- (1.) THIS appear under Sec. 39 of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act has been filed against an order of the Deputy Collector, Jagir, Jaipur dated 23-12 58 in a case presumably under Sec. 37. of the aforesaid Act.
(2.) THE material facts of the case are that Rao Hiralal was a State grant muaffidar of village Bidarka, Tehsil Lalsot, district Jaipur. He died in the year 1944 and Niranjanlal respondent applied for matmi on the ground that he had been adopted by the deceased Rao Hiralal during his life-time. Govind Narain who is now dead and is now represented by the appellants opposed the application of matmi of Niranjanlal and claimed matmi for himself as being the nearest collateral of the deceased. THE Deputy Commissioner was of the opinion that matmi should be sanctioned in the name of Niranjanlal and accordingly he submitted his recommendation to the then Board of Revenue of the former Jaipur State. That Board of Revenue referred that matter to the Government of Jaipur for guidance in respect of rule (2) of rule' 14 of the Jaipur Matmi Rules. Before any decision could be taken by the Jaipur State Government, the United State of Rajasthan came into being and the Revenue Secretary, Rajasthan, returned the case to the Board of Revenue, Rajasthan for deciding it according to its best light. A Full Bench of the Board, vide decision dated 14-7-51, held that as the adoption of Niranjanlal had been made by the deceased without obtaining the previous sanction of the Government it could not be recognised as valid under Rule 14 of the Jaipur Matmi Rules. THE Board also held that even before the enforcement of these Rules it was necessary for a State grantee to obtain prior sanction of the Government for adoption according to the practice and usage of that period. THE Board accordingly sanctioned the matmi in the name of Govind Narain. THE respondent went up in appeal to the Revenue Secretary who by his decision dated 26/27 June, 1952 rejected the same and upheld the order of the Board. A review petition was also filed but that was also dismissed on 17th November, 1952. THEreafter a writ petition was filed by the respondent before the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan. It was argued that the Board had exceeded the power conferred upon it by Rule 26 of the Jaipur Matmi Rules and all that the Board of Revenue could do was to make recommendation to the Government for passing of final order. It was also argued the Board had committed an obvious error by applying Rule 14 (2) of the Matmi Rules retrospectively to an adoption which had been made prior to the enforcement of the Rules. THE appellants who were the respondents before the High Court agreed that the Board had exceeded its authority in sanctioning matmi but argued that subsequently the matter was referred to His Highness the Rajpramukh and that Govind Narain was recognised as successor of Hiralal by His Highness the Rajpramukh by virtue of the power conferred upon him by Art. VII (3) of the Covenant and as the recognition of a successor to Jagir was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Rajpramukh there was nothing wrong with the decision of the Board. THE letter of the Revenue Secretary to the Commissioner Jaipur dated 6-9-54 was also produced which ran as below: - "i am directed to convey formal sanction of His Highness the Rajpramukh to the matmi in the name of Shri Govind Narain in respect of the muafi grant last held by Shri Hiralal deceased in village Bidarka, Suranpura, Naila and Nagal. " It was further argued that the power conferred on the Rajpramukh by Art. VII (3) of the Covenant could no longer be exercised after the enforcement of the Constitution. This contention was upheld by the High Court which observed as below: - "after the commencement of the Constitution therefore no special form for adjudication on a claim to succeed to a Jagir remained in existence. Whatever may be conditions of State Grants in other States, the Matmi Rules recognised the right of a heir to succeed to a State Grant although the determination of the heir depended upon certain relationship and other factors mentioned in the Rules. . . . . . The claim to succeed to a Jagir is a civil right and in the absence of any express or implied bar, a civil court of competent jurisdiction is empowered to adjudicate upon the claim under sec. 9 C. P. C. " As a result the decision of the Board dated 14-1-51 sanctioning Matmi in the name of Govind Narain was set aside as being without jurisdiction and for the reasons mentioned in the judgment the sanction of the Rajpramukh conveyed by the letter of the Revenue Secretary referred to above was held to be ineffective. The Rajasthan Jagir Decisions and Proceedings Validation Ordinance, 1955, was enforced in July 1955 and it was subsequently repealed by the Rajasthan Jagir Decisions and Proceedings Validation Act. As the Preamble itself shows this Ordinance was promulgated to