot fish out what possibly have been the intention of the Legislature; we cannot aid the Legislature's defective phrasing of the Statute ; we cannot add, and mend, and by construction, make up deficiencies which are left there. On the other hand the primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislature must be found in the words used by the legislature itself. The courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of the consequences when the words of the statute are clear and unambiguous and reasonably susceptible to only one meaning. Keeping these primary rules of construction in view we have to interpret the meaning of part two of clause (xiii) quoted above This clause requires that in order to incur disqualification a person firstly must have accepted employment as legal practitioner and secondly such employment should have been accepted during the term for which he has been elected. The term of a Board definitely commences after the members are elected to it. Therefore the disqualification envisaged by this clause does not refer to the employment of a person as legal practitioner before his election to the Board or in other words for being chosen as a member of the Board. To my mind the words of the clause are susceptible to one meaning only and they cannot be interpreted to mean that a person who is employed as a legal practitioner against a Board shall be disqualified for being chosen as its member. If the legislature intended that a person employed as a legal practitioner against a Board shall be disqualified for being chosen as its member nothing was more easier for the legislature than to say in clause (xiii) "who is employed as a paid legal practitioner on behalf of or against such Board". But the first part of the clause as it stands refers to disqualification for being chosen as a member of the Board and the latter part refers to disqualification for continuing as member of the Board. It has to be remembered that sec. 26 as it stood before the amendment of 1961 by Act No. 26 of 1961, was as under - "a person, not withstanding that he is otherwise qualified shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of a Board. So the disqualifications mentioned in sec. 26 were at that time applicable both for being chosen and also for continuing as a member of the Board and if clause (xiii) is read in the context of the original section then it would be clear that there was no inconsistency or repugnancy within the section because the first part of clause (xiii) related to the disqualification for being chosen as a member and the later part as a disqualification for continuance for a member of the Board. By Act No. 26 of 1961, sec. 26 was amended and the words "and for being" were omitted and along with it clause (c) was added in sec. 63 which deals with removal of members, clause (c) of sec. 63 is as follows : "that after his election he has incurred any of the disqualification mentioned in sec. 18 of or sec. 26 or has creased to fulfil the requirements of sec. 24. " But the above amendment did not alter the position in any way and all the disqualifications without any distinction whether they could be applicable for being chosen as a member or for his removal remained clubbed as before. From this however, it cannot be inferred that all the disqualifications mentioned under Sec. 26 were meant to apply for both purposes i. e. , for being chosen as a member and for his removal under section 63. As for instance due to dis-qualification mentioned in clause (iii) a person who is dismissed from the services of the Central or State Government or any local authority for misconduct, can not be chosen as a member. But this disqualification cannot be incurred by a member after his election in view of clause (viii) because when a person who holds a salaried or part time appointment under the Central or State Government or local authority is debarred from being chosen as a member, then he cannot incur the disquali-fication mentioned in clause (iii) after his election although section 63 (c) generally mentions that iff any member after his elecrion has incurred any of the disqualifica-tions mentioned in sections 18 or 26, he will be liable to be removed. Similarly in clause (xiii) the first part of the disqualification pertains to his being chosen as a mem-ber while the latter comes in to play only after his election and does not debar him from being chosen as a member. I have, therefore, no doubt that on the plain languag of the second part of clause (xiii) it cannot be held that a person employed as a lega practitioner against the Board before his election is disqualified from being chosen as it member. It is next contended that the above interpretation of the second part of clause (xiii would create obvious anomaly inasmuch as a person after his election to the Board would be liable to remove under sec. 63 if he accepts employment as a legal practitioner during the term for which he has been elected. But at the same time a person employed as a legal practitioner against the Board before this election would not be disqualified from being chosen as member. As already stated if the legislature intended to debar a person holding employment as legal practitioners against the Board for being chosen as a member it could have given expression the said intention in clear language. But whatever the anamoly when the language of the clause is clear and unambiguous it has to receive the only construction of which it is capable. Though it is not open to the court to speculate as to what the intention of the legislature was, it however seems that the legislature did not treat the act of accepting the employment by a legal practitioner against the Board before his election to the Board and a similar act after his election alike, because in the former case the act does not conflict with his duties as a member of the Board while in the latter case such conflict is obvious. It might also be that the legislature might not have considered proper to disrupt the existing contracts between legal practitioners and their employers entered into in the normal course long before the elections. Whatever might have been the reasons if the meaning of the language used by the legislature is plain and clear the court has nothing to do, but to give effect to it. Learned counsel for the appellant referred to Mangoo Singh vs. Election Tribunal, Bareilly (2 ). But that case has no relevance to the present controversy and is, therefore, of no help to him. In that case it was held that : "if a person is disqualified on the date of nomination, he cannot be chosen as a candidate because the disqualification mentioned in sec. 13-D of the U. P. Municipalities Act (2 of 1916) attaches to him on that date, and further that : "the wiping off of the disqualification under the second proviso has no retrospective effect, and the disqualification which subsisted on the day of filing nominations does not cease to subsist on that day by reason of a subsequent payment of the arrears of municipal tax. " This however, is not the case here. Here the point is whether the disqualification mentioned in latter part of clause (xiii) of sec. 26 is a disqualification for being chosen as a member or it is only a disqualification for the continuance of a member. The effect of payment of deficit court fee by the appellant after the period of limitation for the appeal had expired and the question of condonation of delay has not been considered by me as the learned counsel for the respondent gave up the objection at the time of hearing although he had raised it at the previous hearing. There is thus no force in the appeal and it is hereby dismissed with costs. .;