G. M. LODHA, J. - (1.) RESPONDENT Ganpat Singh Bhandari who was Vice Principal of M. L. V. Government College, Bhilwara was retired under Rule 244 (2) of the Rajasthan Service Rules, hereinafter called as 'the Rules', by the State Government by order dated 13/14th November, 1975 on his attaining the age of fifty years. The respondent challenged this order by an appeal before the Rajasthan Civil Services Tribunal, Jaipur hereinafter called as 'the Tribunal' under the Rajasthan Civil Services (Service matters appellate Tribunal) Act, 1976, hereinafter called as 'the Act' by memorandum of appeal dated 26-8 76 (Annexure B ). The petitioner took preliminary objection in its reply Annexure C challenging the Tribunal's jurisdiction to hear an appeal against the order of retirement under Rule 244 (2) of the Rules.
(2.) THE Tribunal heard this objection at length because the same objection was raised in number of other cases pending before the Tribunal and which related 1o the authority and jurisdiction of the Tribunal under the Act to decide the matter relating to retirement under order 244 (2) of the Rules which is known in common parlance as compulsory retirement. THE Tribunal after hearing this case at length over-ruled the objection of the State on 17-2-1977 by a detailed judgment. THEre was a difference of opinion between the members of the Tribunal. Shri S. N. Deedwania and Shri P. K. B. Kurup constituting the majority came to the conclusion that such an order of compulsory retirement can be challenged as it is a service matter within the definition given in the Act of 1976. THE relevant part of their judgment is as under: "we are, therefore, of the opinion that when an order of retirement against a Government servant is made under rule 244 (2) of the RSR some of the grounds on which the aggrieved Civil Servant can challenge such an order are as follows: 1. That the requisite opinion has not been formed that the efficiency of the civil servant or the Government servant is impaired. 2. That the decision is based on collateral grounds 3.That it is arbitary or mala fide decision. 4. That the order is not made by the prescribed authority. 5. That the government servant or the civil servant has neither completed the qualifying service of 20 years nor has attained the age of 50 years. THE above grounds have been mentioned only by way of illustration and try by no means exhaustive. An order under Rule 244 (2) in our opinion can be challeged before the Tribunal when it has been made in accordance with the conditions mentioned in the rule, and the procedure laid down by the Government. Such an order would definitely deny or vary the service conditions to the disacvantage of a Government Servant otherwise than as a penalty. " Shri K. D. Bhargava, the thrid member of the Tribunal gave a decision of dissent and accepted the objection of the State by holding that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal against the order issued under Rule 244 (2) of the Rules. The operative portion of the judgment of third Member Shri Bhargava is as under: "what I have mentioned above is in relation to the interpretation of sub-clause (v) of section 2 (f) of the Act. I am of the opinion that under that sub-clause, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal against the order issued under 244 (2) of the R. S. R. is overruled. " Since the majority was of the opinion that the Tribunal can entertain appeal against an order under Rule 244 (2) of the Rules, the preliminary objection was over ruled. The operative part of the impugned judgment is as under: "as per the decision of the majority of the members present and hearing the matter, the decision of the Tribunal is that the preliminary objection taken by the respondent, that the tribunal has no jurisdiction to hear the appeal against the order passed under rule 244 (2) of R. S. R. " The State of Rajasthan being seriously aggrieved by the rejection of its preliminary objection and entertainment of the appeal against the order of compulsory retirement of the respondent No. 1 has submitted this writ petition. The contention raised in the memorandum of writ application as such, are as follows: (a) "an order retiring the Government Servant under Rule 244 (2) of Rajasthan Service Rules is an exercise of absolute right of the State to retire the Government Servant on his completion of his qualifying service or attaining the age of 50 years. There is no right of Government Servant to hold an office after completion of the aforesaid period. Consequently, no question of variance or denial of any service condition to the disadvantage of Government Servant by an order is involved in it; (b) An order of compulsory retirement cannot be said to be a variance of any service conditionand consequently, it is not covered by section 2 (f) of the Act as it would not involve any loss of benefit already earned; (c) The Tribunal committed a clear error in not appreciating that the legislature deliberately not used the term 'compulsory retirement' in the Act; (d) The Tribunal did not appreciate and committed an error in rejecting the argument that the definition of 'service matter' as used in the Act, is restrictive as it uses 'service matter' "means" and "not means and includes". The expression "means" used by defining the "service matter" is clear indication of the legislative intent that the deffition has to be strictly restricted to the words which have been used in the section and to give a wider import to the definition by extending the means of these words and the words 'other service conditions' used in section 2 (f) (v) would be doing violence to the language itself; (e) That the words 'other service condition' at used in section 3 (f) (v) should have been interpreted by the rule of 'ejusdem geneis. "
(3.) THE ordinary meaning of the word 'other service conditions' in the context in which it has been used would not include the manner relating to the compulsory retirement. However when the writ petition was argued before this Court the ground which were taken in the writ application and which have been reproduced above, were not adhered to. Mr. Rastogi, the learned Advocate General, concentrated his arguments on two points only. His first contention was that the words "other service conditions" as used in Sec. 2 (f) (v) is to be interpreted by the rule of "ejusdem generis" and as the words used before the phrase 'any other service condition are 'pay allowance and pension', any other service conditions' which can be included in clause (j) should relate to pay allowance and pension or analogous matters only and not to compulsory retirement. This argument of Mr. Rastogi is similar to the one raised before the Tribunal. In P. Radha Krishna Naidu vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh (1) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows: - "the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal Order, 1975 confers power on the Tribunal to exercise jurisdiction with respect to appointment allotment or promotion conditions of service of such persons. It is open to a person who complains about an order of compulsory retirement to approach the Tribunal in a given case. " Mr. Rastogi tried to distinguish the above observations of the Supreme Court by saying that the argument of "ejusdem generis" was not made and considered by the Supreme Court because before the Supreme Court, the Andhra Pradesh law was under consideration where the word used were with respect to a phrase which is missing in Rajasthan law. The second branch of argument of Mr. Rastogi distinguishing it is that the term 'appointment' used in the Andhra Pradesh law includes the service condition of compulsory retirement also. It is contended that appointment is a comprehensive term and all service conditions commencing from the stage of appointment and ending till the stage of termination are included in it. I enquired from Mr. Rastogi if it was so, why the legislature used the phrase 'allotment, promotion' after 'appointment'. The learned Advocate General answered my query by saying that it was as a matter of abundant caution only otherwise the term 'appointment' included the service conditions regarding allotment and promotion also. I am not inclined to accept this submission for the simple reason that it is well established principle of interpretation of statutes that the legislature never uses a superfluous word. Every word is required to give appropriate meaning. If the term 'appointment' was so comprehensive as Mr. Rastogi wants this court to inter-prete, the Andhra Pradesh legislature would not have used the words 'allotment or promotion' after the phrase 'appointment', and before 'other conditions of service'. I am of the view that the term 'appointment' relates to the stage of appointment only and cannot be pressed to the stage of termination as the two stages have got different connotation, implications and meaning. ;