- (1.) THIS writ petition has been filed quashing the order (Anx. 6) of orders the Superintendent of Police, Banswara (Respondent No. 2) dated June, 3. 1987 by which the petitioner was dismissed from service with immediate effect the order (Anx. 8) December 4, 1987 by which his appeal has been dismissed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Udaipur (Respondent No. 3) and order (Anx. 9) dated July 11, 1988 by which his review petition has been dismissed by the Director General of police; Rajasthan, Jaipur. The facts of these case may be summarised thus.
(2.) THE petitioner was appointed as a constable on probation for two years by order dated August 2, 1984 and his period of probation was extended by one year. He remained absent from duty on various dates. Charge-sheet (Annexure 4) was served upon him. After taking his reply and recording the evidence, he was dismissed from the service by the Superintendent of police, Banswara by his order dated June 3. 1987 (Anx. 6) He preferred appeal (Anx. 7) against this ord3r before the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Udaipur. It was dismissed by him by his order dated December 4, 1987 (Anx. 8 ). His review petition was also dismissed by the Director General of Police by his order (Anx. 9 ). It has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that it is clear from a bare perusal of the charge sheet (Anx. 4) that it has been issued on the basis of the absence from duty on different dates, extra-ordinary leave had been granted in respect of each absence and it cannot, therefore, be said that the absence of the petitioner was wilful. He also contended that in view of the circular (Annexure 10) dated February 28, 1982 of the Director General of Police Rajasthan, Jaipur, no charge-sheet could be given on the ground of absence from duty for which leave was duly sanctioned, and for this reason no reply has been filed by any respondent. The learned Assistant Government Advocate tried his best to support the orders (Anxs. 6, 8 and 9) No. respondent has filed reply to the writ petition. Admittedly, it is mentioned in the charge sheet itself that E. O. L. (Extra-ordinary leave) has been granted in respect of each absence much prior to the issuance of the charge-sheet. It has also been specifically stated so in the writ petition. As already mentioned above, reply, to the writ petition has not been filed by any respon-dent. During arguments, this fact was not disputed. The granting of leave, of whatever nature it may be, amounts to considering the absence as justified or at any rate the condonation and regularisation of the absence. After such regula-risation and condonation, no disciplinary action lies. It was open to the Superintendent of police Banswara (Respondent No. 2) to have refused to grant leave to the petitioners. When once leave has been granted, it cannot be said that the petitioner had absented himself from duty and thereby made himself liable for punishment. The very purpose of granting leave was to regularise the petitioner's absence. Thereafter it was not open to him to initiate any disciplinary action against the petitioner for his absence from duty. The Director General of Police, Rajasthan, Jaipur issued circular order (Anx. 10) as early as on February 28, 1982. It would be best to quote it here in extenso. It runs as under: -
(3.) ...[VERNACULAR TEXT OMITTED]... It is binding on all officers of the police department of Rajasthan Reference of Navnit Lal v. Income Tax Appellate Commissioner, may be made here. If the respondent No. 2 would have complied with it he would not have served the charge-sheet (Anx. 4) upon the petitioner. The order (Anx. 8) of the Deputy Inspector General of police. Udaipur Range, Udaipur date December 4, 1987, dismissing the appeal of the petitioner does not contain any reason. It has not at all discussed any point raised by the petitioner in his lengthy memo of appeal (Anx. 7 ). It is not a speaking order. It has been observed in V. B. Sarraf v. New Education, Institute, (2) of follows:- " 17. The above decision referred to in the case of Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. V. Union of India, (1966) 1 SC 466 : (AIR 1966 SC 671) : where it has been observed that the practice of the executive authority dismissing prejudice the rights of the aggrieved party without giving reasons is a negation of rule of law. Similar observations have been made in the case of Mahabir Jute Mill vs. Shibbon Lal, AIR 1975 SC 2057 at p. 2060. The same view was also reiferated in Siemen Engineering & Manufacturing Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1976 SC 1985 and Bachhan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 1355 at p. 1958, paras 18, 19 and it was observed that where an authority made an order in exercise of a quasi-judicial function it must record its reason in support of the order it made. Similar view was expressed by this Court in the case, of Rangnath v. Daulat Rao, (1975) 1 SCC 686 at p. 690, para 7; (AIR 1975 SC 2146 at p. 2149), Every quasi-judicial order must be supported by reasons. This well settled principle will undoubtedly apply to orders made by a Court in disposing of writ applications. " Consequently, the writ petition is allowed with costs. The order (Anxs. 6, 8 and 9) are set aside The petitioner is re-instated back with all consequental benefits. . ;