- (1.) THIS revision under section 230 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act has been filed against the order of the Collector, Ajmer dated 13 6 58 whereby it was held that inspite of the repeal of the Ajmer Tenancy and Land Records Act, 1950, the provisions contained in that Act regarding confirmation of proceedings shall continue to be governed by the provisions of the Act.
(2.) WE have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and have examined the record as well. Shri Kishanlal Lamror has argued before us that the Rajasthan Tenancy Act repealed the Ajmer Tenancy and Land Records Act. that sec. 206 of the Rajasthan Act is given retrospective effect, that according to this provision the cases that were pending before the confirming courts should be deemed to be converted into appeals and should be transferred to the courts competent to hear them and that the view taken by the learned Collector is therefore untenable. It has been replied by Shri Chitranjan Verma that the Ajmer Tenancy and Land Re* cords Act was not repealed by the Rajasthan Tenancy Act but by the Rajasthan Revenue Laws (Extension) Act. 1957 and hence sec. 206 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act can have no application to the present case. The question as to whether sec. 206 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act is applicable to the present case or not is not of much practical significance for the reason that shall be subsequently stated in this judgment. But as lengthy arguments were addressed to us on this point, we consider it necessary to examine it. The Ajmer Tenancy and Land Records Act was enforced in the former State of Ajmer in the year 1950 and remained in force till it was repealed by item No. 11 of the Second Schedule of the Rajasthan Revenue Laws (Extension) Act, 1957 (Act No. 2 of 1958 ). The Rajasthan Tenancy Act came into force on 15th September, 1955 and it extended to the whole State of Rajasthan which at that time did not include the areas included in the then existing State of Ajmer. So it cannot be held that the Rajasthan Tenancy Act came into force in the area of the former Ajmer State at the time of its enforcement. It was made applicable to that area by the provisions of the Rajasthan Revenue Laws (Extension) Act, 1957. This has been clarified by the preamble to the Act itself which runs as follows: - 'whereas, with a view to securing uniformity of revenue laws in the new State of Rajasthan as formed by sec. 10 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 (Central Act 37 of 1956?, it is expedient to provide for the extension to the Abu, Ajmer and Sunel areas of that State of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (Rajasthan Act 3 of 1955) and the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 (Rajasthan Act 15 of 1956) as in force in the pre-reorganisation State of Rajasthan and to make suitable modifications therein for that purpose and for other purposes hereinafter appearing; Be it enacted by the Rajasthan State Legislature in the Eighth Year of the Republic of India as follows)" Sec. 9 (3) of this Extension Act provides that the provisions of secs. 6 & 9 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955 shall apply to such repeal and supersession as may be brought about by this Act. The provisions of section 6 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act are also clear on the point. This Section may be reproduced as below: - "6. Effect of repeal.- Where this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not - (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed" It is of course open to the Legislature to give retrospective effect to a piece of legislation, but unless it is provided in the Act itself either expressly or impliedly every statute is to be given prospective application only. There is absolutely nothing in this Extension Act to suggests that any section of the Rajasthan Act, 1955 was to have retrospective effect in its application to the former State of Ajmer. For these reasons we are of the opinion that sec. 206 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act cannot be made applicable to the present case Even if it be assumed for a moment that sec. 206 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act is applicable to cases pending in Ajmer court when the Extension Act came into force the proposition for which there is no justification whatsoever- it would not be possible to agree with the interpretation put upon it by the learned counsel for the applicant. A confirmation proceeding pending before a court shall be deemed to be a confirmation proceeding only, though it by a legal fiction can be deemed to have commenced under the provisions of the Extension Act. But that legal fiction cannot be carried out further beyond that and it cannot be held that the confirmation proceeding should be converted into an appeal and should be heard and disposed of as such by a court competent to hear appeals against the decisions of the courts passing orders which form the subject matter of confirmation. This aspect of the case was examined by their Lordships of the Rajasthan High Court in Niroti vs. The Board of Revenue Rajasthan (D B. C Writ Petition No. 17 of 1956, decided on 11th September. 