- (1.) THIS is a revision by Ashwani Kumar against the order of the District Judge, Sri Ganganagar dt. May 23, 1987 allowing certain amendments sought to be made by non-petitioners Nos. 4 and 5 in their application for setting aside the award filed on Feb. 19, 1985.
(2.) FACTS leading to the filing of this revision petition are that the petitioner and non- petitioners Nos. 4 and 5 had entered into an agreement dt. June 18, 1984 for settlement of dispute regarding properties specified in the agreement. Non-petitioners Nos. 1 to 3 were appointed arbitrators who gave their award on August 25,1984. The arbitrators moved an application under S.14(2) of the, Arbitration Act, 1940 (for short, hereinafter, "the Act") before the District Judge Shri Ganganagar along with the award and prayed that the award may be made the rule of the Court. Notices of the filing of the award were served by the Court upon the petitioner as well as non-petitioners Nos. 4 and 5. Non-petitioners Nos. 4 and 5 filed objections under S.30 of the Act for setting aside the award. These objections were filed by tern on Feb. 19, 1985. Subsequent to that non-petitioners Nos. 4 and 5 moved an application on Sept. 19, 1986 seeking certain amendments in their application for setting aside the award. Non-petitioners Nos. 4 and 5 wanted to add more objection for setting aside the award to the effect that in respect of the agricultural land covered by the award, a revenue suit was pending before the Assistant Collector, Sri Ganganagar and, therefore, without obtaining prior permission of that Court no award could have been passed in respects of the agricultural land and the award was liable to be set aside on this ground also. This amendment application was opposed on behalf of the petitioners on the ground that the same was belated. The District Judge, Sri Ganganagar, however, allowed the amendment application filed by the non-petitioners Nos 4 and 5 on the ground that for finally deciding the controversies between the parties effectively, the amendment deserved the allowed and moreover the same also did, not alter the nature of the objects. It is against this order allowing the amendments sought by the non-petitioners. Nos. 4 and 5 that petitioner Ashwani Kumar has filed this revision before this Court. Mr. Lekh Raj Mehta appearing for the petitioner urged that the District Judge had no jurisdiction to allow the amendment application. It was argued that objections under S.30 of the Act for setting aside the award can only be filed within thirty days of the service of notice of the award. According to the learned counsel each and every objection must be raised in the application for setting aside the award within the statutory limitation period of thirty days. After the expiry of the said period neither any objection application can be filed nor any further objections can be added which were not taken within the limitation period of thirty days. It was pointed out that non-petitioners Nos. 4 and 5 had filed their objections to the award on Feb. 19, 1985 and had not raised any objection which they wanted to add by way of amendment by their application moved on Sept. 19, 1986 much after the expiry of the limitation period of thirty days from the service of the notice of the award. Mr. M.C. Bhandari, learned counsel appearing for the non-petitioners Nos. 4 and 5 urged that objections had been filed by the non-petitioners Nos. 4 and 5 within the limitation period of thirty days and non-petitioners Nos. 4 and 5 could amend their objections in order to put forward all the objections to the award so that all of them may be decided to settle the rights of the parties. He also urged that the period of limitation of thirty days applies to the original objection petition and it does not preclude a party from making an amendment applications in order to amend his objections.
(3.) MR. Lekhraj Mehta has relied before me upon the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Madan Lal v. Sunder Lal, AIR 1967 SC 1233, that of the Calcutta High Court in Haji Ebrahim Kasam Cochinwalla v. Northern Indian Oil Industries Ltd., AIR 1951 Cal 230 and that of the Patna High Court in Prabhat Kumar Lala v. Jagdish Chandra Narang, AIR 1968 Pat 399, to contend that no application to set aside an award can be considered by the court unless the objection for setting aside of the award are made within the period of limitation of 30 days which is provided as the limitation period by Art.119(b) of the Limitation Act of 1963 which corresponds to Art.158 of the Limitation Act of 1908 and that any ground subsequently added must be treated as a new application and such subsequent ground, if raised after the period of limitation of 30 days provided by Art.119(b) of the Limitation Act of 1963 would be barred by time. It was also argued that the District Judge Sri Ganganagar should not have allowed the amendment and permitted non-petitioners Nos. 4 and 5 to raise a new ground for setting aside the award after the period of limitation as a right had accrued to the petitioner by lapse of time. As against this MR. M.C. Bhandari on behalf of non-petitioners Nos. 4 and 5 relied upon the decision of the Patna High Court in Union of India v. Binod Behari Singh, AIR 1967 Pat 144 and he contended that it is not a case where non-petitioners Nos. 4 and 5 had raised a new ground by any supplementary objections or during the course of arguments. On the other hand, it is a case where non-petitioners Nos. 4 and 5 had applied for amendment of their objection petition which was admittedly filed within limitation and the amendment petition was rightly allowed by the court for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. It goes without saying that their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Madan Lal's case, (AIR 1967 SC 1233) clearly laid down that it is clear from the scheme of the Act that if a party wants an award to be set aside on any of the grounds mentioned in S.30 it must apply within 30 days of the date of service of notice of filing of the award as had been provided in Art.158 of the Limitation Act of 1908. If no such application was made, the award could not be set aside on any of the grounds specified in S.30 of the Act. There can be no doubt on the scheme of the Act that any objection even in the nature of a written statement which falls under S.30 cannot be considered by the Court unless such an objection is made within the period of limitation of 30 days, though if such an objection is made within limitation that objection may in appropriate cases be treated as an application for setting aside the award. Facts in Madanlal's case were that the appellant had filed an objection in the nature of a written statement. By this objection he attacked the validity of the award on various grounds. But the objection did not contain any prayer at the end nor did it indicate what relief the appellant desired, though there were as many as 43 paragraphs therein. Their Lordships observed that where an objection, as in that case, raised grounds which fell squarely within S.30 of the Act, that objection cannot be heard by that Court and cannot be treated as an application for setting aside the award unless it was made within the period of limitation. In Madanlal's case, even the objections in the nature of the written statement were filed within 30 days of the service of the notice of filing of the award. The Supreme Court, therefore, upheld that order of the Courts below passing a decree in terms of the award. As already stated, in the present case, non-petitioners Nos. 4 and 5 had filed their objections and had prayed for setting aside the award within the limitation period of 30 days.;