validate certain decisions given in respect of matters relating to the recognition according to law of succession to the rights and titles of Jagirdars therein and to provide the forum for the disposal of such cases and proceedings. The following may be quoted from the Preamble to show that the Ordinance removed the ground on which the decisions were held invalid by the High Court : - "and whereas such laws have lately been held to have been impliedly repealed by paragraph 3 of Art. VII of the Covenant in so far as they provide for the powers of the various grades of Revenue Courts and officers for the disposal of cases arising out of or under them: and whereas it has further been held that the jurisdiction vested in Raj-pramukh by paragraph 3 of Art. VII of the Covenant in respect of such cases has ceased to be operative with the commencement of the Constitution. " "the grounds on which the decision of the Board and of the Rajpramukh were held invalid and ineffective by the High Court in the judgment referred to above are exactly those referred to in the Preamble of the Ordinance. Sec. 3 of the Ordinance provided that notwithstanding anything contained in the Covenant or in any judgment, decree or order of any court all final decisions given by the various grades of revenue courts or officers or by the Rajpramukh in cases or proceedings arising out of or under the laws of the Covenanting State providing for the resumption of Jagirs in those States and the recognition of succession to the rights and titles of Jagirs therein shall be valid and shall be deemed always to have been valid and shall not be called in question in any civil court. '' After the decision of the High Court the widows of the deceased Hiralal and Niranjanlal applied before the Jagir Commissioner for grant of compensation in respect of this Jagir. The appellants applied before the Collector that grant of matmi Jagir and deceased Govind Narain, who died on 10. 9. 55 after the resumption of the of the this application eventually went down to the SDO who by his order dated 17-9-57 held as follows: - ''it appears that the Revenue Secretary sanctioned matmi in favour Govind Narain on 6 9-54 but the High Court set aside the same in a writ petition. Under the circumstances it should be held that the matmi rests with Niranjanlal in whose favour the Deputy Collector Jaipur sanctioned it originally. . . . . . . . . . . . . Niranjanlal's Ujardari be accepted. Application of Jagannath be rejected. " When the matter went to the Deputy Collector, Jagir through the Jagir Commissioner he after examining all these facts come to the conclusion that as the SDO had sanctioned matmi in favour of Niranjanlal he and he alone was entitled to compensation of the resumed grant. The Deputy Collector first submitted his report to this effect to the Jagir Commissioner but returned the papers with the remarks that Deputy Collector was competent to decide the point. The Deputy Collector Jagir by his decision dated 23-12-58 confirmed his report dated 25-10-58 and held that Niranjanlal was entitled to compensation. Hence this appeal. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at great length. We have no hesitation in observing that the decision of the learned Deputy Collector which is in turn based on the decision of the SDO, Dausa dated 17-9-57 is clearly untenable. The decision of the High Court dated 31-3-55 held the decision of the Board to be ultra vires as it had no authority to decide a disputed case finally. The decision of the Rajpramukh was held ineffective as it came into being after the enforcement of the Constitution. The Jagir Decisions and Proceedings Validation Ordinance - which was subsequently repealed by the Act of the same title, rendered the decision of the High Court ineffective inasmuch as sec. 3 of the Ordinance clearly laid down that notwithstanding anything contained in the judgment, order or decree of any court the decision of the Rajpramukh in a matter of succession to the rights and titles of Jagirdars shall be valid and shall be deemed always to have been followed and shall not be liable to be called in question in any civil court. The learned counsel for the respondent has argued that this provision was held invalid by the Rajasthan High Court in Bahadur Singh versus the Rajpramukh (1957 R. L. W. 620 ). This argument is based upon a mis-appreciation of the law enunciated by their Lordship in the ruling. We may reproduce paras 9, 10, 11, and 12 of this decision. "9. The decision of the Full Bench purported to affect all decisions by the Rajpramukh after the enforcement of the Constitution and Government came out with the Rajasthan Jagir Decisions and Proceedings (Validation) Act, 1955 (Act No. XVIII of 1955 ). Learned counsel for the respondent urged that in view of the said Act, XVIII of 1955, the decision of the Rajpramukh had been validated, and could not be questioned by this Court. 