Dave - (1.) THIS is a writ application by Kartar Singh under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.
(2.) THE petitioner's case is that he was elected Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat, Chak Bhagsar in an election which was held on the 10th of June, 1958. He was declared elected as Sarpanch on the same day by Returning Officer. On the 16th of October, 1958, the non-petitioner No. 1, Shri Mukand Singh, filed against him an election petition before the Collector of Ganganagar, non-petitioner No. 2. Non-petitioner No. 2 sent that application to the Sub-Divisional Officer, Ganganagar for an inquiry and report. On the 22nd of January, 1958, the Sub-Divisional Officer submitted his report to the Collector. It was opined by the Sub-Divisional Officer that the application of non-petitioner No. 1 was time barred. Non-petitioner No. 2, however, held on the 29th of April, 1959, that the petition was within time and remanded the case back to the Sub-Divisional Officer for further inquiry and report. THE petitioner seeks to challenge the correctness of the Collector's said order, dated the 29th of April, 1959. It is urged by the petitioner's learned counsel that according to R. 19 of Rajasthan Panchayat Election Rules, 1954, the time prescribed for presenting an election petition was 15 days from the date of the notification under R. 18, but this rule was amended with effect from the 8th of September, 1958, and according to the changed rule, 15 days' period is to be computed from the date of the declaration of the result. According to learned counsel, the result of the election was declared on the 10th of June, 1958, and therefore (according to the amended rule), the election petition ought to have been presented within 15 days from that date and since it was not presented within that period, it was time barred. It is further contended by learned counsel that non-petitioner No. 2 has committed an error of law in holding that the amendment of the rule on the 8th of September, 1958 could not have a retrospective effect. It is urged by learned counsel that it is well-settled that the law of limitation which is to apply to a particular case is the law in force on the date on which the suit or application is filed and, therefore, according to him, it was the amended rule which applied to the present case and not the old rule. I have given due consideration to the argument raised by learned counsel and it will suffice to say that the point raised by him is without any force and it is already concluded by the view taken by a Full Bench of this Court in Jeth Mal vs. Amb Singh (1). In that case it was observed that - "......It is firmly settled that the law of limication relates to the branch of procedural laws and no one can claim a vested right in any period of limitation. It therefore, follows without the slightest doubt or dispute, that the law which is applicable to a suit or proceeding is the law which is in force when it is instituted. Therefore, such laws normally have received and are entitled to receive retrospective force. It is with a view to avoid the hardship resulting from the retrospective operation of such laws that usually when the pre-existing Jaw of limitation is amended and the period prescribed thereunder is reduced, the legislature provides a saving clause in the amending Acts, which allows a period of grace within which suits may be filed and suitors" may not be taken by complete surprise." At the same time, it was pointed out that considerable difficulties arise where no time is allowed and the amending Act comes into force at once. A number of cases were then reviewed, and it was held further that - "....Although a law of limitation is primarily a law relating to procedure and as such comes into effect right from the moment it has been enacted and governs all proceedings instituted thereafter and thus has retrospective operation, there is overwhelming authority in favour of the principle that where a subsequent law curtails the period of limitation previously allowed, and such law comes into force at once, it should not be allowed to have retrospective effect, which it would otherwise have, so as to destroy preexisting vested rights of suit, because the giving of such retrospective effect amounts to not merely a change in procedure but a forfeiture of the very right to which the procedure relates." It may be pointed out that it is this latter (foregoing) observation which would 'govern the present case. The amended rule came into force from the 8th of September, 1958, and it could not have retrospective application to these election petitions which under the old rule could be filed within 15 days from the date of the notification under R. 19. If the amended rule be applied to the present case, then it would mean that the election petition in the present case became time barred on the 25th of June, 1958, even before the notification was made by the Government and long before the amended rule came into force. It could not have been meant by the Legislature to give retrospective effect to the amended rule so as to destroy/the pre-existing vested rights of aggrieved persons to file an election petition. There is nothing in the amended rule to show that it was given retrospective effect by the Legislature. Non-petitioner No. 2 was, therefore, correct in holding that the election petition was not time barred. There is no force in this writ application and it is, therefore, hereby dismissed.;