Modi, J. - (1.) THESE are cross revisions against the judgment of the Senior Sub Judge Ajmer in a suit for arrears of rent and ejectment.
(2.) RAM Kishore is the tenant and Mst. Bhanwari Bai is the landlord. The suit out of which the present revisions arise was based on an oral tenancy with respect to a shop and a 'kothri' (room) situate in Ghee Mandi, Ajmer. The plaintiff Bhanwari Bai's case was that defendant RAM Kishore had sub-let the shop to Hanumanprasad and Prahlad who were running a ration shop, and sub-let the Kothri to one Shankerlal, and that both these sub-lettings had been done sometime in 1951 without the consent of the plaintiff The plaintiff therefore filed the present suit for arrears of rent and ejectment on the 9th September, 952. It may be stated at once that there is no dispute about the arrears of rent at this stage, and therefore, it is unnecessary to state the contentions of the Parties in hat connection. The defendant contended that the he had not sub-let either the shop or the Kothri at all, and, therefore, the Plaintiff's suit for ejectment deserved to be dismissed. The trial court held that sub-letting was not proved and in that view dismissed the suit for ejectment. Bhanwari Bai went in appeal to the Senior Sub Judge Aimer who held that it had been proved satisfactorily that the shop had been sub-let by the defen-dant to Hanumanprasad and Prahalad. The lower appellate court, therefore, decreed the plaintiff's suit for ejectment with respect to the shop. By some oversight, however that court failed to give any finding or pass any order as to the Kothri. This has led to the present cross-revisions. Revision No. 169 of 1956 has been filed by the defendant Ram Kishore, and his contention is that the court below has committed an error in decreeing the plaintiff's suit for ejectment from the suit shop. Revision No. 177 of 1956 has been filed by Mst Bhanwari Bai, and her contention is that the appellate court below should have ordered the ejectment of the defendant from the Kotri as well and not merely from the shop. I shall take up the defendant revision first. The contention of the defendant is that the lower appellate court fell into error in coming to the conclusion that the defendant had sub-let the shop as alleged by the plaintiff. Now, it is admitted even by the defendant that Hanumanprasad and Prahalad had been allowed by the defendant the use of the suit shop for about a year and a half It is also admitted that these persons were running a ration shop being licensed dealers' Obviously Hanumanparshad and Prahalad were businessmen. On these facts the lower appellate court came to the conclusion that the defendant Ram Kishore must have sub let the shop to Hanumanparshad and Prahalad and not allowed them to make use of the shop ex gratia or without charging any rent from them. On a careful consideration of all the facts and circumstances of the case. I do not feel disposed to hold that this conclu-sion of the court below calls for any interference. In the first place, it is a question of fact. In the second placet it does seem to me to be highly improbable that defendant should have allowed, at any rate, Prahalad who is no relation of his and was an utter stra-nger to him to have occupied the shop out of love. I, therefore, unhesitatingly concur in the finding of the learned Senior sub Judge that defendant Ram Kishore did sub-let the shop in question some time in 1951. This, however, does not conclude the matter and brings me to the legal aspect of the case which was strenuously raised before me on behalf of the defendant. The argument was put in this way. It was contended that according to the Delhi and Aimer Merwara Rent Control Act, 1947, (Act No. XIX of 1947) (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1947) which was in force at the time the sub-letting is said to have been made in the present case a sub-letting of the rented premises "in part" was not objectionable My attention has been inviced in this connection to clause (ii) of sub-sec. 1 (b) of sec. 9 of this Act and to clause (c) of the same sub-section and it is urged that there is apparent contradiction in these two parts of same sub-section, inasmuch as under clause b (ii) it is a sub-letting of the whole and not merely a part of the premises even after the commencement of the Act that is objectionable, though under clause (c) the subletting of a part of the premises would be sufficient for eviction after commencement of the Act. It was therefore submitted that the only proper way to harmonise these clauses would be to interpret clauses (l) (c) in such a way that a sub-Setting simpliciter of any part of the premises after the commencement of the Act was not objectionable under this clause, and that it really comes into play where a part having been sub-let already, a subsequent part happens to have been further sub-let after the commencement of Act of 1947. It was further contended in the same connection that although the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 (No. 38 of 1952) hereinafter called the Act of 1952 was in force at the time the present suit was brought on the 9th September 1952, and clause (c) (i) of