Modi, J. - (1.) THIS is a revision by the plaintiff Ramratan against the judgment of the Civil Judge, Bikaner, dismissing the plaintiff's suit for compensation, as a Small Cause Court.
(2.) THE facts of the case are short and simple. THE plaintiff's case is that on the 24th June, 1950, eighteen bags of Gur and two bags of Moong were on his behalf handed over to the Bikaner State Railway under invoice No. 103983 to be delivered at Deshnokh, and similarly on the 27th June, 1950, 121 bags of gawar were entrusted to the same Railway at Keshrisinghpur under invoice No. 105360 also to be delivered at Deshnokh. THE plaintiff's grievance is that out of the first consignment he received 37 seer of gur short of the total quantity consigned, and out of the second consignment he received a shortage of eight maunds and ten seers of gowar. Consequently, the plaintiff gave a notice to the Bikaner State Railway on the 10th July, 1950, apparently under sec. 77 of the Indian Railways Act, and he further gave a notice under sec. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the 3rd April, 1951. Learned counsel who drew up the plaint for the plaintiff thought that limitation for the suit commenced after the expiry of two months from the 3rd April, 1951, and consequently it was stated that the suit was within time as it was brought on the 17th December, 1951. This impression of the legal advisers of the plaintiff, in my opinion, was completely wrong. Be that as it may, the plaintiff claimed a total compensation of Rs. 147/- for the loss caused to him as also prayed for costs and pendente lite interest, and brought this suit against the Bikaner State Railway and the Union of India. The defendants resisted the suit. A number of pleas were raised; but it is unnecessary to refer to them as the learned trial Judge held that the suit was barred by time and threw out the plaintiff's suit on that ground alone. The plaintiff has now come up in revision to this Court. The sole question for determination in this revision is whether the plaintiff's suit has been rightly dismissed as barred by time. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that limitation for the suit really commenced from the 18th December, 1950, and the 19th December, 1950, being the dates of letters with respect to the suit consignments, which the petitioner received from some body who signed for the Traffic Manager, Bikaner State Railway, and wherein it was stated that the consignments had been booked at owner's risk under risk note form A, and, therefore, the claim for compensation was inadmissible. If this is the correct starting point for limitation, then undoubtedly the plaintiff's suit is within time. Now the relevant articles of the Limitation Act which fall to be considered to determine the question of limitation are Art. 30 and 31. According to learned counsel for the petitioner, the correct article to apply in this case is Art. 30 whereas learned counsel for the opposite parties submits that the proper Article applicable is Art. 31. These two articles read as follows: - "30. Against a carrier for compensation for losing or injuring goods. . . . . . One year When the loss or injury occurs 31. Against a carrier for compensation for non delivery of, or delay in delivering goods. . . . . One year When the goods ought to be delivered. Having carefully considered the rival contentions raised as regards the applicability of either Art. 30 or 31 to the facts and circumstances of the present case I have arrived at the conclusion that it is really unnecessary to determine that question for the purposes of the present revision, and, therefore, I do not propose to address myself to that task which has occasioned divergence of judicial opinion in the various High Courts. Assuming that Art. 30 governs this case, the question arises how the period of one year has to be computed for purposes of limitation. The starting point as provided under this Article is "when the loss or injury occurs". The correct view is that loss or injury referred to in this article means loss or injury by the carrier, and not the loss or injury to the consignor or the consignee. Time, therefore, begins to run when the carrier loses or injures the goods and not from the time when the consignor or the consignee suffers the loss. See Jugal Kishore vs. G. I. P. Railway Co. (1) and East India Railway vs. Gopilal Sharma (2 ). There is also authority for the view that ordinarily the burden of proving as to when the goods were lost or injured is on the carrier; and if the carrier fails to prove that the goods were lost more than one year before the institution of the suit, the claim would not be barred by limitation. Reference may be made in support of this view to Rivers Steam Navigation Co. vs. Bisweshwar Kundu (3) Firm Sitaram Bindraban vs. G. I. P. Railway (4) Seetharoma vs. Hyderabad State (5 ). The contention of learned counsel in the present case, therefore, is that the trial Judge had committed a mistake in throwing the burden of proving when the goods were lost on the plaintiff, and that