- (1.) This revision petition has been preferred before this Court against the impugned order dated 5-9-1997 passed by learned Special Judge (Essential Commodities Act) (Sessions Judge), Kota in proceedings arising out of FIR No. 114/1995 P.S. Udhyog Nagar, Kota in respect of offences punishable under Ss. 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (for short "The Act of 1955") and for offences punishable under Ss. 407 and 120-B, IPC whereby the petitioner's application dated 25-3-1996 was dismissed.
(2.) The questions of law which have arisen for determination of this Court in the context of the case as set up by the prosecution against the accused petitioner are formulated herein below :- (a) Whether the learned Special Judge (E.C. Act) cases, Kota by the impugned order dated 5-9-1997 in a case arising out of FIR No. 114/1995 for offences punishable under Ss. 3/7 of the Act of 1955 and Ss. 407 and 120-B, IPC was justified in dismissing the petitioner's application for his discharge on the ground that the Bar under S. 167(5), Cr. P.C. was not attracted to this case notwithstanding the abatement of the proceedings automatically after the expiry of the statutory period of six months as specified under the Code with regard to the summons cases. Unless the Officer conducting the investigation gives a satisfactory explanation to the concerned Magistrate that for the special reasons recorded in writing and in the interest of justice the continuation of the investigation beyond the period of six months was necessary? (b) Whether in absence of non-fulfilment of the aforesaid requirements as stipulated under the law, the trial Court was justified in extending the statutory period beyond six months for trial of summons cases under the Act of 1955 by giving the extensions from time to time on the request of learned A.P.P. for the State and which has culminated in filing of the challan/chargesheet in the said Court on 4-4-1996? (c) Whether such extensions beyond the stipulated period of six months in absence of any satisfactory explanation on the record of the trial Court which would have justified such extensions would not have vitiated the trial and the accused petitioner deserved his discharge in respect of the charges framed by the prosecution for offences punishable under Ss. 3/7 of the Act of 1955 and Ss. 407 and 120-B, IPC? (d) Whether the ratio of the decision of the Apex Court in the matter of "Common Cause" a Registered Society v. Union of India reported in 1996 (6) SCC 775 : AIR 1997 SC 1539 : (1997 Cri LJ 195) clarifying/modifying its earlier judgment dated 1-5-1996 in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1128/1986, wherein the Apex Court had observed that the time limit of six months for conclusion of trial in respect of Criminal Cases instituted under the Essential Commodities Act registered as summons cases, the trial would be deemed to have commenced with effect from the date when the accused who was charged for commission of the said offence are produced before the concerned Magistrate and are directed in accordance with S. 251, Cr. P.C. as to whether they pleaded guilty or have any defence to set up, shall not apply to the cases where the dilatory tactics adopted by the accused are directly attributable to the actions of the accused which results in prolonging the trial, is attracted to this case? (e) Whether in lieu of the ratio of the aforesaid decisions of the Apex Court, the accused is entitled to the benefit of discharge of charges framed against him since the trial Court not be concluded within the stipulated period of six months in accordance with law particularly when no dilatory tactics were attributed by the prosecution and the delay in conclusion of the trial was mainly on the part of the prosecution which is not entitled to take any benefit of its own laches which resulted in protraction of the trial against the accused?
(3.) The brief facts giving rise to the filing of this Revision Petition are that an FIR was lodged against the petitioner under the Rajasthan Trade Articles (Licensing and Control) Order, 1980; Clause 3(2) of the Rajasthan Kerosene (Restriction on Use and Fixation of Ceiling Price Order, 1993; Clause 8 of Rajasthan Motor Spirit and High Speed Diesel (Prevention of Mal Practices in Supply and Distribution) Order, 1980 and Ss. 407 and 120-B, IPC in pursuance of which the petitioner was arrested on 19-4-1995 and investigation commenced on the said dates and he was enlarged on bail. The challan was filed with the concerned Magistrate on 4-4-1996.;