SABINA, J. - (1.) Appellants-claimants have filed this appeal challenging the award dated 11.01.2017 passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, whereby, Insurance Company was exonerated from its liability to indemnify the appellants.
(2.) Learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the appellants had filed claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988, seeking compensation on account of death of Chagan Lal in the motor vehicle accident, which had occurred on 08.02.2014. Tribunal vide its award dated 11.01.2017 has allowed the claim petition filed by the claimants, but has exonerated the Insurance Company from its liability to indemnify the insured due to breach of terms of the insurance policy. Learned counsel has submitted that the only prayer in the present case raised by the claimants is that the Insurance Company should be directed to pay the amount of compensation to the claimants and liberty should be granted to the Insurance Company to recover the same from the insured. In support of his arguments, learned counsel has placed reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Amrit Paul Singh and Another. Vs. Tata AIG General Insurance Company Limited and Others 2018 (7) Supreme Court Cases 558, wherein it was held as under:- "In the case at hand, it is clearly demonstrable from the materials brought on record that the vehicle at the time of the accident did not have a permit. The appellants had taken the stand that the vehicle was not involved in the accident. That apart, they had not stated whether the vehicle had temporary permit or any other kind of permit. The exceptions that have been carved out under Section 66 of the Act, needless to emphasise, are to be pleaded and proved. The exceptions cannot be taken aid of in the course of an argument to seek absolution from liability. Use of a vehicle in a public place without a permit is a fundamental statutory infraction. We are disposed to think so in view of the series of exceptions carved out in Section 66. The said situations cannot be equated with absence of licence or a fake licence or a licence for different kind of vehicle, or, for that matter, violation of a condition of carrying more number of passengers. Therefore, the principles laid down in Swaran Singh (supra) and Lakhmi Chand (supra) in that regard would not be applicable to the case at hand. That apart, the insurer had taken the plea that the vehicle in question had no permit. It does not require the wisdom of the "Tripitaka", that the existence of a permit of any nature is a matter of documentary evidence. Nothing has been brought on record by the insured to prove that he had a permit of the vehicle. In such a situation, the onus cannot be cast on the insurer. Therefore, the tribunal as well as the High Court had directed the insurer was required to pay the compensation amount to the claimants with interest with the stipulation that the insurer shall be entitled to recover the same from the owner and the driver. The said directions are in consonance with the principles stated in Swaran Singh (supra) and other cases pertaining to pay and recover principle."
(3.) Learned counsel has next placed reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pappu and Others Vs. Vinod Kumar Lamba and Others. (2018) 3 Supreme Court Cases 208, wherein, it was held as under:- "The next question is: whether in the fact situation of this case the insurance company can be and ought to be directed to pay the claim amount, with liberty to recover the same from the owner of the vehicle (respondent No.1)? This issue has been answered in the case of National Insurance Company Ltd. (supra). In that case, it was contended by the insurance company that once the defence taken by the insurer is accepted by the Tribunal, it is bound to discharge the insurer and fix the liability only on the owner and/or the driver of the vehicle. However, this Court held that even if the insurer succeeds in establishing its defence, the Tribunal or the Court can direct the insurance company to pay the award amount to the claimant(s) and, in turn, recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. The three-Judge Bench, after analysing the earlier decisions on the point, held that there was no reason to deviate from the said well-settled principle. In paragraph 107, the Court then observed thus: "We may, however, hasten to add that the Tribunal and the court must, however, exercise their jurisdiction to issue such a direction upon consideration of the facts and circumstances of each case and in the event such a direction has been issued, despite arriving at a finding of fact to the effect that the insurer has been able to establish that the insured has committed a breach of contract of insurance as envisaged under sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, the insurance company shall be entitled to realize the awarded amount from the owner or driver of the vehicle, as the case may be, in execution of the same award having regard to the provisions of Sections 165 and 168 of the Act. However, in the event, having regard to the limited scope of inquiry in the proceedings before the Tribunal it has not been able to do so, the insurance company may initiate a separate action therefor against the owner or the driver of the vehicle or both, as the case may be. Those exceptional cases may arise when the evidence becomes available to or comes to the notice of the insurer at a subsequent stage or for one reason or the other, the insurer was not given an opportunity to defend at all. Such a course of action may also be resorted to when a fraud or collusion between the victim and the owner of the vehicle is detected or comes to the knowledge of the insurer at a later stage." ;