1956 ). In that case application under sec 7 of the Rajasthan (Protection of Tenancy) Ordinance was presented before an Anti Ejectment Officer and a revision against his decision was filed in the Board. During the pendency of the revision, the Rajasthan Tenancy Act came into force and the Board on the ground that under the Rajasthan Tenancy Act an appeal lay against the order of the trail court in a proceeding of that nature held that revision to be an appeal and transferred the same to the court of Commissioner for disposal. The learned Judges of the High Court held that this was not in accordance With the provisions of the Act and that the revision should be heard by the Board as a revision alone. The following extracts may be quoted in this connection from that judgment: - "it has been provided by sub-sec. (1) of sec. 206 that all suits, cases, appeals, applications, references and proceedings relating to matters dealt with in the Act and pending before a revenue court on the coming into force of the Act, should be deemed to have been commenced under the Act and should be tried, heard and determined in the manner prescribed by or under the Act. The argument which has found favour with the learned members of the Board is that when a revision being a continuation of the suit was pending at the time of the coming into operation of the Act, it (the suit) could be considered to have been commenced under the Act and as a decision of the first court is appealable under the Act, the pending revision should be regarded as an appeal under the Act, which could be heard and decided by the court of an Additional Commissioner by sec. 206 (1) of the Act. " "it may be pointed out that the language of sec. 206 (1) is very clear and it cannot be read in such wide terms as has been done by the learned members of the Board. According to sec. 206 (1), the revision which was pending before the Revenue Board on the date the Act came into force, has to be deemed to have been commenced under the Act and is to be heard and determined in the manner prescribed by or under it. By sec. 230 of the Act the revisional jurisdiction has been vested only in the Board and consequently the revision petition which was pending could be heard and decided only by the Board and the court of the Additional Commissioner had no jurisdiction to decide it. Though the authority vested in the Board under S. 10 (2) of the Ordinance was much wider than the authority which the Board is competent to exercise under sec. 230, yet the effect of sec. 230 read with sec. 206 appears to be that the revisional powers which the Board enjoyed under sec. 10 (2) of the Ordinance have been curtailed and after the passing of the Act the Board can only act in revision as provided under sec. 230 of the Act. The learned members of the Board, however, took a different view ad construed the revision that was pending before them as an appeal from an order under sec. 230 of the Act. How far this line of approach is in accordance with law, is the main question at issue before us. Every piece of legislation has to be considered to be ordinarily prospective, unless otherwise expressly or by necessary implication provided in the Act. In the Act there is no express or implied provision by which a right of appeal under sec. 225 might be considered to have been conferred retrospectively from orders and decisions under the laws thereby repealed, and, when no appeal lay from the order under sec. 7 of the Ordinance, a revision under sec. 10 (2) could not be regarded as a pending appeal so as to change the character of an order under sec. 7 from being final to one subject to an appeal. The concept of treating a revision as continuation of the proceedings in suit could not be made basis for turning a final order into a non-final one. According to sec. 206, all suits, cases, appeals, applications references and proceedings relating to matters dealt with in the Act and pending before the revenue court on the date of the coming into force of the Act, have to be deemed to have been commenced under the Act as suits, cases, appeals, applications, references and proceedings respectively and they have to be tried, heard and determined in the manner prescribed by or under the Act. What was pending before the Board at the time the Act came into force, was a revision and sec. 206, therefore, covered the revision alone and not the proceedings that had terminated in the first court. " The learned counsel for the applicant has cited some decisions of the Board reported in 1956 R. R. D. 10 and 191. In view of the authoritative pronouncement of Rajasthan High Court on the point of law involved in the case these rulings of the Board cannot be regarded as good law now. We, therefore, come to the conclusion that the decision of the learned Collector Ajmer is correct and calls for no interference. The revision is hereby rejected. . ;