CHAUHAN, J. - (1.) THE instant writ petition has been filed challenging the order dated 27. 4. 93, contained in Annexure 18 to the petition, by which the Labour Court allowed the application under Section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred as the I. D. Act") and re- fixed the salary of the respondent-workman as in 1986 and 1988 and directed the petitioner to pay the arrears according. By the said impugned order, some amount of gratuity and retrenchment allowance have, also, been directed to be paid.
(2.) THE facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that respondent-workman had been working with petitioner with effect from 18. 9. 68. A voluntary retirement scheme was floated and respondent-workman opted for it and as a con- sequence his services came to an end in view of the Agreement/settlement dated 3. 12. 88 contained in Annexure 17 to this petition. THE said Settlement provided for the workmen opting for voluntary retirement, retrenchment compensation on their complete service and payment of gratuity and making payment of the said amount prior to their retirement. THE third clause of the said agreement was that after retire- ment, the workmen shall not raise any dispute whatsoever before any Court. In addition to three clauses, above referred, to the Settlement, made it clear that fixation/re-fixation of salary had not been made in 1986 and 1988. After retirement, the full retrenchment allowance and gratuity had not been paid to the respondent-workman and he filed an application under Section 33-C (2) of the I. D. Act before the Labour Court on 24. 4. 90, (Annexure 2), in which in addition to the reliefs for gratuity and retrenchment compensation, workman also sought the direction for re-fixation of salary in 1986 and again in 1988 and claimed the arrears thereof for the period he remained in service. Petitioner raised preliminary objection before the Labour Court the said application was not main- tainable so far as the question of re-fixation and award of consequential benefit thereon was concerned. The Labour Court, vide its order dated 27. 4. 93. (Annexure 18) allowed the said application and directed the petitioner to re-fix his salary in 1986 and 1988 and pay him the arrears. Hence this petition. Heard Mr. B. C. Bhansali, learned counsel for petitioner and Mr. P. R. Mehta, learned counsel for the respondent-workman and perused the record. Sri Bhansali has vociferously submitted that the impugned order is a nullity to the extent of issuing direction for fixing the revised pay scale as the Labour Court had no competence to issue such a direction in exercise of its jurisdiction under the provisions of Section 33-C (2) of the I. D. Act. In Central Bank of India Ltd. vs. P. S. Rajgopalan (1), the Constitution Bench of Supreme Court observed that the scope of Sub-section (2) of Section 33-C of the I. D. Act is much wider than Sub-section (1) as the words `of limitation' contained in Sub-section (1) did not find place in Sub-section (2) It is, also, possible that claims not based on Settlement/award or the provisions of Chapter V-A of the Act may, also, be competent under Sub-Section (2) and that illustrates its wider scope. The policy of the Legislature for enacting the provisions of Section 33-C is to provide a "speedy remedy to the individual workman to enforce or execute his existing rights" and it would not be reasonable to exclude from the scope of this section cases of existing rights which are sought to be implemented by individual workman. Life Executing Court has a right to interpret the decree at the time of its execution, in appropriate cases it is open to the Labour Court to interpret the award of settlement on which the workman's rights rest.
(3.) IN Bombay Gas Company Ltd. vs. Gopal Bhiva & Ors. (2), it was held that Labour Court, in exercise of its power under Section 33-C (2) of the Act would be competent to interpret the award, on the basis of which the claim has been made and it would also be open to it to consider the plea that the award sought to be enforced is a nullity. The proceedings in Section 33-C (2) are analogous to execu- tion proceedings and the Labour Court, which is called-upon to compute, in terms of money, the benefit, is in a position of an executing court. The INdustrial Tribunals dealing with disputes referred to them under Section 10 (1) (d) of the Act are tribunals with a limited jurisdiction as they cannot travel out-side the terms of the reference and deal with matters not included in the reference, subject, of course, to incidental matters which fall within their jurisdiction. What is incidental and ancillary was considered in Sri Ambica Mills Company Ltd. vs. S. B. Bhatt (3) and the Court held that the question should be "intimately and integrally connected" with the problem but in determining the scope of incidental question care must be taken to see that under the guise of deci- ding incidental matters, the limited jurisdiction is not unreasonably or unduly extended. In Punjab National Bank vs. K. L. Kharbanda (4), it was held that the benefit referred to in Section 33-C (2) is not confined to non-monetary benefits which could be computed in terms of money but it concerns with all sorts of benefits. It applies when benefits have to be computed or calculated and there is a dispute as to the calculation or computation. The Court had to examine the benefits given under the Shastri Award, which provided for fixation of pay of clerks and the issue involved was whether persons employed in Banks, known by other nomenclature such as Supervisors/accounts Clerks or Accounts Incharge, can be extended the benefit of the Shastri Award. ;