DWARKA PRASAD, J. - (1.) THIS revision application has been filed against the order passed by the Judge, Small Causes Court, Jaipur City dated February 5, 1974 returning the plaint to the plaintiff under Order 7, Rule 10, C. P. C. for presentation to the proper Court.
(2.) A Firm of Ahmedabad, M/s. Ramesh and Company entrusted 5 bags of Sugan Vegetable to the defendant M/s. Jaipur Golden Transport Co. , Delhi for carriage from Ahmedabad to Jaipur. The goods were to be delivered from Jaipur to M/s Ramnath and Co. and Sohan Lal plaintiff is the sole proprietor of the consignee firm. A goods receipt, bearing No. D-350040, dated 14th Oct. 1971 was issued by the aforesaid Transport Company to the consignor M/s Ramesh and Co. It is alleged that the goods were not delivered to the consignee and as such the plaintiff filed a suit for the recovery of the price of the aforesaid goods against the transport company, in the court of the Judge, Small Causes, Jaipur City. One of the objections raised by the defendant transport company in its written statement was that according to the terms of carriage of goods in question, the suit could have been filed only in the Delhi court and the court at Jaipur had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The question about the jurisdiction of the Jaipur Court to entertain the suit was considered as preliminary issue and the learned Judge, Small Causes Court, Jaipur by his order dated February 5, 1974 accepted the contention of the defendant and came to the conclusion that he had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. It was held by the trial court that according to the condition of the goods receipt, given in respect of the booking of the goods in question, the parties to the agreement relating to the carriage of the goods, had agreed that in case of dispute the suit shall be filed in the Delhi Court alone. The trial court relied upon the decision of this court M/s Singhal Transport vs. M/s Jesa-Ram Jamumal, (1) in support of its aforesaid finding. Learned counsel for the petitioner has, in the first instance, argued that the goods receipt (Ex. 1) which was received by the consignee from the consignor did not contain any condition that the Delhi Court alone will have jurisdiction to decide any dispute with respect to the carriage of the goods is not binding on the plaintiff. In the second place, it was argued by the learned counsel that the condition should be prominently and specifically brought to the notice of the contracting party. If the conditions are many and lengthy, which included the clause relating to the jurisdiction as well, then the same would not be binding on the plaintiff, as this fact was not specifically brought to his notice that the Delhi Court alone had jurisdiction to deal with the dispute. So far as the first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is concerned, the parties have led evidence and defendant's evidence is that two copies of the goods receipt were given to the consignor and on the first copy meant for the consignee it was printed that the consignment of goods was accepted and booked on the terms and conditions printed overleaf and that the liability of the transport company stood limited by the agreement. On the back of the goods receipt, are the terms and conditions, of which condition No. 17 runs as under ;- "the Court in Delhi City alone shall have jurisdiction in respect of all claims and matters arising under the consignment or of the goods entrusted for transport. " According to the defendant two copies of the goods receipt were given to the consignor, at the time of acceptance of the consignment, by the transport company and the first copy which is marked "consignee Copy" was the only negotiable document as the goods receipt. The other copy was specifically marked "copy for consignor's record" and it was also stated on the face there of that the said copy was not negotiable. The plaintiff has stated that he has received only the second copy from the consignor and he has disclaimed any knowledge as to whether the consignor had given both the copies or not. Moreover the consignor was not produced in evidence. In view of such state of evidence, it must be accepted, as was done by the trial court, that the defendant transport company gave both the copies of the goods receipt to the consignor, including the consignee's copy, on the back of which are printed the terms and conditions for the carriage of the consignment. The contracting parties in respect of the carriage of goods, were the consignor and the transport company and the consignee was bound by the terms and conditions which were entered into between the consignor and the defendant transport company. If one of the terms and conditions for carriage of the goods was that in case of dispute about the goods or the carriage there of, the Court at Delhi alone will have jurisdiction,then it could be held that the parties by their violaton restricted the jurisdiction to the Courts in Delhi City. It is not in dispute that the Delhi Court had jurisdiction in the present case. But the Jaipur Court could also have jurisdiction to entertain the suit, as the goods were to be delivered at Jaipur, but for the condition No. 17 contained on the back of the goods receipt. It is settled law now that when a contract for carriage of goods is entered into and the transport company accepts the carriage of consignment on the terms and conditions printed on the back of the goods receipt and it also printed on the face of the goods receipt that the terms and conditions printed overleaf