the pro-viso to sec. 13 (i) (c) of the said Act seems to govern the case, that section should not be applied in such a way that what was permissible until that Act came into force became objectionable retrospectively after the coming into force of the Act. I now proceed to examine the contentions set out above. It is conceded at the bar that the question of interpretation of sec. 9 of the Act of 1947 is not covered by authority. The material portions of sec. 9 of the Act 1947 and sec. 13 of the Act of 1952 are in these terms: - Sec. 9 of the Act of 1947. (1) "notwithstanding anything contained in any contract, no court shall pass any decree in favour of a landlord. . . . evicting any tenant. . . . . . . . unless it is satisfied either - (b) that the tenant without the consent of the landlord has whether before or after the commencement of this Act, -. (ii) assigned, sublet, or otherwise parted with the possession of, the whole of the premises; or (c) that the tenant without the consent of the landlord has, after the commencement of this Act sublet any part of the premises. Sec. 13 of the Act of 1952. "notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or any contract, no decree or order for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be passed by any court in favour of the landlord against any tenant (including a tenant whose tenancy is terminated): Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to any suit or other proceeding for such recovery of possession if the court is satisfied (b) that the tenant without obtaining the consent of the landlord in writing has, after the commncement of this Act, - (i) sub-let, assigned or otherwise parted with the possession of the whole or any part of the premises; or (c) that the tenant, without obtaining the consent of the land-lord has, before the commencement of this Act, - (i) sub-let, assigned or otherwise parted with the possession of, the whole or any part of the premises; or Let us turn to sec. 9 of the Act of 1947 first. Clause (i) (b) of this section, having regard to its language, makes sub-letting of whole of the premises objectionable and enacts that as a ground for eviction, where such sub-letting has been made without the consent of the landlord, whether before or after the commencement of the Act. There fore it is contended by way of inference from the phraseology of this clause that a subletting of a part of the premises would not be within the mischief of this provision even though it is made after the commencement of the Act. Clause (i) (c), however, in very plain language provides that a sub-letting of even a part of the premises without the consent of the landlord would be objectionable after the commencement of the Act and would furnish an adequate ground for eviction of a tenant. It is argued, therefore, that the two clauses are mutually contradictory so far as the sub-letting of a part of the premises after the commencement of the Act of 1947 is concerned, and call for interpretation. Now it is a well established principle of the interpretation of statutes that whenever a court is called upon to interpret a provision or provisions contained in any statute it must put the natural and grammatical meaning on the words thereof, and, as a rule, and save in statute or subtract any word from it is not for the court to import any words into the statute or subtract any word from it in interpreting it. It is equally well established, however, that where different provisions of a statute call for interpretation owing to some ambiguity or inconsistency therein, then the Court should adopt or prefer the interpretation which harmonises the various provisions of the statute under interpretation rather than the one which may impair or destroy one or the other. (See Pakala Narayana Swami vs. Emperor (1), Shamrao vs. Parulekar (2), Raj Krishna Bose vs. Binod Kanungo (3 ). I have no doubt that if the clauses in question are interpreted in the manner sought by the defendant the result can only be that clause (l) (c) would appear to take back what clause (1) (b) may be said to give. But precisely for that reason such a interpretation does not commend itself to me. I have given this matter my careful and anxious consideration. It does appear to me, with respect, that the language of clause (b) of sec. 9 (1) is not felicitous, and that is why it has given rise to the difficulties that are being raised in the present case. It is suggested in this connection that the proper interpretation of clause (l) (c) would be to hold that that clause applies only to those cases in which a part of the premises is cobbler after the commencement of the Act, where the emailing part has been already sub-let before the Act came into force. Speaking for myself, I do not feel disposed to accept this as a satisfactory solution of the difficulty with which we are confronted in this case. Clause (1) (c) unmistakably provides for and governs a case of sub-letting any part of the premises where such sub-letting has taken place after the commencement of the Act, without more, and its language does not, and, in my judgment cannot bear the meaning which is sought to be impressed on it. Now the