1. The relevant provision of that Act is sec. 5, which is as follows: - "notwithstanding anything contained in the Covenant or in any judgment, decree or order of any Court all final decision given by the various grades of Revenue Courts of Officers, or by the Rajpramukh, in cases or proceedings arising out of, or under, the laws of the Covenanting States providing for the resumption of Jagirs in those State and the recognition of succession to the right and titles of Jagirdars therein shall be valid and shall not be liable to be called in question in any civil court. " 11. This provision came in for notice in Purshotam Singh vs. Narain Singh and it was held that the bar against the decision being questioned in any civil court did not bar the jurisdiction of this Court under Art 226 of the Constitution. The jurisdiction conferred by Art. 226 of the Constitution cannot be barred by any legislation by any State, and can only be taken away by amendment of the Constitution, even if this Court may be exercising civil jurisdiction in matters of this kind. It was also explained that sec. 3 did not validate the decision of the Rajpramukh. if given in his executive authority, but the effect of sec. 3 was that it validated the decision of the Rajpramukh, the Revenue Officers and courts in the matter of succession to Jagirs, as provided by the laws of the Covenanting State, and thereby the forum which existed prior to the Covenant had been again brought into existence. 12. The Rajpramukh in that sense could only be treated as a quasi-judicial tribunal, and the decisions of such tribunal had only been validated. Under what law the Rajpramukh could act in the matter requires examination. " A perusal of the above would make it clear that the High Court held that the decision of the Rajpramukh would stand validated but the manner in which that decision was arrived at could be examined. In that particular case it was found that according to the Alwar State Jagir Rules it was essential that there must be a finding that a certain person was the legally adopted son before he can be held to be rightful successor under rule 4 of the Alwar State Jagir Rules. Such finding in that case was missing and hence the decision of the Rajpramukh was set aside and the record was returned to the Board for dealing with the matter according to law. This decision can clearly be distinguishable from the present one. In this case the decision of the Board or of the Rajpramukh was not set aside for want of compliance of any mandatory provision of law or any illegality or irregularity in the manner in which jurisdiction was exercised. The decisions were invalidated for absence of jurisdiction and this defect having been removed by the Rajasthan Jagir Decisions and Proceedings Validation Ordinance, the decision of the Rajpramukh conveying sanction of succession in favour of Govind Narain would automatically stand revived and validated We, therefore, hold that the Matmi of the deceased Rao Hira Lal was sanctioned by the Rajpramukh in favour of Govind Narain and that the decision of the High Court referred to above cannot be given effect to in view of the express provisions contained in sec. 3 of the Jagir Decisions and Proceedings Validation Act, corresponding to sec. 3 of the Act. Having held that the Matmi of the deceased Rao Hira Lal was validly sanctioned in favour of Govind Narain by a competent authority we will now proceed to examine the future course of events. This Jagir was resumed some time in January, 1955. Govind Narain was alive at that time, he having died subsequently on 10. 9. 55. The matter would, therefore, be governed by sec. 38 of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act. It is provided therein that if any Jagirdar to whom compensation is payable under this Act dies before the full payment of such compensation to him, such compensation as may remain payable to him under the Act shall be payable to the persons found by the Collector upon enquiry in the prescribed manner to be the heir or heirs of the deceased Jagirdar according to his personal law. There is a proviso added to this section which lays down that in cases in which the question of such succession or heirship is in dispute the Collector shall direct all claimants to succession or heirship to have their respective title thereto adjudicated upon by a competent civil court and payment of the remaining compensation shall be in accordance with such adjudication. The case has, therefore, to be determined in accordance with this provision. The result is that we allow this appeal, set aside the order of the Deputy Collector, Jagir dated 25. 10. 58 and 23. 12. 58 and remand the case back to him with the direction that he should determine the question as to whom compensation which was payable to the deceased Jagirdar Govind Narain should be paid after his death in accordance with the provisions contained in sec. 38 of Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act. . ;