- (1.) THIS is a Civil Second Appeal by the plaintiff against the judgment of the District Judge of Baran dated the 18th of January 1950 by which a decree passed by the court of the Civil Judge, Baran, of the 15th of November 1949 was set aside and the suit of the plaintiff was dismissed. Bhanwerlal, who is the appellant before this Court, filed a suit against Lila Dhar on the 21st of July 1949 with the allegations that he pledged with the defendant certain gold ornaments weighing 15-1/2 Tolas for a sum of Rs. 275/- on the 8th of June 1926, stipulating the rate of interest at one rupee per cent per month. It was further pleaded that the plaintiff served a notice on the defendant on the 16th of July 1947 asking him to redeem the pledge of ornaments and on failure of the defendant to respond to the notice of the plaintiff, the plaintiff filed the present suit. The defendant Liladhar admitted the pledge of gold ornaments, as stated by the plaintiff, but resisted the claim on the basis of the law of limitation of Kota State, and also for the reason that the plaintiff had, by agreement on the 1st of November 1929, corresponding to Kartik Badi Amawas, Svt. year 1986, relinquished his claim for redemption of his ornaments. The first court decided the question of limitation in favour of the plaintiff and rejected the plea of the defendant regarding relinquishment by the plaintiff of his claim to redeem the ornaments. The learned Civil Judge also held that the weight of gold of the said ornaments was 15-1/4 and not 15-1/2 tolas, as alleged by the plaintiff in his plaint. He, therefore, passed a decree for redemption of gold ornaments weighing 15-1/4 tolas on payment of the principal amount alongwith interest. The defendant went in appeal to the court of the District Judge, who dismissed the suit holding that the claim was barred by the law of limitation of Kota State. In this appeal, the plaintiff claims that the law of limitation applicable to the present suit is contained in Article 145 of the Indian Limitation Act, and the suit is within time with reference to that provision of law. Sec. 1 of the law styled 'miad Sama't appears at Page 3, in a book published under orders of Mahakma Alia Khas, Kota State, in the year, 1931. The said Hidayat was printed in the Kota Printing Press and bears a crest of the Kota State on its title page. It purports to contain the laws that stood unrepealed upto the 30th of September 1930. Sec. 1, Item 5 of the law of Mia'd Sama't of Kota State, if translated into English, shall run as follows : - (1) Pledge of movable property, (2) 12 years. (3) From the date of pledge.
(2.) THE learned counsel of the appellant concedes that if the law as contained in Hidayat Gair Munsukhshuda, Sigha Dewani of Kota State, printed and published in 1931 applies to this case, this| suit would be barred by limitation but his contention is that the provision of law contained in Hidayat Ghair Mansukhshuda Sigha Dewani, 1931, is not the law that was in force in Kota State at any time. THE argument of the learned counsel is that as it is not stated in the Hidayat Ghair Mansukhshuda, Sigha Dewani of 1931, with reference to the provision of law relating to limitation that it received the approval of His Highness of Kota, who was the legislative authority for Kota State at that time, the said publication of Hidayat Ghair Mansukhshuda, Sigha Dewani, cannot be accepted to contain the law of Kota State on the point of limitation. He has cited the decisions of this Court in Somnathmal vs. State of Rajasthan (1), State vs. Govind Singh (2) and Baboolal vs. Nathmal (3 ). The case came up before one of us sitting singly and was referred to a Division Bench by order dated the 4th of February 1958 as important questions of law were involved in it. During the pendency of this appeal, by an order of this Court dated the 13th of September, 1956, the District Judge was asked to send for the original order of His Highness of Kota promulgating the law of limitation prior to December 1942. In response to the communication of this Court, the District Judge returned the reply that the original legislative records of the Kota State were not available at Kota as they had been sent to the records of the Legislative Assembly of the State. He, however, sent a copy of the Hidayat Ghair Mansukhshuda Sigha Dewani, referred to above. The office of the Legislative Assembly was then asked to supply the necessary documents to this Court on the subject. After a prolonged correspondence, the said record could not be traced. The original records by which the law of limitation prior to year 1942, was made in Kota State, could not be made available for the use of this Court in this case. We have, therefore, to decide this appeal on the record and the documents that are before us. Sec. 13 of the Indian Evidence Act provides, as follows: - "the Court shall presume the genuineness of every book purporting to be printed or published under the authority of Government of any country, and to contain any of the laws of that country. . . . . " By virtue of sec. 84, the publication of Hidayat Ghair Mansukhshuda, Sigha Dewani, which purports to have been published under the authority of Mahakma Alia Khas of Kota State shall be presumed to be genuine. The said publication also bears the coat of arms of the State of Kota on its title page. It is not disputed that the said publication is not genuine. The question for determination before this Court is relating to the law that was in force in Kota State before the year 1942 on the point of limitation. The statement of that law contained in Hidayat Ghair Mansukhshuda Sigha Dewani purporting to be printed or published under the authority of the Government of His Highness Kota and to contain such law, is relevant under sec. 38 of the Indian Evidence Act, which provides, as follows: - "when the Court has to form an opinion as to a law of any country, any statement of such law contained in a book purporting to be printed or published under the authority of the Government of such country and to contain any such law,. . . is relevant. " It would be evident with reference to sec. 38, that the provision of law contained in Hidayat Ghair Mansukhshuda Sigha Dewani can be made use of for purposes of determination of the question regarding the state of the law of limitation in Kota State before the year 1942. The original records could not be traced and are not forthcoming. We shall, therefore, pronounce our judgment on the basis of the publication referred to above. The appellant has not been able to show that the provision of law appearing in Hidayat Ghair Mansukhuda, was not approved by His Highness of Kota at the time. The only argument that has been advanced against the provision of limitation contained in Hidayat Ghair Mansukhshuda, is that it does not contain any reference to the order of His Highness of Kota, who was the legislative authority at the time. It is true that no such reference is given in the provision of the law of limitation appearing in the Hidayat Ghair Mansukhshuda, but this alone cannot justify the inference that the law published under the authority of His Highness of Kota in Hidayat Ghair Mansukhshuda did not receive His Highness' approval. The presumption is in favour of the validity of the provision of law as stated in Hidayat Ghair Mansukhshuda that, purports to have been issued under the authority of His Highness of Kota, who was also the legislative authority for the Kota State. The authorities that have been cited by the learned counsel of the appellant are distinguishable on the ground that in those cases the laws that were held invalid were not published or approved by the sovereign of the State, who was the legislative authority. In the present case, as has been discussed above, Hidayat Ghair Mansukh shuda purports to have been published under the authority of Mahakma Alia Khas. The conclusion at which we arrive is that the provision of the law of limitation contained in Hidayat Ghair Mansukhshuda, at Page 3, was the law in force in Kota State, before the year 1942. The suit of the plaintiff in the present case became time barred by lapse of a period of 12 years before the Indian Limitation Act was applied to the Kota State under the orders of His Highness of Kota by publication in Kota State gazette of the first of first January, 1943, which came into force from the 1st of February. 1943. We may also refer to sec. 9 of the Hidayat Babat Miad Sama't published in the gazette of the 1st of January 1943, which provides for repeal of the law of limitation contained in Hidayat Gair Mansukhshuda, Sigha Dewani, which is none else than the publication referred to above. This further supports the conclusion at which we have arrived above. The suit of the plaintiff, in view of the aforesaid discussion, has rightly been held to be time barred by the lower court. The appeal fails and it is dismissed with costs. .;