real intention of the framers of the Act in enacting clause (l) (b) in my view is this. This clause appears to have been designed to apply to sub-letting and the other things mentioned therein, irrespective of the consideration whether such subletting etc. occurred before or after the commencement of this Act. And it was, in this context, provided that the sub-letting of the whole of the premises or parting with the whole of them by assignment or otherwise would furnish a valid cause for eviction, whether such entire sub-letting etc. took place before or after the commencement of the Act. In other words where the entire premises, as contra distinguished from a part thereof, are sub-let by a tenant, no matter whether that is done before the commencement of the Act or after its commencement, that would be sufficient for ordering eviction. The emphasis in this clause is upon the expression "the whole of the premises" and the clause is really directed to this class of cases, and provides that where a tenant has parted with the possession of the whole of the premises whether by sub-letting or assignment or otherwise, that would constitute a vital breach of tenancy under the Act and the tenant would thereby make himself liable for eviction utterly irrespective of the consideration whether such a breach has taken place before the commencement of the Act under reference or after the commencement of it. Having so provided the framers of the Act then thought fit further to provide that so far as sub-letting after the commencement of this Act was concerned, even a sub-letting of a part of the premises would be enough to result in eviction. The emphasis in this clause is clearly on the expression "and part of the premises" occurring therein. In other words the net effect is that a sub-letting of a part of the premises if made before the commencement of the Act, would, so far as this Act goes, not afford any ground for the eviction of the tenant so sub-letting, and that any sub-letting to be sufficient for eviction if made before the commencement of the Act must have been of the entire premises and no less. This is what clause (l) (b) provides for, though with all respect in a somewhat unhappy way. With respect again,a good deal of needless confusion appears to me to have been occasioned because clause (l) (b) as it is worded also seems to provide for sub-letting even after the commencement of the Act and may be considered to that extent to be somewhat overlapping clause (l) (c) which plainly provides for sub-letting after the commencement of the Act. There is no gainsaying the position that under the last mentioned clause a subletting of "the whole of the premises" after the commencement of the Act would be a vital breach of the tenancy leading to the consequence of eviction for the simpler reason that even a part thereof leads to that very consequence. It was therefore entirely unnecessary for such a provision to be made in clause (l) (b), and it would have been simpler if this clause had been confined to sub-letting before the commencement of the Act and the consequences relating to it,and the provision contained in sub-clause (i) relating to improper use should have been made the subject-matter of a separate clause altogether. It may perhaps be further pointed out at this stage that clause (l) (b) seems to have been drafted to provide for all those contingencies, at one place, which were to lead to eviction, whether such contingencies occurred before the commencement of the Act or after its commencement) That is how it was provided in this effect in this clause that (1) the use of the premises for a purpose other than that for which they were let and (2) the assigning, sub-letting or otherwise parting with the whole of the premises would have the consequence of eviction; and the intention was to provide further that that must be so, no matter that all this took place before the commencement. It is in this sense that the expression "whether before or after the commencement of the Act" has been used in this clause, and not in the sense that it is only the subletting of the entire premises and not a part of it which would lead to eviction even if such part-subletting took place after the commencement of the Act. Any other interpretation of this clause would render clause (l) (c) completely nugatory which, let it be remembered, unequivocally provides that eviction can be ordered where the tenant has sub-let even a part of the premises after the commencement of this Act.
