CHAUHAN, J. - (1.) THIS is a unique case wherein the petitioner has approached this Court for issuing direction to the respondents that they must act in accordance with law, though he has not established as what is his legal right which is likely to be infringed or what is the cause of action which has given him a right to approach this Court in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
(2.) PETITIONER is holding a valid permanent stage-carriage permit on the route Jhunjhunu to Pabana via Pushkarni Chadi and Mukandgarh within the jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Authority, Jaipur (hereinafter called "the R.T.A."). In the said Region, two routes, namely, Mundawa to Mukandgarh via Chadi, and Jaipur to Pilani via Nawalgarh have been notified under the provisions of Section 100 (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred as "the Act") or under the provisions of Section 68-D (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter called" the old Act") and the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter called, "the R.S.R.T.C.) has an exclusive right to ply its vehicles on the said routes. PETITIONER's grievance is that some persons are trying to get permits on the route Mandawa to Udaipurwati over-lapping the notified route from Mandawa to Mukandgarh via Chadi and also a portion of the route, on which he is plying his vehicle from Mukandgarh to Pabana, his rights will be adversely affected and there is imminent danger to his rights. It has been urged that the notified portion of the route from Chadi to Mukandgarh is 18 kms. and from Dudlod to Nawalgarh it is 12 Kms. and it is not permissible to grant any permit over-lapping the notified route over 10 Kms. under the law. It has further been urged that the R.T.A. is likely to consider the grant of permits by Circulation which is also prohibited by law and, thus, this Court must issue direction to the R.T.A. not to entertain any application for the grant of any permit on the route Mandawa to Udaipurwati. It may be pertinent to mention here that petitioner holds a permit on a non-notified route and he has no concern with any notified route. There is no quarrel with the proposition of law that once a route has been notified under the provisions of Section 68-D (3) of the Old Act or under Section 100 (3) of the Act, 1988, no person other than those who have specifically been permitted under the Scheme are permitted to ply their vehicles on the route for the reason that a Scheme under the said provisions of the Act is a law within the meaning of Article 13 of the Constitution of India, as held by the Constitution Benches of the Supreme Court in H.C. Narainappa vs. State of Mysore (1) and Chau- dhary Khazan Singh vs. State of U.P. and others (2); and by virtue of the provisions of Section 68-B of the Old Act and its corresponding provisions of Section 98 of the new Act, the Scheme of Nationalisation would over-ride the other provisions of the Statute, (Vide T.N.Raghunatha Reddy vs. State Transport Authority (3); and S.A. Abdul Khaddar Sahib vs. Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal & Or.s (4). The Cons- titution Bench of the Supreme Court in M/s. Adarsh Travels Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of U.P. & Ors. (5), held that no person other than those authorised under the Scheme, can ply the vehicle on the notified Route. In Sumer Chand Sharma vs. State of U.P. & Ors. (6), the Apex court has observed that provisions of the Scheme require strict adherence and authorities are required to comply with the terms of the Scheme and consider the applications for the grant or renewal only in consonance with the Scheme. Same view has been taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Smt. T.P.K. Thilagavathy vs. R.T.A, Periyar District (7). In Gajraj Singh vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal & Ors. (8), the Apex Court has held that the approved Scheme is a "self-contained and self-operative Scheme. It is law by itself." There can be no quarrel to the settled legal position that a person can approach the Court in writ jurisdiction when his right is threat or there is a imminent danger to a right or imminent violation of the right, but threate or imminent danger to the right or imminent violation of the right has to be determined on the basis of the alleged overt-act as "the protection of a legal right is to be distinguished from its restoration or remedy after violation. Law surely cannot take action for internal thoughts but can act only after the overt-act is done. If the overt-act and violation have already been done and the same has come to the knowledge of the person threatened with that violation and he approaches the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, giving sufficient particulars of proximate actions as would immediately lead to violation of the rights", the Court can interfere for the reason that if "a threatened invasion of a right is removed by restraining the potential violator from taking any steps towards violation, the rights remain protected and the compulsion against its violation is enforced. If the right has already been violated, what is left is the remedy against such violation and for restoration of the right." ( Vide S.M.D. Kiran Pasha vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh (9); Vedprakash Devkinandan Chiripal vs. State of Gujrat and Another (10); A.K.Gopalan vs. State of Madras (11); and K.K.Kochunni vs. State of Madras (12). It is also, well settled law that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable for enforcing the statutory right or when there is a complaint by the petitioner that there is a breach of statutory duty on the part of the respondent. Therefore, there must be judicially enforceable right for the enforce- ment of which the writ jurisdiction can be resorted to. The Court can enforce the performance of a statutory duty by public bodies through its writ jurisdiction at the behest of a person, provided such person satisfies the Court that he has a legal right to insist on such writ jurisdiction. (State of Kerla vs. K.G. Madhavn Pillai (13); State of Kerala vs. Smt. A. Laxmikutty (14); Mani Surat Jain and Others vs. State of Haryana (15); Calcutta Gas Company (Property) Ltd. vs. State of West Bengal and Others (16); and Smt. Rampati Jaiswal vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others (17). In Rajendra Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others (18), the Apex Court held that every violation of mandatory provisions of law does not furnish a ground for the High Court to interfere in its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Con- stitution of India. It is settled position of law that writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 "is not intended to facilitate the avoidance of an obligation".
(3.) IN fact, petitioner has espoused the cause of the respondent No.2 as if the respondent No.2 is unable to protect its interest. Whether persons, who had been permitted to ply their vehicles on a notified route with corridor restrictions, i.e. with a condition neither to pick-up nor drop any passenger on the over- lapping part of the notified route, can be permitted to approach the writ Court for violation of the Scheme has been considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Smt. Mithlesh Rani vs. R.T.A., Dehradun and Others (19) and the Court has observed as under :- "It is only the respondents No.3 and 4 who are operating on a route which partially over-laps the route concerned herein hat have chosen to come forward. We are not inclined to entertain the said objection at their instance, more particularly, when a copy of the Scheme (s) even has not been filed. This aspect would become relevant if and when the State Transport Authority undertakes objection to the grant of permit to the appellant and the approved scheme or the draft scheme, as the case may be, is placed before the Court in support of the said objection. IN the present state of facts we decline to go into the said question." Similarly, in Charanjit vs. R.T.A., Bikaner and others (20), this Court has held that a private operator has no locus standi to object to the grant of permit on the portion of the notified route. The Court further observed as under :- "The off--set of the discussion made hereinabove is that the petitioners have no locus standi to object to the grant of a permit on a portion of a notified route or draft scheme because it is the R.S.R.T.C. or the State road Transport Undertaking which alone is an aggrieved party and it can object to the grant of such permit on a portion of the notified route or a route covered by an approved or draft scheme." In the instant case the petitioner has not filed the copy of any scheme whatsoever. Not a single application, which allegedly has been filed before the R.T.A., Jaipur for the grant of permit, has been filed and no particulars of any such application have been given. This is a case where the petitioner has approached this Court in a most cavellier manner without any sense of responsibility. ;