that burden should have really been placed on the defendants. This contention appears to me to be not without force, and, therefore, I propose to look at the case from the correct stand point,that is,by placing the burden of proof on the defendants. The question which then arises is whether the defendants have proved as to when the goods in the present case were lost. In those cases where the totality of the goods consigned is lost, a certain amount of evidence would be necessary for the carrier to show when the goods were lost because that is a matter peculiarly within its knowledge. The present case, however is of a different type It is not a case where either the entire consignment was not or even any whole bag consigned was lost but what was really lost was a short quantity of goods out of the total number of bags which were delivered in the exact number in which the goods were consigned. Now, there is material on this record which has been produced by the plaintiff himself from which it appears that one of the consignments was delivered to him on the 5th July, 1950, and the other consignment was delivered on the 30th June, 1950. It is not difficult under such circumstances to hold that the part of goods which remained undelivered should also have been delivered to the plaintiff by the 30th June and the 5th July, 1950 respectively at the latest. See D. H. Rly, Co. vs. Jetmull Bhojraj (6 ). It also seems to me that the loss by the railway was certainly caused on the aforesaid dates, if not earlier. Limitation could, therefore, run in this case from the 5th July, 1950, at the latest. The plaintiff is also entitled under sec. 15 (2) of the limitation Act to two months' period prescribed for the notice under sec. 80 C. P. C. Limitation would thus extend upto 5th September, 1951. The suit, as already stated, was filed in this case on the 17th December, 1951, and was, therefore, barred by time. Learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously argued that he was entitled to all the time that had elapsed since he give the notice to the railway on the 10th July, 1950, under Sec. 77 of the Railways Act and upto the 18th or 19th December, 1950, when the latter informed the petitioner that his claim was inadmissible. Having given my careful consideration to this argument, I am unable to accept it. No law has been pointed out, nor do I know of any according to which the petitioner can further get the time between the 10th July, 1950, and the 18th December, 1950. Learned counsel faintly argued that the letters dated the 18th December, 1950, and the 19th December, 1950, amount to an acknowledgment by the Railway of the plaintiff's loss as claimed. I am, however, clearly of opinion that these letters, worded as they are, do not amount to any acknowledgment of liability whatsoever. The Railway did not admit liability therein, nor is there anything in them to show that they had asked the petitioner to stay his hands because they were making inquiry into the loss or anything of that sort. I, therefore, have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the petitioner is not entitled to the benefit of sec. 19 of the Limitation Act, nor is there any other section of the Limitation Act which helps him in this connection. The result, therefore, is that even though the burden of the issue of limitation is placed on the defendants, and the case is looked at from that angle on the material which is on the record, there is no escape from the conclusion that the present suit is barred by limitation, and I hold accordingly. It may farther be pointed out that the suit would equally be barred by limitation if Art. 31 is held to be applicable to it. One year's limitation provided under that Article starts from the point of time when the goods ought to be delivered. Now it is true that the question when the goods ought to be delivered in a case, where there is no fixed time for delivery, will be a question of fact dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case and will have to be established by evidence. No such trouble however really arises in the present case, because a very substantial part of the consignments was actually delivered to the petitioner on the 30th June and the 5th July, 1950. That being so, it would be idle to contend in the present case that there is no proof on the record to show when the goods should have been delivered by the carrier to the plaintiff. The correct principle applicable to a case like the present undoubtedly is that where bulk of the goods has been delivered, the date for the delivery of remaining goods should be taken to be when such bulk was actually delivered. Therefore, a suit filed more than one year after such date would be barred by limitation. The position in law, therefore, is that, from whichever points of view the case is looked at,the plaintiff's suit is barred by time,and in this view of the matter,i see no reason to interfere with the judgment of the trial court. The result is that this revision fails and is hereby dismissed but without any order as to costs. . ;