(3.) PUT in a nut-shell : my conclusion is that clause (1) (b) (ii) sec. 9 does not provide for or govern the case of a part sub-letting or for that matter a partial parting with of possession by another made after the commencement of the Act of 1947 at all; and it really deals with the case of sub-letting of the entire premises, or parting with the entire possession thereof by assignment or otherwise (but that is not material for our present purposes) whether before or after the commencement of the said Act; and my further conclusion is that it is only clause (l) (c) of this section which governs the case of partial sub-letting after the commencement of the Act. If this conclusion is correct, and the more I have thought of this, the more convinced I am that that is so, then there is no contradiction between the two clauses, and they can be read harmoniously the one without in any manner impinging upon the effect of the other. In this view of the matter the result at which I confidently arrive is that granting that the defendant had sub-let only a part of the premises rented to him, such subletting was a vital breach within the meaning of sec. 9 of the Act of 1947, liable to eviction and his eviction has been rightly decreed by the court below. This brings me to sec. 13 of the Act of 1952. This section so far as material, has already been quoted in full above and need not be repeated at this place. Clause (b) (1) of the proviso to the first sub-section makes sub-letting, among other things, objectionable, after the commencement of the Act, where such sub-letting has been made without obtaining the consent of the landlord in writing; whereas clause (c) (1) of the proviso makes a similar provision in relation to subletting etc. done before the commencement of the Act; and the one material difference in requirement is that whereas the consent of the landlord may have been oral before the commencement of the Act, it must be in writing after the commencement of the Act. It is important to note in this connection that both these clauses place sub-letting of the whole or any part of the premises on the same footing, in the sense that both are equally objectionable if they are made without the consent of the landlord though, as already pointed out, where the sub-letting has been made (among other things mentioned in these two clauses) after the commencement of the Act, the consent of the landlord must have been obtained in writing, while if such sub-letting has been made before the commencement of the Act, the consent of the landlord need not have been in writing. It is clear that if S. 13 applies to this case,a sub-letting of even a part of the premises in question would be sufficient for eviction. In the connection it may be pointed out that the Act of 1952 came into force on the 15th April, 1952, before the present suit was brought on the 9th June, 1952 and, therefore, would prima facie apply to the present case. I have already held above that on my interpretation of the clauses (b) and (c) of sec. 9 (1) of the Act of 1947, a sub-letting of a part of the premises was objectionable after the commencement of that Act. The same is the position in law according to the Act of 1952 having regard to the plain language of sec. 13 thereof and indeed this is not disputed. That being so, I am definitely of the opinion that the result is the same whether this case is held to be governed by clause (c) (i) of the proviso to sec. 13 (1) of the Act of 1952 or clause 9 (1) (c) of the Act of 1947 as I have interpreted it above. In this view of the matter the contention that the Act of 1952 should not be applied retrospectively to a sub-letting which when made was valid under the Act of 1947 is quite unsubstantially and needs no further consideration. As the legal position, so far as the present case goes, turns out to be the same under the Act of 1947 as it must be under the Act of 1952 no further question can possibly arise. The result of this discussion is that the defendant's revisions has no force and must be dismissed. I next turn to the plaintiff's revision. It cannot be disputed that the learned Senior Sub Judge completely lost sight of the plaintiff's case so far as the Kothri is concerned, and he has not mentioned a word in his judgment about that. The contention of the plaintiff is that the tenancy in respect of the shop and the Kothri was one and indivisible, and, therefore, the conclusion such as may be arrived at with respect to the shop cannot but apply to the case of the Kothri as well. I pause here to point out that at one stage, learned counsel for the plaintiff argued that this was a case of the sub-letting of the whole of the premises and not merely a part thereof. As the learned judge of the lower appellate court had not gone into this aspect of the case, it become necessary to go into evidence so far as the sub-letting of Kothri is concerned. I consider it sufficient to say in this connection thai on going into all the relevant record I find that the plaintiff has failed to establish satisfactorily that the Kothri was sublet to Shankerlal and, therefore, it cannot be said that the defendant had sublet the whole of the premises. The plaintiff's husband Ramchandra's statement on oath is counteracted by that of the defendant and there is no other proof. Be that as it may, the plaintiff's case as disclosed in the plaint clearly was that the tenancy of the defendant consisted of the shop and the Kothri, and that this was a single transaction. This case has not been controverted by the defendant. The result, therefore, must be that the plaintiff is not only entitled to recover possession of the shop but also of the Kothri, as I have found above, in concurrence with the court below that a subletting of the premises in part has been proved, and I have further held that such subletting was objectionable. ;