shall be binding on the parties and the consignment was accepted and booked on those terms and conditions, then the consignor is bound by such conditions whether he cares to read them or not and whether he signs the goods receipt or not. The issue of goods receipt is regarded as an offer by the transport company and if the consignor took the same after delivery of the goods to be carried to the transport company, and retained such goods receipt for the carriage of the consignment without any objection, then this act on the part of the consignor amounts to acceptance of the offer made by the transport company regarding the carriage on the goods. When the consignor accepts the goods by the transport company then it must be understood that he is bound by the terms and conditions which are printed on the goods receipt or on the back thereof. In England, the law on the subject as laid down by Mellish L. J. in Parker vs. South Eastern Railway Company, (2) as early in the year 1877 has since then being followed name!y,that the customer is bound by the conditions Contained in the ticket or the receipt subject to the proviso that either he knew all the conditions or that the company or the defendant had done what was reasonably necessary to draw the attention of the customer to such conditions. If it is found that the customer knew all the conditions or that the company did what was reasonably sufficient to give notice of the conditions printed on the back of the ticket to the person taking the ticket or the receipt then such person would be bound by the conditions. The dictum of Mellish L. J. in Parker V. South Eastern Railway Company (Supra) was: " (1) did the passenger know that there was printing on the Railway ticket ? (2) did he know that the ticket contained or referred to conditions ? and (3) did the company do what was reasonable in the way of notifying prospective passengers of the existence of conditions" the same principle was followed in Hood V. Anchor Line (3) where Lord Dunedin made the following observations- " Accordingly it is in each case a question of circumstance whether the sort of restriction that is expressed in only writing (which of" course includes printed matter) is a thing that is usual, and whether, being usual, it has been fairly brought before the notice of the accepting party". The aforesaid principle, laid down in the English cases, was followed by Hon-'ble Jagat Narayan J. , as he then was, in M/s Singhal Transport V. Jessaram, Jemmumal (supra) 1 am in respectfully agreement with the view taken in M/s Singhal Transport's case. In Thornton V. Shoe Lane Parking Limited (4) Lord Denning again applied the dictum of Mellish L. J. in Parker V. Southern Eastern Railway Company (supra) subject to the qualification that where a condition was exceptionally wide and destructive of the plaintiff's right or was one which was not usually applied in that class of contracts then it was not sufficient to show that the plaintiff had been given notice that the ticket was issued subject to the condition but it must also be shown that adequate steps had been taken to draw his attention in the most explicity way to the particular exempting condition relied on the defendant. Thus a distinction has been made in Thornton's case (supra), by the Lord Denning in the ordinary regulatory conditions, which are found in that class of contracts. If those conditions which are exceptionally wide and destructive of plaintiff's right and which exempts the defendant from ail liability or risk. In that case, the condition was completely destructive of the plaintiff's right in as much as it exempted the defendant not only from the liability or of damage to the car parked, but also from any injury to a customer or any other person occurring when the customer's motor vehicle is in the parking building. Thus, the exempting condition may be treated as an exception to the general rule enunciated by Mellish L. J. namely, that the plaintiff would be bound by the conditions written or printed on the ticket or the receipt, if it was shown that he knew about it or that the defendant had done all what was reasonably necessary to draw his attention to such condition. In the present case, I am not concerned with any exceptionally wide or exempting condition which may be destructive of the plaintiff's right nor such type of conditions are usual in the class of contract relating to the cariage of goods and as such the present case cannot be brought with in exception carved out by Lord Denning in Thornton's case. (Supra)The condition contained on the back of the goods receipt in the present case is of ordinary regulatory type by which the parties agreed to restrict forum for the decision of dispute relating to the consignment of the goods carried by transport company to one of the places where the courts have jurisdiction to entertain suits about Such disputes. As it has been printed on the the goods receipt that the consignment was accepted and booked subject to the terms and conditions primed overleaf and the condition No. 17 printed on the back of the goods receipt specifically mentions that the courts in Delhi city alone will have jurisdiction in respect of all claims and matters arising in respect of the consignment of the goods entrusted for transport, in my view the transport company had done all what was reasonably necessary for it to draw the attention of the consignor to the aforesaid condition. In view of that has been stated above, I find no force in this revision and the same is dismissed. The parties are left to bear their own costs. .;